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Abstract 
 
European Airline Performance: A Data Envelopment Analysis with 
Extrapolations Based on Model Outputs 
 
 
 
Martin Phillips 
 
 
 
Airlines are notoriously difficult to run successfully.  In the 40 years to 2010 the 
airline industry generated a cumulative profit margin of only 0.1 per cent. Airlines are 
complex and heavily regulated entities which makes like for like comparisons difficult. 
This makes the identification of ‘best practice’ challenging and as a result airlines, while 
performing the same basic function, do so very differently. This study set out to identify 
the best performing airlines in Europe in an attempt to rank airlines in terms of company 
performance. 
Previous empirical work in this area was reviewed and Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) was identified as a suitable performance measurement and ranking technique. 
The analysis was further developed through the application of sensitivity analyses and 
robustness measurement methodologies. 
 This study identifies Ryanair as one of Europe’s most efficient airlines and KLM as 
one of Europe’s least efficient airlines. As a result of further analysis various financial, 
operational and strategic elements of airlines were selected for further investigation. 
This in turn led to the identification of various ‘best practices’ and exemplars that 
poorer performing airlines may wish to emulate. 
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1.1 Introduction 
Profit has always been elusive for the airline industry. In the 40 years to 2010 the 
airline industry generated over $12,000 billion of revenue in today’s prices but a total of 
only $19 billion of net post tax profit, a margin of only 0.1 per cent (Akbar, Nemeth & 
Niemeier, 2014). Despite this historic elusiveness of profit the future for the air 
transport industry looks bright. Growth is predicted to continue at 4.7 per cent until 
2028 resulting in global airlines carrying 5.7 billion passengers (O’Connell, 2011). 
However, as a result of ongoing deregulation in the worldwide aviation industry 
competition for these passengers is fiercer than ever and airlines need to look for ways 
to maximise profits. Consequently it is those airlines that develop and implement 
strategies to manage costs, improve productivity and deliver a product for which 
customers are willing to pay a compensatory price that will ultimately survive and 
prosper into the future (Belobaba, 2011). Simply put, in order to compete airlines must 
“do more with less” and grow the top line while holding the costs down (Coby, 2011). 
This research sets about examining European airlines in an attempt to not only identify 
those airlines that are embracing the necessary productivity, but to also identify areas or 
characteristics of commonality across the best performers. These characteristics may 
then be suitable for emulation by poorer performing airlines in an attempt to improve 
productivity. 
1.2 Evolution of the Aviation Industry 
The world’s first heavier than air flight took place in Yorkshire, England in 1804. 
The designer and builder of the craft was George Cayley. Cayley was an engineer who 
had originally drawn up plans for the aircraft five years previously. The craft was basic 
in the extreme and was essentially a glider with no control surfaces. Control was by 
means of shifting weight and thus the centre of gravity of the aircraft (Ackroyd, 2011). 
Cayley continued to develop aircraft and in 1849 built a biplane in which it is generally 
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accepted a young child accompanied him during a flight thus becoming the world’s first 
passenger in a heavier than air aircraft. The issues surrounding in-flight control 
presented quite a challenge for early aeronautical engineers. Up until this point Cayleys 
success had come about as a result of studying the aerodynamics of birds in flight and it 
was still not determined whether or not in flight control could be achieved without 
wings that flap. 
Otto Lilienthal was a Prussian engineer who was born in 1848, a year before the 
world’s first aircraft passenger took flight. Like Cayley, Lilienthal was fascinated by 
manned flight and also looked to birds for inspiration. Lilienthal flew his first glider in 
1891. In total he made over 2000 flights in various gliders some of which covered 
distances of up to 25 meters. Control of Lilienthals craft was also by means of weight 
shifting and as with previous gliders, this method only allowed for minimal control. In 
order to help with maneuverability on landing Lilienthal developed a hinged tailplane 
that could be manipulated in flight. This is accepted as the first control surface used in 
flight and ultimately led to the elevators, ailerons and rudders seen in modern aircraft 
(Lukasch, 2003). As a result of this simple addition Otto Lilienthal became the first 
person to successfully control a heavier than air craft in flight. Lilienthal’s contribution 
to aerodynamics was enormous (Berlins Tegel Airport is named in his honour) and the 
work of both he and George Cayley was instrumental in the world’s first powered 
controlled flight at Kittyhawk Hill, North Carolina in 1903. 
In 1899 in response to the request for information on designing and building 
aircraft, the Smithsonian Institution forwarded the research and design notes of both 
George Cayley and Otto Lilienthal among others to Wilbur Wright of Dayton, Ohio. 
Wilbur and his brother Orville were bicycle manufacturers and publishers, both of 
whom had an interest in engineering. Although they lacked formal education (both men 
dropped out of high school) they were both talented engineers who started their first 
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business with a printing press that they had designed and built themselves. Their interest 
in aviation is credited to a toy helicopter bought for them by their father in 1878 
(Crouch, 2003).  
The Wright brothers differed from previous fliers in that they conducted 
experimental research, even going so far as to build their own wind tunnel. This 
approach alongside witnessing the untimely demise of many of their predecessors 
convinced them that the secret to successful flight lay in an adequate control system. 
Just like Lilienthal before them, the Wrights turned to nature and observed birds in 
flight in an effort to understand in flight control. They observed that birds can change 
the shape of their wings in order to affect turns and set about replicating this capability 
in their own flying machines. They achieved this by means of a technique known as 
wing warping. By “twisting” one wing, extra lift could be produced on that side of the 
aircraft resulting in banking and thus turning in the required direction. Wing warping 
along with a vertical stabilizer, the idea for which they got from shipbuilding, gave the 
Wright brothers the in flight control they sought. 
The Wright brothers employed several engine shops all of whom were unable to 
produce an engine not only of sufficient power, but light enough for sustained flight. 
Ultimately, an engine was designed and built by their in-house mechanic. This 
“Wright/Taylor” engine was the world’s first practical aeronautical power plant. It was 
extremely innovative having been cast from aluminum in order to save weight and fitted 
with a fuel injection system. Earlier attempts to produce an aero engine by George 
Cayley had resulted in a gunpowder fuelled engine whose ignition source was a candle. 
In a culmination of over a century of experimentation and development and at the cost 
of many lives, the Wright brothers found themselves standing at Kittyhawk Ohio on the 
17
th
 December 1903. Orville took the controls of their aircraft, the Wright Flyer 1 and at 
10:35am became the pilot of the world’s first powered and controlled flight in a heavier 
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than air aircraft. The flight lasted 12 seconds and covered a distance of 37 meters. Over 
the following 90 minutes the brothers made three further flights, the greatest of which 
lasted 59 seconds and covered a distance of just under 260 meters (Collins, 1999). 
Over the next three years the brothers continued to develop their flying machines but 
made relatively minor advances. During 1906 and 1907 the brothers ceased all aviation 
activity in an unsuccessful attempt to sell their machines both in the US and Europe. 
Although initially unsuccessful, these promotional tours ultimately led to the U.S. Army 
requesting bids for flying machines. A stipulation of any bid made was that the machine 
must be capable of carrying a passenger. In answer to this the Wrights modified one of 
their existing aircraft by adding an extra seat and on the 14
th
 May 1908, the world’s first 
passenger in a controlled, powered, heavier than air craft took to the skies. It was as a 
result of the outbreak of World War I that aviation evolved from little more than a 
hobby into a massive industry in its own right (MacLeod, 2013). 
Although aircraft have been in use in revenue services since 1909, the aircraft in 
use at that time were hydrogen filled airships and were very different from today’s fast, 
efficient and safe aircraft. The first airline to operate with aircraft as they would be 
recognised today was Aircraft Transport and Travel (AT & T) which was founded in 
1916. AT & T’s aircraft were capable of carrying only two passengers and the fare for 
the first flight between London and Paris was £21 (Crouch, 2014). The average weekly 
wage at the time was approximately seven shillings which equates to 1.7 per cent of the 
aforementioned air fare (conversion figures from www.royalmint.com). By 1919 the 
company was operating the world’s first international scheduled service on that route. In 
the following years, on the back of AT & T’s success, airlines began to appear all over 
Europe. KLM was also established in 1919 (www.klm.com) and is still in existence 
today making it the world’s oldest operating airline. In 1923 Finnair was established 
(www.finnair.com) and the airline now known as Aeroflot also began operations. 
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Ireland’s first airline Aer Lingus was established in 1936 by the Irish Government 
(www.aerlingus.com). This rapid growth in the number of airlines operating in Europe 
at that time gave rise to the high levels of competition that is a feature of the airline 
industry to this day. 
Given the proliferation of smaller airlines in Europe during the 1920’s and 30’s, 
competition was intense and many simply could not compete. In order to survive, many 
of the smaller airlines consolidated into larger operators. These consolidations 
ultimately led to the emergence of airlines such as British Airways, Air France and 
Lufthansa. These airlines were heavily subsidised by their respective states and thus 
became “national” airlines. They were state funded, state controlled and heavily 
regulated. This regulation and control persisted until the early 1990s and allowed for 
such practices as route allocation, fare fixing and revenue sharing. Capacity on routes 
was often split between two carriers with each providing 50 per cent of the available 
seats and cargo capacity. Essentially each market was operated as a network of 
duopolies. This was facilitated through various governmental bilateral agreements. 
These practices and the highly regulatory environment resulted in virtually no 
competition in the European airline market (Scharpenseel, 2001). 
Originally the rules governing the conduct of the aviation industry were intended 
to provide a safe reliable and affordable service. However, since the mid 1970s concern 
had been expressed that the regulations had become inflexible and unduly protective of 
those they were supposed to control (McGowan & Seabright, 1992). In an effort to 
address these issues the EU Council of Ministers agreed a range of measures designed 
to encourage competition in the European airline market. These measures were to be 
introduced as three “packages”. The first two packages introduced in 1989 related only 
to scheduled passenger services and freight. The pricing benefits of these packages were 
full cargo pricing freedom, the lifting of some passenger capacity restriction and the 
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liberalisation of passenger fare setting. The third package which was implemented 
between 1993 and 1997 removed the distinction between scheduled and non-scheduled 
operations. The most significant elements of the third package however were the 
common licensing and operational standards, the fact that licensed carriers were no 
longer required to own their own aircraft, the abolition of capacity restrictions, the 
allowing of multiple operators on international routes, the allowing of a carrier from one 
state to operate between two other states (cabotage) and the right to carry passengers 
and/or freight between two foreign countries on a route originating or terminating in the 
state of registration of the carrier (Fifth Freedom rights) (Reynolds-Feighan, 1999). 
This deregulation lowered the “barriers to entry” to the European airline market 
and took the duopolistic control away from the state carriers. An airline registered in a 
member state could now operate a route of its choice, set its own fares and frequency, 
and with leased aircraft which greatly reduced capital costs. Between 1993 and 1996 
eighty new operator licenses were issued (Scharpenseel, 2001). Many failed, but these 
new entrants to the market were the first salvos in the upcoming battle between state 
owned flag carriers and privately operated enterprises. This was the beginning of real 
competition in the European market. In addition the introduction of the “low cost” 
model into Europe by Ryanair in 1991 was a game changer in the European airline 
market and ultimately resulted in the state carriers losing their stranglehold on the 
market (Dobruszkes, 2009) and forced them to compete with the low cost carriers in 
terms of financial and operational efficiencies (Lee & Worthington, 2014). 
Ryanair operated their first flight between Waterford and London Gatwick with 
a 15 seater aircraft in July 1985. It is interesting to note that this is approximately the 
same capacity as the aircraft that Imperial Airways (the forerunner to British Airways) 
were operating in the 1930s. In 1986 Ryanair began operations between Dublin and 
London Luton with fares of IR£94.99. This was well below the IR£208 charged by both 
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Aer Lingus and British Airways, the only other operators on the route (Barrett, 2008). In 
1986 the average industrial wage was approximately IR£232 per week (Casey, 2004). 
Despite the competitiveness of Ryanair’s fares its first years were turbulent. Between 
1985 and 1990 Ryanair lost IR£25 million (Morrell, 2003). In 1991 Ryanair Deputy 
Chief Executive Michael O’Leary visited Southwest Airlines based in Dallas, Texas. 
Southwest was the innovator of the “low cost” model for airlines. O’Leary returned to 
Ryanair and implemented many of the strategies he had observed while at Southwest. In 
its first year as a low cost airline Ryanair reported its first ever profit of IR£293,000 
(www.ryanair.com). As Ryanair success continued unabated, other “low cost” airlines 
started to appear in Europe. These new players presented a very real challenge to the 
incumbent national airlines who for the first time found themselves facing competition 
from leaner, more efficient operators who could compete on a level playing field. 
The term deregulation implies a lack of regulation but this is not the case. 
Airlines are still regulated and subject to oversight by various industry bodies, 
associations and regulators such as International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), 
International Air Transport Association (IATA), European Aviation Safety Agency 
(EASA) and the regulator of the state of registration. In the case of airlines registered in 
Ireland the regulator is the Irish Aviation Authority (IAA). 
The International Air Transport Association (IATA) - was founded in Cuba in 
1945. It is the trade association for the world’s airlines representing 240 airlines or 84 
per cent of total air traffic. IATA is instrumental in formulating industry policy on 
aviation issues. IATA is the advocate for the international air transport industry and 
challenges unreasonable rules and charges, holds regulators to account and considers 
sensible regulation its core mission (www.iata.org). 
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) - has been in operation since 
2004. The main purpose of EASA is to draft aviation safety legislation for the European 
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Commission and its member states. EASA are also responsible for inspection and 
training in order to ensure the uniform implementation of European aviation safety 
legislation in all member states. EASA also approve maintenance and production 
facilities that are located outside of the European Union (www.easa.europa.eu).  
The Irish Aviation Authority (IAA) - is a commercial semi state body which is 
responsible for the safety regulation of the civil aviation industry in Ireland. They are 
also responsible for aviation security oversight. These roles were assumed by the IAA 
from the Department of Transport in 1993. The IAA ensures compliance through 
regular inspections and audits of airports, air carriers, cargo companies and suppliers. 
The IAA is also responsible for the licensing of aviation professionals (pilots, air traffic 
controllers and maintenance personnel) and entities such as airlines and airports within 
the Irish state (www.iaa.ie). 
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) - was created in 1944 
with the signing of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (The Chicago 
Convention). There are currently 191 signatory states and various industry organizations 
who work together to develop international standards and recommended practices with 
regard to safety, security and civil aviation policy. These standards and recommended 
practices form the basis of the legally binding National Civil Aviation Guidelines 
developed by signatory states (www.icao.int). The original signatory states of the 
Chicago Convention agreed nine “Freedoms of the Air”. The purpose of these freedoms 
of the air was to provide a framework for the development of civil air transport. Any 
states that are signatories to the Chicago Convention may enter into bilateral agreements 
with other signatory states and grant each other any or all of the freedoms as defined by 
the convention.  
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The Nine Freedoms of the Air are: 
1) The right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air services, 
granted by one state to another state or states to fly across its territory without 
landing. 
2) The right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air services, 
granted by one state to another state or states to land in its territory for non-
traffic purposes. 
3) The right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air services, 
granted by one state to another state to put down, in the territory of the first state, 
traffic coming from the home state of the carrier. 
4) The right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air services, 
granted by one state to another state to take on, in the territory of the first state, 
traffic destined for the home state of the carrier. 
5) The right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air services, 
granted by one state to another state to put down and to take on, in the territory 
of the first state, traffic coming from or destined to a third state.  
6) The right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air services, 
of transporting, via the home state of the carrier, traffic moving between two 
other states.  
7) The right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air services, 
granted by one state to another state, of transporting traffic between the territory 
of the granting state and any third state with no requirement to include on such 
operation any point in the territory of the recipient state, i.e. the service need not 
connect to or be an extension of any service to/from the home state of the 
carrier. 
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8) The right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air services, 
of transporting cabotage traffic between two points in the territory of the 
granting state on a service which originates or terminates in the home country of 
the foreign carrier or (in connection with the so-called Seventh Freedom of the 
Air) outside the territory of the granting state. 
9) The right or privilege of transporting cabotage traffic of the granting 
state on a service performed entirely within the territory of the granting state. 
(www.icao.int) 
Cabotage is defined in the Chicago convention as “Each contracting state shall have the 
right to refuse permission to the aircraft of other contracting States to take on in its 
territory passengers, mail and cargo carried for remuneration or hire and destined for 
another point within its territory. Each contracting state undertakes not to enter into any 
arrangement which specifically grant any such privilege on an exclusive basis to any 
other state or an airline of any other state, and not to obtain any such exclusive privilege 
from any other state.” (www.icao.int). 
This framework was not agreed between the USA and the UK who reached a 
separate compromised agreement in Bermuda in 1976. This agreement was later 
revisited and an updated “Bermuda II Agreement” was brokered in 1977. This second 
agreement was actually more restrictive than the original and restricted capacity, 
reduced US carrier fifth freedom rights and added provisions concerning international 
charter services (Chang, Williams & Hsu, 2009). In terms of liberalisation this was a 
retrograde step, however efforts are ongoing in an attempt to achieve the ultimate goal 
of full freedom or “Open Skies” for international air transport.  
Even though the airline industry is some way off a true “Open Skies” scenario 
there is little doubt that the liberalization achieved to date has been beneficial. Air travel 
has grown while average fares continue to decline and with no apparent impact on 
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safety. These improvements have come about as a result of the former legacy carriers 
having to compete with the new entrant low-cost carriers on a direct commercial basis.  
However, competing on a like for like basis is often extremely difficult due to 
the varying strategic, financial and operational approaches taken by the different 
airlines. For example, legacy airlines tend to operate hub and spoke networks with their 
associated complexities such as integrated ticketing and baggage transfer. Low cost 
airlines operate simpler point to point networks which allow for quick turnarounds and 
higher aircraft and staff productivity. They also differ in terms of fleet i.e. single type or 
mixed types, maintenance arrangements, the carriage of freight and other key areas. The 
legacy carriers have had to reduce costs, improve efficiency and increase productivity. 
Despite their best efforts sustained profitability still remains elusive for many airlines 
(Belobaba, 2011). This lack of profitability may be directly attributed to “high fixed 
cost structure, overleveraged balance sheets, low barriers to entry, high barriers to exit, 
fragmentation, militant unions, cyclical macroeconomics, fluctuating fuel prices, a 
unique regulatory environment and monopolistic/oligopolistic suppliers – which are just 
a small sample of the varying dynamics that reside when managing airlines.” 
(O’Connell, 2011). 
1.3 Motivation for this study 
There is an adage in the airline industry that states “The quickest way to make a 
million dollars in aviation is to start with a billion”. Airlines are notoriously difficult to 
run successfully. This is due not only to the high initial and ongoing costs involved, but 
to the complexity of the commercial space in which they operate. Airlines operate 
within single markets, across markets, long haul, short haul, full service and low cost. 
Some provide freight services and allow code shares, others are much more streamlined 
and do not offer either. All airlines are regulated bodies of the state in which they are 
registered. Despite efforts to harmonise this regulation, differences do exist. It is these 
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complexities that make performance measurement and comparisons across airlines so 
difficult. Consider two airlines, one of which operates a mixed fleet of 20 aircraft and 
offers passenger and cargo services while employing 1000 people. The second airline 
operates a single type fleet of 25 aircraft offers passenger services only and employs 
750 people. Airline One returns a profit of €8 million and Airline Two returns a profit 
of €7 million. By that metric both are successful but given the complexity of their 
structure it is difficult to establish which airline is making the best use of its resources. 
The researcher works in the aviation industry in Ireland and has watched 
industry leaders such as Ryanair and easyJet achieve the seemingly impossible: 
consistent, profitable growth. Given the apparent simplicity of the concept, i.e. provide 
a seat from A to B, determine the cost of providing the seat and then sell the seat for 
‘cost + profit margin’ it seems remarkable that other airlines are not emulating industry 
leaders with greater success (Sparaco, 2012). 
In his role within the operations department of a major aviation company the 
researcher is familiar with the importance of operational performance measures. 
However, he realised that there was a lack of awareness amongst his operational 
colleagues of financial performance measures outside of the headline profit figures. On 
further investigation it became apparent that the reverse was true for staff in the 
financial departments, i.e. they were familiar with financial performance measures but 
not operational performance measures. 
This led to an initial review of the literature in the area of performance 
measurement in the airline industry. With regard to financial and operational 
performance measurement there does appear to be a bias in favour of financial 
measures. A google.scholar search using the search string “airline financial 
performance” carried out on 15/10/13 returned 151,000 results. A second search using 
“airline operational performance” returned 76,000 results, while a search using the 
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string “airline financial operational performance” returned 86,000 results. This gives 
some indication of the proclivity towards a single category of performance measure in 
the body of literature. 
Eccles (1991) highlighted the importance of combining operational and financial 
indicators in performance measurement. He also drew attention to the potential 
advantages in benchmarking a company’s performance with competitors so that best 
practice in various areas may be identified and emulated. 
Comparing performance across airlines is difficult due to the complexity of their 
structure (MacKenzie-Williams, 2005). While an airlines core business activity is 
always the same, the elements which make up the airline itself are often vastly different. 
Fleet size, route structure, staff numbers and even the regulatory environment in which 
they operate are all factors that must be considered. Direct performance comparisons 
can be useful when assessing firms’ market position.  
1.4 Financial Performance Measures 
Some of the most frequently used financial ratios in evaluating accounting 
performance across industries are: Liquidity ratios, Activity ratios, Financing ratios and 
Profitability ratios. These metrics are also valid in an aviation context. Flouris and 
Walker (2005) used these four ratios when analysing the accounting performance of 
airlines. They are explained and calculated as follows;  
1) Liquidity ratios: These may be explained as the company’s ability to pay its bills 
while allowing for a safety margin. For example, current ratio provides a measure of a 
company’s ability to satisfy short term obligations.  
2) Activity ratios: Total asset turnover effectively measures a company’s efficiency in 
managing its assets. The total asset turnover is an example of an activity ratio. The 
higher the total asset turnover ratio the more efficiently a firm’s assets have been used.  
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3) Financing Ratios: They provide an indication of a company’s ability to pay long term 
debts. Debt ratio represents the percentage of assets financed by creditors and helps to 
determine the level of protection of these creditors in case of insolvency. A high debt 
ratio indicates that a company has more debt and is therefore more of a risk for 
creditors.  
The interest coverage ratio measures the ability of the company to service all debts. The 
higher the ratio, the more likely it is that a company can meet its obligations. Debt ratio 
and interest coverage are two possible financing ratios. 
4) Profitability Ratios:  These ratios provide information on profit performance. Net 
profit margin, return on assets and return on equity are all examples of profitability 
ratios. The net profit margin is the amount of profit available to shareholders after 
interest and taxes. The return on assets ratio measures how efficiently a firm is utilizing 
its assets while the return on equity ratio measures the return earned by a stakeholder’s 
equity in the firm. The higher the rate, the higher the earning for the stakeholder.  
The same measures were used by the same authors in a similar study “Financial 
Comparisons across different business models in the Canadian Airline Industry” 
(Flouris and Walker, 2007). These measures have also been identified as traditional 
accountancy measures by Davila and Venkatachalam (2004).  
1.5 Non-Financial Performance Measures 
The study by Davila and Venkatachalam (2004) which investigated non-
financial performance measures as a means of rewarding CEO’s identified “passenger 
load factor” as one such measure. It is stated that passenger load factor is a measure of 
an airline’s operational efficiency and as such is a better indicator of a firm’s “current” 
performance. Passenger load factor was also identified as a preferred performance 
metric by Francis, Schipper and Vincent (2003) who also identified “revenue per 
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passenger mile (yield)” and “cost per available seat mile” as non financial performance 
metrics for the airline industry. These three measures were also used to demonstrate the 
operating trends of British European Airways (BEA) by Lyth (1993).  
1.6 Aim of This Study 
This research sets out to examine the performance of European airlines across 
both financial and operational measures. The aim of this study is to identify the best and 
worst performers through a benchmarking process. A review of performance 
measurement techniques will be carried out. These performance techniques are: 
Economic Value Added (EVA) which is a method of measuring a company’s 
profitability. EVA goes beyond traditional measures of profit by taking account of the 
cost of the capital employed in producing a company’s profit; The Balanced Scorecard 
(BSC) combines both financial and operational measures to provide managers with a 
comprehensive overview of their company’s performance; Multi Criteria Decision 
Making (MCDM) which is concerned with managerial level decision making in the 
pursuit of a single goal, usually profit. MCDM takes account of financial and non-
financial data available to decision makers in order to formulate strategy and Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) which is “a methodology whereby within a set of 
comparable decision making units (DMU’s) those exhibiting best practice could be 
identified and would form an efficient frontier” (Cook & Seiford, 2009). DEA also 
utilises both financial and non-financial measures. 
These four methods of performance measurement were chosen for consideration 
as they are well known and commonly used for evaluating company performance. A 
literature review of each technique was performed which allowed for evaluation of each 
method across a number of headings. As is outlined in later sections, DEA was chosen 
for this study as it has already been widely used in airline studies, is capable of 
including both financial and non-financial measures and provides rankings. DEA also 
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allows for efficiency ranking in terms of overall efficiency, managerial efficiency and 
scale efficiency which provides a comprehensive insight into company performance. 
For the purposes of this study three DEA models are employed. 
1) Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) – This model provides an overall 
efficiency score and includes both technical and scale efficiency. 
2) Variable Returns to Scale (VRS) – This model provides a technical 
efficiency score only. Technical efficiency is the measure of how efficient a 
company is at turning input x into output y. It is also known as Managerial or 
Process efficiency. 
3) Pure Scale – This model provides a scale efficiency score only. It is a 
measure of whether or not a company is operating optimally for its size. 
The best and worst performers across these three models are identified and a 
comparative analysis is performed. 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter one introduced the subject matter and basis for the thesis. It provided an 
overview of the development of the airline industry from its inception up to and 
including the deregulation of the European airline market. An outline of the 
performance measurement models was also introduced. The remainder of the thesis is 
structured as follows. Chapter two presents a literature review. The current state of the 
literature around various performance measurement techniques is presented. This forms 
the basis for this thesis. The literature surrounding performance measurement, airline 
performance measurement and several specific performance measurement techniques 
are reviewed. Based on this review a performance measurement model is constructed 
and applied to European passenger airlines. Chapter three provides the methodological 
approach taken in the design and execution of this study. This includes data 
identification & gathering, sample selection, software selection & validation and data 
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analysis. Chapter four presents the DEA efficiency scores from all three models for each 
of the airlines examined. The best and worst performing airlines are then evaluated by 
means of a comparative analysis. The output targets that are required in order for each 
airline to achieve pareto optimal efficiency are also provided. Robustness scores for 
each airline identified as efficient are determined. Chapter five consists of a sensitivity 
analysis of the three DEA models. The sensitivity of the models is ascertained and 
findings are reported with respect to airline specific findings. Chapter six outlines the 
conclusions, limitations of the study, and recommendations for future research. 
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2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a review of the literature surrounding performance 
measurement both generally and pertaining specifically to aviation. An in depth review 
of four performance measurement techniques; Economic Value Added, The Balanced 
Scorecard, Multi Criteria Decision Making and Data Envelopment Analysis, is 
performed and a thematic bibliography of the current state of the aviation performance 
literature is also presented. This review draws from the fields of strategy and operations 
management. In doing so it seeks to influence not only each of these fields individually, 
but also as a result of focusing these fields through an aviation lens to have an impact in 
the sphere of aviation management. The literature is primarily sourced from academic 
journals and text books but in some cases periodicals are used.   
The key studies drawn upon are; The EVA Financial Management System 
(Stern, Stewart & Chew, 1996), The Balanced Scorecard: Translating Strategy Into 
Action (Kaplan & Norton, 1996), MCDM – If Not a Roman Numeral, Then What? 
(Zionts, 1979), Multi-Criteria Decision Making Methods: A Compatitive Study 
(Triantaphyllou, 2000), Measuring the Efficiency of Decision Making Units (Charnes, 
Cooper & Rhodes, 1978), Some Models for Estimating Technical and Scale 
Inefficiencies in Data Envelopment Analysis (Banker, Charnes & Cooper, 1984). 
 
2.2 Measuring performance 
In business, performance measurement has historically been based almost 
exclusively on financial performance. This has been recorded as far back as the middle 
ages (Bruns, 1998). Specifically, profit was generally considered to be the primary 
metric when measuring the performance of a business. At the most basic level this is a 
reasonable assumption. Profit may be defined as “Revenue realised in excess of costs 
incurred” (Roberts, 1988). Thus, in order to survive a company must make profit. Profit, 
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however, should not be mistaken as a measure of company performance (Tulvinschi, 
2013). Company performance is an evolutionary measure which takes a holistic 
approach over time. Conversely, profit is a singular measure attributable to a single 
defined accounting period. As a result, concentrating solely on profit as a performance 
measure leads to short term-ism (Hayes & Abernathy, 1980) and may lead to profit 
chasing at the expense of the business as a whole. Greene & Segal (2004) demonstrated 
a direct link between the inefficient use of resources and an adverse affect on profit. 
This suggests that a more efficient use of resources will result in a positive effect on 
profit. Thus the inclusion of non financial performance measures when assessing overall 
company performance gives greater insight into the current state of a company and can 
identify areas where, if efficiencies were made, profits may be increased. This approach 
has the added benefit of promoting more long term strategic planning. 
Ndlovu (2010) identified a paradigm change in how business performance is 
evaluated. The emerging paradigm places much stronger emphasis on combining 
financial and non financial performance measures when assessing business 
performance. These non financial performance measures include operational efficiency, 
productivity and customer satisfaction. The catalyst for this shift towards a combined 
measure approach was the rise of the technology industry. Technology companies are 
often built on human capital and non physical assets, making valuation difficult. This 
resulted in the need to find new ways to assess performance as simple profit and loss 
measures became ever more inadequate as sole indicators of business performance. This 
approach spread to other industries with Kurtzmann (1997) reporting that by the mid 
1990’s 64 per cent of US companies were experimenting with new methods of 
measuring the performance of their business. Increasingly companies began to 
recognise the benefits that could be gained through the inclusion of operational 
measures in performance measurement (Marr & Schiuma, 2003; Radner & Barnes, 
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2007). The inclusion of non financial performance measures also opened up the 
possibility of comparing a company’s performance with that of its peers on an 
operational as well as a financial level with potentially advantageous results (Adebanjo, 
Abbas & Mann, 2010). The advantages of combining financial and non financial 
performance measures include enhanced cash flow, reduced operational risk and 
improved levels of working capital (Protopappa-Sieke & Seifort, 2010). These benefits 
highlight how multi dimensional performance measuring methods are preferable and 
more informative than basic profit and loss depicted performance (Sardana, 2008) 
which measures the effectiveness of managerial decisions which have already been 
taken. The inclusion of non financial performance measures transforms business 
performance measurement into a forward looking proactive exercise. It does this by 
allowing a company to examine how it is currently utilising its resources and identify 
any efficiencies that may be made in the future thus increasing profitability (Kanji, 
2002).  
2.3 Measuring Performance in Aviation 
Much research has been carried out on company performance in the field of 
aviation. The majority of this research is concerned with examining the performance of 
airport operators and airlines. This section examines the current literature surrounding 
these topics. 
2.3.1 Airport Performance 
 The application of efficiency evaluation techniques to the airport sector is a 
relatively recent concept. While efficiency evaluation studies on other industries 
(electricity, water, banking health and agriculture) were commonplace, these techniques 
were not applied to the airport sector until the mid-1990’s. Since then the most 
commonly used techniques when evaluating airport performance are Multi Criteria 
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Analysis and Frontier Analysis i.e. Stochastic Frontier Analysis, Total Factor 
Productivity and Data Envelopment Analysis (Lai, Potter & Benyon, 2012). 
 Despite its identification as one of the most commonly used methods, Multi 
Criteria Analysis has been used relatively infrequently when analysing airport 
performance. Multi Criteria based studies tend to make use of qualitative data for 
analysis. Yeo, Wang & Chou (2013) made use of this method by means of surveys in 
their paper which evaluated the competitiveness of Aerotropolisis in East Asia. They 
identified various important criteria for a successful Aerotropolis including geographic 
location and airport access modes. Multi Criteria type analysis strengths lie in 
identifying optimal criteria when making decisions. However, a limitation of this 
approach is the inability to compare the optimal criteria once they have been identified. 
For example, in the above study airport accesses modes have been identified as an 
important criteria for success but no metrics are provided that allow direct comparisons 
across airport access modes. 
 The most common techniques used in airport performance studies are Frontier 
type analyses; Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). All three of these techniques are similar in that they 
establish an efficient frontier from which relative inefficiencies are determined. Beyond 
that they differ in how they estimate and explain these inefficiencies (Pels, Nijkamp & 
Rietreld, 2003). SFA is often used in conjunction with DEA when examining airport 
performance. Assaf (2011) and Assaf, Gillen & Barros (2012) both used a combination 
of SFA and DEA when investigating airport performance. In both cases the input/output 
variables were chosen based on the previous literature in the area and the data were 
drawn from annual reports and the University of Bath. Scotti, Malighetti, Martini & 
Volta (2012) made sole use of SFA for their study of Italian airports with data drawn 
from Ente Nazionale Per L’Aviazone Civile (ENAC) and the Italian National Institute 
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for Statistics while Marques & Barros (2011) made use of the Cost Frontier Model in 
their study of airport managerial efficiency. In all of these studies data were drawn from 
primary and secondary sources which has the potential to give rise to consistency issues.   
 One of the most common Frontier methods employed in airport performance 
studies is Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Lozano, Gutierre & Moreno (2013) make 
use of the Variable Returns to Scale (also known as the Banker, Charnes & Cooper or 
BCC) model of DEA. This model (BCC) is a measure of technical or 
process/managerial efficiency. Another DEA model is the Constant Returns to Scale 
(also known as the Charnes, Cooper & Rhodes or CCR) model which is a measure of 
overall efficiency. The ratio CCR/BCC provides a measure of pure scale efficiency. 
Data were collected from third party sources. Two DEA models, BCC and CCR were 
used by Wanke (2013) when analysing the efficiency of Brazillian Airports again data 
were drawn from a third party. Chang, Yu & Chen (2013) made use of all three models 
CCR, BCC and CCR/BCC when they examined 41 Chinese airports. However, while 
their paper focused on geographical characteristics as opposed to the more typical 
financial and operational measures it is notable in that all three DEA models were 
applied. In some instances it is not possible or at least difficult to ascertain which model 
of DEA was used (Zhang, Wang, Liu & Zhao, 2012). In many cases these studies drew 
their data from third party sources which while not necessarily problematic in itself can 
lead to the data used being data of convenience.  
 Key Performance Indicator (KPI) identification and comparison was used by 
two studies that sought to measure and benchmark airport performance (Painvin, 2011; 
Goulmy, Stern & Eggenkamp, 2013) These studies were “high level” in comparison 
with the previous MCDM and DEA studies and gave little insight into the identification 
of inefficient practices within the airports examined. 
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2.3.2 Airline Performance 
 Along with airports, airline performance studies comprise the majority of 
aviation industry research. In a similar way to airport performance studies, various 
methods have been employed. A quantitative approach such as the Balanced Scorecard 
(Wu & Liao, 2014) and surveys (Wen & Chen, 2011) have been used in order to 
evaluate airline performance. This approach can be useful for introducing information 
and opinions from passengers on service quality into performance investigations. 
MCDM was used to rank and benchmark Turkish domestic airlines based on their 
service quality (Kazancoglu & Kazancoglu, 2013), The link between service quality 
was also investigated by Stevenm Dong & Dresner (2012) using non-linearities and 
modelling effects.  Direct comparisons of business models and practices have also been 
used to evaluate airline performance (Klophaus, Conraddy & Fichert, 2012). However, 
these types of study are relatively high level and struggle to assist in the identification of 
areas to be targeted for performance improvement. Data sources were provided by 
means of survey and third party sources which led to data of convenience being used in 
at least one instance.  
 DEA is one of the most prolific performance measurement methods used in 
airport performance studies and this is also the case for the airline industry. As with 
airport performance studies various models of DEA are used by researchers 
investigating the airline industry. While not making direct use of DEA, Akbar, Nemeth 
& Niemeier (2014) make several references to its use in terms of airline performance. 
Lin (2012) while using DEA gave no indication of which model was used, i.e. BCC, 
CCR or pure scale. Other studies use one model only (Arjomandi & Seutert, 2014; Zhu, 
J, 2011; Assaf & Jesiassen, 2011; Lu, Wang, Hung & Lu, 2012; Lee & Worthington, 
2014) More comprehensive results are achieved by studies that apply to two or more 
DEA methodologies (Merkert & Morrell, 2012; Joo & Fowler, 2014). While Merket & 
Chapter Two 
26 
 
Williams (2013) used all three models (BCC, CCR and Pure Scale) only technical 
efficiency was reported (results for pure scale and pure technical efficiency are available 
on request). Again, data were drawn from both primary and secondary sources which 
gives rise to the previously documented issues. 
Other methods have been used sporadically in airline performance measurement. 
Zuidberg (2014) used econometric analysis to identify the influence of airline 
characteristics on average operating cost per aircraft movement. Barros & Couto (2013) 
and Jentabadi & Ismail (2014) used the Luenberger Productivity Indicators and 
Structural Equation Modelling respectively to evaluate productivity and overall airline 
performance. Both of these studies used financial and operational data. Squalli (2014) 
used the Estimated Specifications technique to compare airline passenger traffic 
openness and the performance of Emirates Airlines. Cashflow has been used in 
conjunction with Ratio Analysis (RA) as a metric for comparing airline performance 
(Armen, 2013) however this approach provides a measure of liquidity more than actual 
company performance. 
2.3.3 Performance Measurement Technique Review 
As has been shown above there are many different performance measurement 
techniques available to the researcher wishing to investigate company performance in 
aviation. These range from the less common cash flow and service quality type analyses 
to the prolific use of Frontier type analyses. All of these techniques are valid research 
tools and this validity is not dependent on prolificacy of usage. This research is 
concerned specifically with airline performance measurement and comparison and as 
such requires the identification of a suitable technique. 
Comparing performance across airlines is difficult due to the complexity of their 
structure. While an airlines core business activity is always the same, the elements 
which make up the airline itself are often vastly different. Fleet type and size, route 
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network and structure, staff numbers, airports served and even the regulatory 
environment in which they operate are all factors that must be considered making direct 
comparison difficult. Direct performance comparisons can be useful when assessing a 
firms’ market position. When attempting to compare the financial and operating 
performances of airlines a difficulty arises when trying to take account of their differing 
business models. This issue was addressed by Mason and Morrison (2008). Their paper 
identified the key components of both the product and organisational architecture 
present in the airline industry which could be used as benchmark metrics. However 
some of the key components identified by Mason and Morrison such as promotional 
spend per passenger and yield figures are commercially sensitive and thus not always 
available to the researcher. 
This gives rise to a trend in the literature whereby when airline performance is 
being measured or compared there is a clear tendency towards publicly available 
financial only measures. Flouris and Walker (2005), Gittel, Von Nordenflycht and 
Kochan (2004), Smith, Grim, Gannon and Chen (1991) and Potter (2011) are examples 
of studies that use publicly available financial measures. 
In an attempt to identify a process that considers both financial and non financial 
measures in an airline context the following four methods of performance measurement 
where chosen for review primarily because they are relatively well known and widely 
used both in academia and in industry. This results in a sufficient body of literature from 
which to make decisions regarding suitability and practicality for the purposes of this 
research. The four performance evaluation techniques are: 
1) Economic Value Added – A measure of profit which accounts for the cost of 
capital invested in realising that profit.  
2) The Balanced Scorecard – Well established method for identifying financial and 
operational measures of a company,  
Chapter Two 
28 
 
3) Multi Criteria Decision Making – Concerned with managerial level planning and 
decision making, the ultimate goal of which is pareto optimisation – the point at 
which no further gains can be made in one objective at no cost to another 
objective. 
4) Data Envelopment Analysis – Originally developed for evaluating not-for-profit 
entities whereby those exhibiting best practice could be identified. 
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2.4 Economic Value Added (EVA) 
Economic Value Added is a performance metric that was developed by the Stern 
Stewart Company in the early 1990’s. It is a measure of the after tax cash net profit less 
a charge for the capital employed to produce those profits. In other words EVA is a 
measure of profit – the cost of the capital invested. For example a company with a 10 
per cent cost of capital that earns a 20 per cent return on $100 million of net operating 
assets has an EVA of $10 million (Stern, Stewart & Chew, 1996). EVA may be 
expressed fractionally as  
EVA = NOPAT - CKI 
where: 
NOPAT = Net Operating Profit After Tax – determined for a certain period of 
time 
CKI = Cost of Capital Invested  
(Vasile, 2013) 
EVA like many performance metrics is calculated over a defined calendar period. 
However, it differs from traditional performance metrics in how it measures a 
company’s economic performance. Traditionally this is achieved through performance 
measures such as profit, earnings and cash flow (Burksaitiene, 2009). EVA goes beyond 
these baseline performance measures by measuring the value created in excess of 
traditional performance measures and this excess value is then used for evaluating the 
performance of firms (Salehi, Enayati & Javadi, 2014). However, one of the original 
creators of EVA, Joel Stern stated that it was not intended as a pure measure of firm 
performance like the conventional performance measures, but rather a system that could 
be used to create a compensation structure that would encourage employees across the 
board to work towards maximising shareholder wealth (Kramer & Peters, 2001). From 
this perspective EVA is not just a simple performance measure, but may constitute the 
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core element of an integrated financial management system. Thus EVA is not just 
concerned with measuring performance but also highlighting areas within a firm that 
may benefit from a different managerial approach (Stern, Stewart & Chew, 1997). 
2.4.1 Usage 
Economic Value Added is a widely used measure of operating performance 
(Ferguson & Leistikow, 1998). This is because it is not subject to industry specific bias 
and therefore is suitable for use across a wide range of sectors (Kramer & Peters, 2001). 
EVA as a technique is proprietary to the Stern Stewart strategic consulting company. 
For that reason, information on specific usage is not necessarily readily available. 
However, there is existing research that gives some indication of the use of EVA across 
various industries, for example, the automobile industry (Ghanbari & More, 2007), the 
banking industry (Oberholzer & Van der Westhuizen, 2010), information technology 
(Yao, Sutton & Chan, 2010), air navigation service provision (Austin, 2005), hospitality 
and tourism (Kim, 2006) and agribusiness (Geyser & Liebenberg, 2003).  
There are numerous studies on EVA, but reference to a specific company or 
industry is relatively rare, for example, Sharma & Kumar (2010) conducted a review of 
EVA literature which examined 112 papers, but concentrated on identifying the 
countries in which EVA was used rather than focusing on specific industries or 
companies. These countries were USA, India, South Africa, Australia, UK, China, 
Malaysia, Canada, Brazil, Greece, Russia, New Zealand, Kuwait, Turkey and Indonesia.  
EVA is used both in industry and research settings. It is widely accepted as a 
performance measure by corporate management services and is increasingly being 
adopted by financial and management researchers (Yao, Sutton & Chan, 2009). 
2.4.2 Benefits 
Proponents of EVA argue that as a performance metric it is superior to 
traditional performance measures because it concentrates on maximizing shareholder 
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value. The most vocal of these proponents is the Stewart Stern company who were the 
original developers of the EVA technique and who claim that “The best practical 
periodic performance measure is EVA” (Stewart, 1991) and ‘EVA is almost 50 per cent 
better than accounting based measures in explaining changes in the shareholders 
wealth” (Stewart, 1994). This view was further supported by Ehrbar (1999) in an in-
house study for Stewart Stern which compared returns for companies grouped according 
to industry and size. This found that EVA adopters outperformed non-adopters over a 
period of up to five years. Kleiman (1999) also found improved returns for EVA 
adopters compared to non-adopters for companies in the same industry.  
EVA has also been shown to be a superior metric when considering performance 
based bonus schemes for CEOs. Traditional performance based compensation schemes 
(i.e. those based on profit and/or earnings) are sensitive to anomalies whereby an 
exceptional event causes a one-off unsustainable spike in profits. Yet it is this figure 
that the CEOs bonus is based on. EVA avoids these issues by calculating bonuses based 
on value created for the shareholder and is thus a better indicator by which to evaluate 
CEO performance (Ferguson & Leistikow, 1998). This view is supported by Coles, 
McWilliams & Sen (2001) who carried out a review of performance measures including 
traditional metrics and found that while traditional performance metrics were valid 
indicators of performance, EVA is a preferred measure as a tool for assessing CEO 
performance. When justifying CEO bonuses to shareholders with respect to company 
performance, EVA is one of the strongest measures that can be used to do this and at the 
same time demonstrate improved company performance (Ghanbari & More, 2007).  
In addition to being a performance metric EVA is also a financial management 
system in its own right. Firms which have adopted it as a management system have 
shown improvement in terms of stock performance and profitability relative to their 
peers (Ferguson, Rentzler & Yu, 2005). Alternatively, in certain circumstances such as 
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de facto monopolies (Air Navigation Service Provision) and industries subject to 
regulation, EVA may also be used to demonstrate that profits are not excessive (Austin, 
2005).  
2.4.3 Limitations 
The creators of EVA, the Stern Stewart company assert that EVA is a superior 
company performance metric when compared with traditional performance metrics. 
Dunbar (2013) points to numerous studies that refute these claims. These criticisms are 
founded on a lack of clarity in the literature as a result of the confidential nature of 
corporate privacy. This view is supported by Ivanov, Leong & Zaima (2014) who state 
that while EVA has theoretical appeal, empirical evidence regarding its efficacy are 
mixed. Paulo (2010) goes a step further and states that the empirical evidence is not 
compelling. This paper also examined the methodology of EVA and found it to be 
deficient and claimed that overall there was insufficient supportive evidence to validate 
the claims that EVA makes with respect to being a superior performance metric. 
Previous to this Paulo (2002) had also contended that EVA was of dubious value due to 
being construct deficient. It is also argued that there are fundamental issues with the 
economic and financial factors that are the very basis of EVA and that these have been 
demonstrated to have minimal effect on variation in share price and consequently share 
returns. Paulos findings supported earlier research by Biddle, Bowan & Wallace (1997) 
which found that traditional measures such as earnings were more highly associated 
with returns and firm value than EVA. They also suggested that EVA provided 
information that was only marginally useful beyond that of earnings. Paulos assertions 
are contradicted by Chen & Dodd (2002) where they claim that Paulo makes 
fundamental errors and assumptions when evaluating EVA. They contend that Paulo 
omits fundamental factors such as earnings in his calculations. This contention is also 
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levelled at analysts by Machuga, Pfeiffer & Kerma (2002) who state that the 
information within EVA is often used inappropriately. 
Kumar & Sherma (2011) conducted a study of 873 firms in order to examine the 
claims of EVA proponents that it is superior to traditional performance measures as a 
corporate financial performance metric. Their findings revealed that NOPAT (Net 
Operating Profit After Tax) and OCF (Operating Cash Flow) outperform EVA as a 
company performance metric. This study also supported Biddle, Bowan &Wallace 
(1997) findings that EVA components add only marginally to the information content 
beyond earnings. Kumar and Sherma also concluded that non-financial variables such as 
employees should be considered when measuring company performance.  
Silverman (2010) found a marked disparity between present EVA estimates and 
the actual market value of firms in the US technology sector which suggests that there 
may be questions surrounding the validity of EVA as a performance measure. This 
disparity may be due to EVA neglecting to account for long-term investment by 
concentrating on assets in place, thus making it suitable only as a short-term 
performance measure (Johnson & Soenen, 2003). This means that the adoption of EVA 
is not appropriate for all firms as it does not account for long term investment (Griffith, 
2004). 
2.4.4 Summary – Economic Value Added 
Economic Value Added was originally developed by the Stern Stewart company 
and is a measure of the after tax cash net profit less a charge for the capital employed. It 
is not just a performance measuring tool, but may also be incorporated into a managerial 
system that promotes the creation of shareholder wealth by employees across the board.  
It is widely used across many industries worldwide although specific data can be 
difficult to obtain due to company privacy issues. Despite the issues with data 
collection, EVA is popular with financial and management researchers.  
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The primary advocate of EVA is the Stern Stewart company, who developed the 
technique as a means of going beyond the traditional company performance measures in 
attempt to create a metric that also promotes the creation of shareholder wealth. EVA 
has also been identified as a superior performance metric when evaluating and 
remunerating CEO performance. In terms of stock performance companies that have 
adopted EVA as a core element of their financial management systems have been 
demonstrated to perform better than non adopters. 
Numerous studies have refuted Stern Stewarts claims of EVA’s superiority 
claiming that while EVA has theoretical appeal, results from empirical work vary. This 
is primarily due to difficulty with data collection as a result of corporate privacy issues. 
Various studies have shown EVA to provide only marginally greater information 
content than traditional performance measures such as profit while others have found 
EVA to be inferior to NOPAT and OCF as performance metrics. EVA has also been 
accused of short term-ism and as a result is not suitable for all firms and industries. 
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2.5 The Balanced Scorecard 
The Balanced Scorecard was devised by Kaplan and Norton (1996) in an attempt 
to provide managers with a fast and comprehensive overview of their business. It 
combines financial measures (lagging) and operational measures (leading) to provide a 
dashboard which can be read to give an indication of a company’s performance. Kaplan 
and Norton compare the balanced scorecard to the instruments in an airplane’s cockpit. 
They all must be monitored and fixation on any one instrument may prove fatal. The 
Balanced Scorecard considers a company from four important perspectives; 
1) The Customer perspective – How do customers see us?  
2) The Internal Perspective – What must we excel at? 
3) The Innovation and Learning Perspective – Can we continue to improve 
and create value? 
4) The Financial Perspective - How do we look to shareholders? 
An important element of the Balanced Scorecard is limiting the number of measures 
examined from each perspective. This forces managers to focus on the measures that are 
most critical. Another important element is that it forces managers to consider all 
operational measures no matter how disparate, allowing them to identify if 
improvements in one area are coming about at the expense of standards in another area. 
This is a crucial principle of the Balanced Scorecard – a failure to convert improved 
operational performance into improved financial performance is a failure of the process 
and requires re-examination. The Balanced Scorecard is about strategy not individual 
control. Goals are established and it is assumed that management and staff will do 
whatever is necessary to achieve them. These goals are strategic and apply to the 
company as a whole. As a result no one goal may be achieved to the detriment of 
individual sections of the company. It is this understanding of interdependent 
relationships that promotes strategic thinking which keeps companies moving forward. 
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2.5.1 Usage 
The Balanced Scorecard (BSC) is a highly adaptable tool and has been 
successfully utilised across a wide range of industries including engineering, computing, 
technology, semiconductors (Kaplan & Norton, 1993) manufacturing (Hoque & James, 
2000) education (Haddad, 1999), insurance, chemical, hotel and banking (Juhmani, 
2007). Silk (1998) reported that 60 per cent of Fortune 1000 firms had experimented 
with the Balanced Scorecard. This included firms which had not fully embraced the 
BSC process and had used a diluted form of the process. Thompson & Mathys (2008) 
found that 40 per cent of Fortune 1000 companies used the BSC in 2007. Banchier, 
Planas & Sanchez (2011) stated that 53 per cent of 1430 companies surveyed used BSC 
making it the sixth most commonly used management tool. It would appear from these 
studies that usage of the method has remained reasonably constant over time. It is 
difficult to pin down precise usage of the BSC as some companies have been found to 
be using it unknowingly. Its use is widespread across the banking sector in Pakistan 
where a large number of banks surveyed were following all four perspectives without 
any specific knowledge or formalisation of the process (Ahmed, Ahmed, Ahmed & 
Nawraz, 2010); it was simply how they did business.  
2.5.2 Awareness  
A general knowledge of the process appears to be quite high. For example, 
Juhmani (2007) found that of the 83 usable replies returned, 54 of the companies 
surveyed formally applied the BSC but there was a high level of awareness of the 
process among the respondents (various industries in Bahrain). All respondents to this 
survey considered the BSC to be useful whether they used it or not. This may suggest 
that the BSC is being utilised to varying degrees across various industries, but that 
companies do not necessarily consider themselves to be users of the BSC.  
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2.5.3 Implementation  
Developing a Balanced Scorecard can be a complex, costly and lengthy process 
(Haddad, 1999), (Lipe & Salterio, 2000). It is also not without risks. Venkatraman & 
Gering (2000) state that there are as many failures as successes in implementing a BSC, 
while Williams (2004) states that fewer than 20 per cent of companies utilising the BSC 
have realised performance improvements. One of the primary issues with 
implementation of the BSC is its top down approach. The research for and development 
of the scorecard itself is carried out at senior management level and then filtered down 
despite the fact that the managers involved may have no experience of the process 
(Niven, 2006). This combined with scepticism and a lack of trust from the staff side 
may lead to the process being effectively defeated before it begins. Othmen, Khairy, 
Domil, Senik, Abdullah and Hamzah (2006) also identified the top down approach as 
being problematic to successful implementation of the BSC for similar reasons. 
2.5.4 Benefits 
Companies that are formal users of the BSC believe it brings many benefits. The 
BSC can help streamline highly diversified companies whose various business units 
need to be realigned with one unifying corporate strategy. This was the case with 
F.M.C., a highly diversified company which produced over 300 product lines in 21 
divisions organised into five business segments. In 1992 F.M.C. embarked on a growth 
strategy with the help of a BSC. It was so successful that the BSC is now considered a 
cornerstone of the management system (Kaplan, 1993). This is an important point; the 
BSC is not a quick fix, it requires integration into the company’s culture and ethos. This 
allows for long term growth and improvement (Haddad, 1999). Greater BSC usage has 
been associated with increased organisational performance (Hoque & James, 2000). 
There are other positives for companies that use the BSC. Chen & Jones (2009) found 
that these companies are more likely to link strategic objectives to long term targets, 
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thus avoiding short term-ism. They also tend to be more flexible and open to 
restructuring working environments if required. Employees see an attitude that is less 
resistant to change and individual business units have the autonomy to make 
adjustments in organisational procedures which may facilitate any changes required. 
These companies are also viewed by their employees as promoting continuous 
improvement. Ittner & Larcker (2003) found that 23 per cent of the 157 organisations 
they surveyed consistently built upon and improved their models and that all 23 per cent 
that did so achieved a superior level of performance. This is particularly true when the 
BSC used complements the company’s strategy as opposed to being a measurement 
focused process (Braam & Nijssen, 2004). There is also evidence to suggest that the 
BSC is positively correlated to managers levels of job satisfaction. Burney & Swanson 
(2010) found that managers whose emphasis was on the Financial, Customer and 
Innovation & Learning perspectives had higher levels of job satisfaction than those 
whose emphasis was on the Internal Business perspective, although no reason is given 
as to why this may be the case. Also, Gonzalez-Padron, Chabowski, Hult & Ketchen Jr. 
(2010) found a positive correlation between a focus on the customer perspective and 
financial performance but found no such correlation for the other perspectives. Overall 
BSC usage has remained reasonably consistent over the last fifteen years. It is popular 
with its users with 88 per cent of regular users believing it has led to improved operating 
performance (DeBusk & Crabtree, 2006). It has also been associated with flexibility, 
openness to change and increased job satisfaction. 
2.5.5 Limitations 
As with every performance measurement technique there are some issues with 
the BSC model. In a review of the literature Banchieri et al. (2011) analysed 309 articles 
and identified three areas of concern in the model – perspectives, indicators and cause & 
effect relationships. Essentially the BSC views an organisation from a mechanistic 
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perspective; it does not consider any outside influence and reduces the complexity of 
the company to a simplistic cause and effect relationship. There have been calls for 
these issues to be addressed by, for example, adding an external perspective (Epstein & 
Manzoni, 1998) but this should not be regarded as a major issue as Kaplan & Norton do 
allow for the addition of other perspectives if required (Kaplan & Norton, 1996). The 
oversimplification of the cause and effect model is a larger issue. The main issue is that 
the BSC does not consider the time lag factor and views the cause and effect 
relationship as simultaneous (Kune, 2008). These views are supported by Rillo (2005) 
who also criticises the BSC’s top down approach to implementation and its unsuitability 
for small and medium sized companies. The lag in the cause and effect relationship 
must be monitored closely as the entire BSC concept is about harmonisation and it is 
pointless improving, for example, quality at the expense of volume or productivity 
(Norreklit, Jacobson & Mitchel, 2008). Another major issue with the BSC is the 
tendency towards financial measures. Lipe & Salterio (2000) reported that managers 
may pay insufficient attention to leading and non-financial measures. This of course 
defeats the purpose of the Balanced Scorecard. Neumann, Roberts & Cauvin (2010) 
found that managers preferred financial measures over non-financial measures at a rate 
of two to one. Another study by Herath, Wayne, Bremser & Birnberg (2010) identified 
this phenomenon and proposed a method for counteracting it. However, this method 
was based around the assumption that “there is a full open truthful exchange of 
information between the parties, that the parties are analytically minded and that they 
have agreed upon the strategic objectives, performance measures and hypothesised 
cause-effect linkages”. If the above assumption was in fact the reality then perhaps the 
problem wouldn’t arise in the first instance. The core of this issue lies in the fact that it 
is usually the financial measures against which performance bonuses for managers are 
set. This combined with the understandable scepticism of mangers, whose bonus may be 
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at stake, may lead to a lack of openness and honesty (Tate, 2000). This was also 
highlighted by Chen & Jones (2009) who reported that the employees in BSC 
companies indicated that the company pays more attention to the financial measures.  
The manner in which the metrics themselves are developed can also be problematic. 
The goals and metrics are constructed by senior management and then filtered down 
through the company. There are several challenges with this process. Top management 
may not have a complete view of the area for which they are setting the benchmarks. 
There is also a tendency for groups to favour decision consensus over decision quality. 
Communication lines must be open and honest, although even if they are there may be 
no opportunity for middle management to have any real input into the process as the 
decisions have already been made at a higher level (Hughes, Cauldwell & Paulson, 
2005). This process is dependent on the assumptions of a good knowledge of the 
concept as well as openness and honesty.  
The BSC has been criticised on a very fundamental level by Norreklit (2003) 
“What the model offers is not particularly innovative and lacks a reliable theoretical 
base”. This study also criticises the lack of monitoring of technological developments, 
the fact that the model takes no account of external risks to strategy and that it is a top 
down process. Many concepts such as employee empowerment and organisational 
learning as well as issues such as implementation problems and gaining support for the 
process are assumed to be completely unproblematic by Kaplan & Norton. Norreklit 
even takes issue with how the model is presented and described as is evidenced by the 
question “is the Balanced Scorecard a new and convincing theory or just persuasive 
rhetoric?”   
2.5.6 Summary – Balanced Scorecard 
The Balanced Scorecard was introduced by Kaplan and Norton in 1992. It was 
an attempt to combine financial and non-financial measures of a company’s 
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performance in order to drive improvements in a company’s strategic performance. It 
has been successfully implemented across a wide number of industries and geographical 
locations. It has much support from its users who believe it has brought about 
improvements to their organisation’s performance. It is however not without its issues. 
It is complex and costly to develop. It relies on an assumption that a company adopting 
it is open, honest and willing to embrace it from the top down. It is not really suitable 
for small companies. Organisations must foster involvement, consistency and 
adaptability in order to achieve measurable results from the implementation of a BSC 
(Deem, Barnes, Segal & Perziosi, 2010). This would imply that company culture also 
plays a large part in the usefulness of the Balanced Scorecard (Chavan, 2009).  
  BSC usage only leads to higher performance if managers understand the cause 
and effect relationships that link drivers with future financial performance (Capelo & 
Dias, 2009) and that a BSC which focuses purely on measurement and not strategy or 
improvement may in fact have a negative effect on performance (Braam & Nijssen, 
2004).  
The primary issues faced by the BSC are that it is costly and complex to develop 
and implement. It takes no account of many dimensions such as external forces. It 
assumes no lag in the cause and effect relationship. There still appears to be a bias 
towards financial measurements by managers. These challenges may be overcome if 
management are fully open, honest and not resistant to change. Management must have 
good lines of communication with their staff who must feel involved and who must also 
trust management (Dyball, Cummings & Yu, 2011). These points are summed up by 
Albright, Burgess, Davis & Juras (2007) who state that there are five elements required 
for the successful implementation of the BSC; 
1) Fairness 
2) Communication 
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3) Involvement in developing measures and standards 
4) Stretch Goals 
5) A meaningful reward system 
This gives rise to the question that if a company has knowledgeable, open, honest 
management with good lines of communication to staff who trust management, feel 
involved and who are well rewarded, how much of an improvement can the formal BSC 
offer as it is likely that management are already operating under some form of BSC. 
Conversely, if these attributes are not present then it is unlikely that management would 
be receptive to the BSC. Due to these issues the BSC is usually only suitable for larger 
companies and despite all the work involved reliance on the BSC does not necessarily 
translate to a strong market position (Hoque & James, 2000) 
 
  
Chapter Two 
43 
 
2.6 MCDM - Multi Criteria Decision Making 
Multi Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) is concerned with the managerial level 
planning and decision-making process. This process ranges from a single decision 
maker (DM) making the decision in the pursuit of a single goal, usually profit, up to 
theoretically any number of DM’s being involved in the decision-making process, the 
results of which may not necessarily be purely profit driven and may be subject to any 
number of constraints. The two primary perspectives of MCDM are; 
Multi Objective Decision Making (MODM). In these cases the alternatives are not 
explicitly known and the number of possible solutions are infinite. This method requires 
the application of complex mathematics and is of limited value to the practitioner. And, 
Multi Attribute Decision Making (MADM). In these cases the alternatives are explicitly 
known and are countable. The mathematics required for this method are not as complex 
and given the fact that the number of alternatives are finite, is of much greater value to 
the practitioner. 
1) The basic elements of the MCDM process which are common to the majority of 
MCDM methods are: 
2) Alternatives- represent the different set of choices of action available to the 
decision maker. 
3) Multiple attributes- also known as "goals" or "decision criteria". These represent 
the different perspectives from which the alternatives may be viewed. If the 
number of criteria is large (generally greater than 12) they may be weighted and 
arranged in a hierarchical manner. 
4) Conflicts among criteria- different criteria representing different dimensions of 
the alternatives may conflict with each other. 
Incommensurable units- different criteria may use different units of measure 
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Decision weights- most MCDM methods require that the criteria be assigned weights of 
importance these rates are normalised and add up to 1. (Triantaphyllou, 2000) 
Although the mathematics involved can be complex the following example using the 
Weighted Score Method is basic and gives a good insight into how the concept works; 
Let     be the score of option i using criterion j 
Let   be the weight for criterion j 
Let    be the score of option i 
Hence, 
            
This operation is carried out on each option using each criteria and the option with the 
best score is then selected. (Triantaphyllou, Shu, Nieto-Shanchez & Ray, 1998) 
Zionts (1979) realised that in spite of all of the research done in MCDM, most of it was 
not comprehensible to managers because of the mathematics involved. He wrote a paper 
in an attempt to explain the concept in plain English and used the possible decision 
making process employed when purchasing a car. 
In every decision there are conflicting objectives, in this case (buying a car) there are 
four. 
1) The price. The cheaper the better. 
2) The economy. The more economical the better. 
3) The roominess. The larger the better. 
4) The sportiness. The sportier the better. 
These objectives produce the following conflicts; the sportiest is not the cheapest, the 
roomiest is not the most economical, the largest is not the sportiest and so on. This 
means that tradeoffs will have to be made in order to affect a solution. When studying 
decision making, three assumptions are often made which are not necessarily true. 1) 
There is a fixed set of alternatives; one has to be chosen. 2) There is a decision maker 
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who knows the alternatives; he chooses one of these alternatives and 3) The alternative 
selected is in some sense optimal or best. Regardless of the specific scenario preference 
information from the DM's is required in order to reach a solution. This solution is not 
necessarily the best choice but the optimal alternative from a set of available 
alternatives derived from the methods described above incorporating the DM's 
preferences. The same problem with the same constraints may provide a very different 
set of alternatives depending on the DM's preferences. The “all knowing” decision 
maker is a myth. Nobody can know everything. Many decision makers depend on 
advisors when making decisions; further to this many decisions are made by committee. 
The committee scenario presents its own obvious problems. Ultimately the alternative 
chosen may not be the one that scores highest in each category, but the one that is the 
best overall fit or in some cases may even be the “least bad” option. The ultimate goal is 
“Pareto Optimisation” which is the point at which no further gains can be made in one 
objective at no cost to another objective.  
2.6.1Usage 
MCDM is a highly adaptable process and has been applied to many different 
areas including: Transportation and logistics, Business and financial management, 
Agriculture and forestry management, Project management, Manufacturing and 
assembly, Environmental management, water management, Managerial and strategic 
planning, Energy management, Military services and social services (Toloie-Eshlaghy 
& Homayonfar, 2011). These applications were all from a research/academic 
perspective suggesting that MCDM is more suited to research than industry. In fact, 
Steuer, Gardiner & Gray (1996) reported that MCDM has been ranked by various 
surveys as the 5
th
 and 7
th
 most useful operations research/ management science tool. The 
majority of the studies carried out on MCDM are from the academic perspective with 
very few of the studies being initiated from industry. However, MCDM’s flexibility 
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means that it can also be used to resolve concrete problems in industry such as end of 
life solutions (Bufardi, Sakara, Gheorghe, Kiristis & Xirouchakis, 2003) or more 
abstract concepts such as corporate image and reputation (Liou & Chuang, 2010). This 
would suggest that either industry awareness of the process is low or that it is of little 
value to industry. It could also be argued that the simple weighing up of “pros” and 
“cons” is MCDM in its most basic form and that from this perspective usage of the 
method runs at 100 per cent. 
 
 
Figure 1. MCDM Methods Identified in Order of Frequency of Use (Authors own) 
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Figure 2. Areas of Application of MCDM in Order of Use (Authors own) 
 
2.6.2 Awareness 
Awareness of the formal method of MCDM within industry appears to be quite 
low. However, Toloie-Eshlaghy & Homayonfar, (2011) conducted a review of MCDM 
methodologies and applications between 1999 and 2009 and found 628 scholarly papers 
on the subject. These findings make sense as MCDM is primarily an operations research 
tool, so awareness of the process is high in academia/research but low in industry even 
though MCDM can and has been applied to real world industry scenarios. For example 
Bellver, Royo & Augistin, (2011) combined AHP (Analytical Hierarchy Process) and 
valuation ratios in order to place valuations on recently merged Spanish banks. This 
produced methods for valuation but gave no indication of how accurate or correct the 
value estimates were. In this case the variables are both quantitative and qualitative 
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process is described for the selection of these experts nor is a definition of what 
constitutes an expert.  
2.6.3 Implementation 
Applying an MCDM technique can be a costly and lengthy process. Before the 
actual computation itself takes place experts must be identified and agree to come on 
board the project. Parameters must be agreed upon and complex and lengthy 
questionnaires must be completed by decision makers and experts (Zionts & Wallenius, 
1976). Again no method is provided for the choosing of expert decision makers nor is 
"expert" defined. These are traits shared with the Balanced Scorecard. These selections 
can only be made after a suitable MCDM method has been evaluated and chosen. In a 
review Toloie-Eshlaghy & Homayonfar, (2011) identified over 26 different MCDM 
methodologies (see Fig. 1). There is no systematic process available to assist with the 
selection of the most suitable method (Bufardi, Sakara, Gheorghe, Kiristis & 
Xirouchakis, 2003) although efforts have been made to present guidelines which may 
assist with the selection process (Gurrouni & Martel, 1998). One of the biggest issues 
with MCDM is its lack of “real world” applications. While it is undoubtedly highly 
utilised in research settings, there is a definite shortage of real world interventions 
(Montibeller, Gummer & Tumidei, 2006). This is not necessarily a criticism or failing 
of the process as MCDM is after all primarily a research tool. 
2.6.4 Benefits 
MCDM is a widely used decision making research tool (Steuer, Gardiner & 
Grey, 1996; Toloie-Eshlaghy & Homayonfar, 2011) and its users believe it brings many 
benefits. It is usable over short and long term timeframes of two to ten years (Zionts & 
Wallenius, 1976) and is therefore useful in long term strategic planning (Montibeller, 
Gummer & Tumidei, 2006). With regard to strategic planning the MCDM process, as a 
by-product, highlights any lack of cohesiveness or strategic awareness on the part of 
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managers during the questionnaire phase (Kim, Kwak & Yoo, 1988). This in turn can 
result in managers taking a fresher approach to problems (Montibeller, Gummer and 
Tumidei, 2006). These strategies can be more flexible and efficient with minimal extra 
cost through the addition of extra parameters (Linares, 2002). As well as strategic and 
policy planning, MCDM can be used in more “concrete” situations such as selecting 
computer systems (Klersey, Ko & Lin, 1988). The ability of MCDM to handle both 
concrete and more abstract issues such as corporate image (Liou & Chuang, 2010) is 
down to the fact that the model can deal effectively with both qualitative and 
quantitative data (Mardle & Pascoe, 1999). This ability to deal effectively with 
qualitative data is especially useful when dealing with opinions from large and diverse 
groups. The “expert groups” and decision makers all have a role in the refining of 
parameters and these parameters are not necessarily numeric values. The MCDM 
process accommodates these differing opinions and results in agreed aggregate 
weighting (Baucells & Sarin, 2003). This allows for a greater input from expert groups 
which in turn leads to more informed decision making. That said, quantitative data is 
more efficient than qualitative data as quantitative data requires further manipulation 
with the application of fuzzy logic (Rao & Patel, 2010).  MCDM can also account for 
multiple uncertain conditions simultaneously (Kuo, 2011). This is an important feature 
as it allows multiple scenarios to be examined in a single operation instead of taking 
each one in turn which demonstrates MCDM’s efficiency. Most levels of uncertainties 
can be accommodated. There are two broad categories of uncertainty; External 
uncertainty – related to the consequences of our actions and Internal uncertainty – 
related to the decision makers values and judgements. The levels of these uncertainties 
vary from “low level” that can be handled probabilistically right up to deep uncertainty 
(unknown unknowns). There are no MCDM methods for dealing with deep uncertainty 
(Van Der Pas, Walker, Marchan, Van Wee & Agusdinata, 2010) despite the great 
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diversity of the MCDM procedures available (Bouysson, Perny, Pirlot, Tsoukias & 
Vincke, 1993). To this end and in so far as is possible some MCDM methods, for 
example Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), can be predictive. AHP has been 
successful in predicting the rise and fall of stocks, political candidacy, oil prices, energy 
rationing, predicting family size in rural India and the outcomes of chess games (Saaty, 
1997). Despite the complexity of the decisions aided by MCDM the practical 
application of the process itself should be straightforward for the decision makers. The 
real complexity of the process lies in the complex mathematics required, but this is 
usually performed by dedicated software packages. Indeed for relatively simple 
decisions, the process can be executed on an excel spreadsheet (Fischer, 2009). 
2.6.5 Limitations 
Perhaps one of the biggest issues with MCDM is the subjectivity of the decision 
makers. The decision makers input into the process is essentially their opinion. Granted 
this is usually an informed opinion, but it is an opinion nonetheless. This opinion may 
not be the best option in the given context (Zionts & Wallenius, 1976). This is 
especially true if only one decision maker is utilised as a result of biases that may be 
present (Linares, 2002). Even in a situation where there are multiple decision makers, 
they may have conflicting objectives or opinions resulting in a situation where a single 
best solution is unlikely (Mardle & Pascoe, 1999). This scenario results in difficulty 
aggregating the preferences of the decision makers. This is achieved through reducing 
the total number of decision makers to a number of coalitions (Baucells & Sarin, 2003) 
which would seem to degrade any advantage gained through having a large number of 
decision makers in the first instance. The realistic accommodation of these limitations 
of judgement has been an ongoing concern in MCDM research and merits further 
attention (Fishburn & Lavalle, 1999). In order to reach an optimal solution a greater 
number of questions must be answered by the decision makers. This results in a higher 
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computational cost, also the more questions that are asked the greater the lack of 
decision maker consistency (Zionts & Wallenius, 1976). Similarly with criteria, the 
more criteria included, the more flexible the resulting strategy will be but again this 
results in higher costs (Linares, 2002). A large amount of DMs results in a higher 
number of possible alternatives (Mardle & Pascoe, 1999) so it would appear that in an 
effort to include as much as possible in a decision making process may in fact lead to a 
broader set of alternatives instead of narrowing them down. Another concern with extra 
input is that of “entrenched thinking” or “analysis paralysis”. This type of approach 
does not encourage innovative “outside the box” thinking and with so many opinions, 
there is the danger of a trade off between agreeing on the correct answer and simply 
making a decision (Snowden & Boone, 2007). This highlights another serious issue 
with MCDM, the lack of guidelines for choosing decision makers and the lack of a 
definition of “expert” in that context. Some studies employ the services of academics (it 
is often unknown if these academics have interests in the decision making process or the 
industry being investigated) some, industry leaders and others make use of a mix of 
both. There is a shortage of real world interventions using MCDM techniques 
(Montibellar, Gummer & Tumidei, 2006). That is not to say that MCDM techniques 
have not been applied to real world scenarios because they have (Blair, Mandelkar, 
Saaty & Whitaker, 2010) but mostly from a research perspective only. This is possibly 
as a result of MCDM’s inability to cope with deep uncertainty or unknown unknowns 
(Linares, 2002), There have been attempts to develop models that deal with deep 
uncertainty (Van Der Pas, Walker, Marchan, Van Wee & Agusdinata, 2010) but as they 
are dealing with unknown future events, evaluation can be difficult and any correlation 
beyond coincidence would be difficult to prove. When applying MCDM, most studies 
control for deep uncertainty by simplifying parameters and evaluation procedures to a 
level that is rarely so clearly defined and simplistic in real world scenarios (Belton, 
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Ackerman & Isheperd, 1997). Value ranges may be predetermined by the researcher in 
order to avoid complications (Klersey, Ko & Lin, 1998), (Kim, Kwak & Yoo, 1998). 
This required manipulation supports the notion that MCDM may not be a viable option 
when making a “real world” decision that does not have clearly defined parameters and 
high levels of uncertainty. This gives rise to the question why use a complex process to 
solve a relatively simple problem?  In fact this complexity, particularly the high level of 
mathematics required can in itself put managers off using the process (Fischer, 2009). 
Another deterrent may be the sheer number of MCDM techniques available (Bouysson, 
Perny, Pirlot, Tsoukias & Vincke, 1993) (see Fig. 1) with no clear selection criteria 
available (Bufaardi, Sakara, Gheorghe, Kiristis & Xironchakis, 2003) the process of 
choosing a decision making technique almost requires the application of a decision 
making technique. 
2.6.6 Summary – Multi Criteria Decision Making 
MCDM is a decision making framework consisting of many different methods 
that may be applied as per their suitability. It is widely used in the field of operations 
research although it lacks “real world” applications. It is highly mathematical and 
complex process and is capable of dealing with low to mid level uncertainty. There is a 
large number of techniques which may be applied and while no formal solutions 
procedure exists for finding the most suitable technique guidelines were produced by 
Gurrouni & Martel (1998) which include: the type of data, the nature of the data – crisp, 
fuzzy, etc.; the objective of comparing alternatives; Compensation between criteria – 
total, partial, not allowed; Articulation of preference and the type of criteria – pseudo 
criteria, semi criteria or true criteria. While the techniques are widely used by 
researchers (Toloie-Eshlaghy & Homayonfar, 2011) it would appear that managers and 
decision makers struggle with the process in reality  (Montibeller, Gummer & Tumidei, 
2006) despite the simplification of criteria selection and parameters (Kaleta, Ogryczak, 
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Toczylowski & Zoltanska, 2003). It would appear that MCDM is best suited to research 
problems with low to medium levels of uncertainty. However the ability to deal with 
deep uncertainty (essentially the ability to predict the future) is an unreasonable 
expectation of any decision making framework, be it research or industry based.  
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2.7 Data Envelopment Analysis 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) was developed “to provide a methodology 
whereby within a set of comparable decision making units (DMU), those exhibiting best 
practice could be identified and would form an efficient Frontier” (Cook & Seiford, 
2009). 
The following is an example of how the efficiency of a group of airlines may be 
measured using DEA. Each airline has a single output measure which is the number of 
economy passengers carried in a year. Each airline also has a single input measure 
which is the total number of staff employed. 
Airline Passengers (000's) No. of Staff 
Airline A 125 18 
Airline B 44 16 
Airline C 80 17 
Airline D 23 11 
Table 1. Airlines with Single Input and Single Output Measure 
 
Expressing the above as a ratio of passengers per staff member gives us the 
following; 
Airline A......6.94 passengers per staff member  
Airline B......2.75 passengers per staff member 
Airline C.......4.71 passengers per staff member 
Airline D.......2.09 passengers per staff member 
Airline A has the highest ratio so is the most efficient of the examined airlines. 
The relative efficiency of the other airlines can be calculated by dividing the ratio of any 
airline by 6.94 and multiplying by 100 to give a percentage. 
Airline A      100(6.94/6.94) = 100% 
Airline B       100(2.75/6.94) = 40% 
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Airline C       100(4.71/6.94) = 68% 
Airline D       100(2.09/6.94) = 30% 
This shows that the other airlines are not performing as well when compared to 
Airline A. They are relatively less efficient at producing an output from the given input. 
Airline A in this instance could be used to set performance targets for the other less 
efficient airlines. For example, Airline D could carry the same number of passengers but 
with less staff members, this is known as an input target. Alternatively Airline D could 
increase the number of passengers carried while retaining the same number of staff, this 
is known as an output target. In practice a mix of input and output targets would be set. 
Typically there are more than one input and one output. Suppose business class 
passengers carried was included as an output but with the same staff numbers; 
Airline 
Economy Passengers 
(000’s) 
Business Passengers 
(000’s) 
No. of Staff 
Airline A 125 50 18 
Airline B 44 20 16 
Airline C 80 55 17 
Airline D 23 12 11 
Table 2. Airlines with Single Input and Two Output Measures 
 
Again using ratios for comparison purposes; 
Airline 
Staff Members 
 per Economy Passenger 
Staff Members 
  per Business Passenger 
Airline A 6.94 2.78 
Airline B 2.75 1.25 
Airline C 4.71 3.24 
Airline D 2.09 1.09 
Table 3. Ratios of Input to Outputs for Airlines 
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Now consider Airline C and Airline A. Airline C is (4.71/6.94) = 67.86 per cent 
as efficient as Airline A with regard to economy passengers but (3.24/2.78) = 116.55 
per cent as efficient with regard to business passengers. DEA is a method whereby these 
two figures may be aggregated into a single score allowing the airlines examined to be 
benchmarked against their peers. 
DEA can trace its origins back to “Measuring the efficiency of decision making 
units” (Charnes, Cooper & Rhodes, 1978). The method was originally developed for 
evaluating public/not-for-profit programs hence the terminology “DMU” and 
“programme” as opposed to terms such as “firms” and “industry”. Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhodes proposed that the measure of efficiency of any DMU is obtained as the 
maximum of a ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs subject to the condition that 
similar ratios for every DMU be less than or equal to unity. 
This may be expressed mathematically as: 
 
         
           
           
 
Subject to; 
     
       
 
   
       
 
   
                              
  ,   ≥ 0; r = 1.........,s. ; i = 1.........,m.  
(Charnes, Cooper & Rhodes, 1978) 
“Here the    ,     (all positive) are the known outputs and inputs of the  
   DMU and 
the   ,    ≥ 0 as the variable weights to be determined by the solution of this problem 
e.g. by the data on all of the DMU’s which are being used as a reference set. The 
efficiency of one member of this on reference set of j=1.........n DMU’s is to be rated 
relative to the others for the DMU’s that concern us. These     and     values which are 
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constants will usually be observations from past decisions on inputs and the outputs that 
resulted there from. We can, however, replace some or all observations by theoretically 
determined values if we wish (and are able) to conduct the efficiency evaluations in that 
manner.” (Charnes, Cooper & Rhodes, 1978) 
The CCR (Charnes, Cooper & Rhodes) ratio is a measure of overall efficiency 
and is comprised of both technical and scale inefficiencies combined. In 1984 Banker, 
Charnes & Cooper (BCC) developed this concept further to allow separation into 
technical and scale inefficiencies without altering the conditions for the use of DEA 
directly on observational data. 
The identification of technical efficiencies is achieved by identifying the failure to 
achieve the best possible output levels and/or excessive inputs. 
This is described mathematically as follows: 
                  
 
   
 
Subject to; 
     
         
 
   
          
         
 
   
         
 
   
     
                       and    is unconstrained in sign. 
(Banker, Charnes & Cooper, 1984) 
The CCR model provides a measure of technical and scale efficiency combined 
(overall efficiency) and the BCC model provides a pure technical efficiency score, 
while pure scale efficiency may be determined by dividing the CCR score by the BCC 
score. 
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In order to provide clarity the concepts of overall, technical and pure scale 
efficiency are presented graphically in figure 3. For demonstration purposes a simple 
one input one output model is used.  
 
 
 
 
In the above graph the DMUs A, B, C, D, E and F form the efficiency frontier, i.e. are 
100 per cent efficient, according to the Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (CCR) model 
which assumes constant returns to scale. This is a measure of overall efficiency. DMUs 
G, H, I, C, J, K and L form the efficiency frontier, i.e. are 100 per cent efficient, 
according to the Banker, Charnes and Cooper (BCC) model which assumes variable 
returns to scale. This is a measure of pure technical (or managerial) efficiency. The ratio 
of overall efficiency score/pure technical score provides a measure of pure scale 
efficiency.  
Consider the target DMU “T” which is inefficient. 
A 
L K 
J 
I 
H 
G 
F 
E 
D 
C 
B 
Outputs 
T0 
T 
T3 
T1 
T2 
Inputs 
CCR 
BCC 
TMAX1 
TMAX2 
Figure 3. Graph of the Relationship Between the Three DEA Models  
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The efficiency score for DMU T according to the CCR model (overall efficiency) is the 
distance T1 expressed as a percentage of T0.  
The efficiency score for DMU T according to the BCC model (technical efficiency) is 
the distance T1 expressed as a percentage of T2.  
If DMU T were to achieve 100 per cent technical efficiency it would reach the point 
TMAX1. This implies any inefficiencies that are preventing DMU T from reaching overall 
efficiency (TMAX2) are pure scale inefficiencies. Thus the distance T2 represents pure 
scale efficiency when expressed as a percentage of T0. This percentage may be 
calculated by dividing the CCR score for DMU T by the BCC score for DMU T.  
Returns to scale refers to the change of total output due to the change in total 
input. In cases where the changes are directly proportional i.e. a doubling of inputs 
results in a doubling of outputs this is known as constant returns to scale. If however 
outputs change at increasing or decreasing rates this is known as varying returns to 
scale. There are various causes of each type of return to scale. Constant returns to scale 
may occur when a production process is easily replicable. For example a manufacturing 
company may build a second identical factory hence double the inputs results in double 
the outputs. Increasing returns to scale are often a result of various factors. A heavy 
engineering company may need large expensive machinery and these machines must be 
used no matter how small the scale of production.  If scale of production increases then 
there is a more efficient use of the machine and hence an increasing return to scale. 
Decreasing returns to scale can often occur as a result of increased complexity. If a 
manufacturing company buys a second factory some distance from the first there is now 
a requirement for extra coordination, management and logistics these extra inputs are 
additional costs that would not be required with only one factory hence double the 
inputs does not result in double the outputs. 
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2.7.1 Usage 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) as developed by Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhodes (1978) was originally intended as a tool to measure efficiency in not-for-profit 
entities as opposed to firms and industries. However when the process is defined as “the 
measure of the efficiency of any DMU is obtained as the maximum of a ratio of 
weighted outputs to weighted inputs subject to the condition that the similar ratios for 
every DMU be less than or equal to unity” (Charnes, Cooper & Rhodes, 1978) it is not 
surprising to find that DEA has become a popular method of efficiency measurement 
outside of the not-for-profit sector. DEA has been used to measure efficiency in the 
hotel industry (Huang, Lee & Lee, 2012), the airline industry (Zhu, 2011; Merkert & 
Morrell, 2012), healthcare (Assaf & Matawie, 2010), the banking sector (Barr, Seiford 
& Siems, 1993), airports (Martin & Roman, 2006), electricity provision (Sueyoshi & 
Goto, 2012) and government policy analysis (Whittaker, 1994) among others. All of the 
examples provided above are from a research/academic perspective. There is, however, 
evidence to suggest that DEA is a commonly used tool in a ”real world” context. This is 
in spite of the relatively complex mathematics involved and specific expertise required 
to carry out a DEA analysis. There is also evidence which suggests that DEA has a role 
to play in developing early warning tools in failure prediction (Gumus & Celikkol, 
2011). This indicates that DEA may have the potential for an even more significant role 
in industry than it currently does. 
Input and Output Selection 
A feature of Data Envelopment Analysis is the requirement to choose the inputs 
and outputs which are to be compared/measured. There are no firm rules pertaining to 
these selections. In order to reduce any arbitrariness, a further review was conducted 
focusing on the area of input/output selection. A review of 20 airline efficiency studies 
was conducted (see Appendix A). These studies included techniques such as DEA, 
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Total Factor Productivity and Stochastic Frontier Analysis. All of the techniques 
included in this review make use of the input/output model as applied to an airline. The 
purpose of this exercise was to identify the most commonly used inputs and outputs 
utilized in airline efficiency studies (see figures 4 and 5 below).  
 
Figure 4. Most Frequently Used Inputs 
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Figure 5. Most Frequently Used Outputs  
 
This analysis shows that the average airline based study that made use of an 
input/output based technique (DEA, TFP, SFA) consists of three inputs and two outputs.  
From figure 4, the three most commonly used inputs are: 
 Personnel Costs 
 Fuel 
 Operating Cost (total operating expenses) or Materials (fuel, flight/non 
flight equipment and other materials)   
From figure 5, the two most commonly used outputs are: 
 Revenue passenger miles 
 Tonne KMs 
These input and output parameters formed the initial basis for parameter selection 
during the empirical stage of the project. 
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2.7.2 Benefits 
When measuring anything the validity of the measure is crucially important and 
efficiency is no different. DEA provides a technique for accurately measuring efficiency 
and identifying potential areas of improvement. DEA is suitable for a wide variety of 
applications including banking, mergers and acquisitions, public transport and program 
evaluation (Seiford, 1996). Many of these applications are from a real-world perspective 
(Gattouffi, Oral, Kumar & Reisman, 2004). This gives DEA an advantage over many 
other performance measurement techniques which are often concentrated on research or 
academic settings. The popularity of DEA is evidenced by the 3000+ publications 
which have cited the use of DEA (Tavares, 2002). The widespread popularity of DEA is 
attributable to four facts: 
1) Its ability to handle multiple inputs and outputs, 
2) It does not require a priori a relative weighting scheme for the 
input/output variables, 
3) It returns a simple summary measure for the efficiency of each DMU, 
4) It identifies the sources and amounts of relative inefficiency for each 
DMU. 
(Lee & Choi, 2010). 
These four attributes demonstrate how relatively uncomplicated yet comprehensive 
DEA is as a performance measurement technique. This is further emphasised by how 
unrestrictive the underlying modeling of DEA is including the permissive approach to 
defining what inputs and outputs may consist of (Parkin & Hollingsworth, 1997). DEA 
can also accommodate both financial and operational data (Martin & Roman, 2008). 
Again, this puts DEA ahead of those techniques already capable of processing either 
one or the other data types. Meaningful conclusions may be reached by using relatively 
basic, publicly available data (Barr, Seiford  & Seims, 1993; Scheraga, 2004). This 
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means that efficiency comparisons can be made across industries without the direct 
involvement of specific firms. This is a useful property if a firm wishes to benchmark 
itself within its own industry. When combined with the more traditional ratio analysis 
(RA) measures such as liquidity, debt and profitability ratios, DEA provides a more 
comprehensive perspective on resource adjustment (Huang, Lee & Lee, 2012) than RA 
alone. It has also been suggested that future research employing DEA in conjunction 
with RA could be useful in developing early warning tools for failure prediction 
(Gumus & Celikkol, 2011). One of the reasons DEA provides further insight than RA is 
its ability to quantify variables such as managerial efficiency (Barr, Seiford & Seims, 
1993) which RA alone cannot (Sherman & Gold, 1985). Further refining of the DEA 
approach can provide even further insight into efficiency (Zhu, 2011). This combining 
of financial and operational ratios can be used in the creation of standards against which 
to measure other firms (Guerra, de Souza & Moreira, 2012). The data required for such 
an analysis may be in the form of theoretically prescribed values or they may be in the 
form of observations (Banker, Charnes & Cooper, 1984). DEA is capable of suggesting 
financial and operational improvements into the future (Charnes, Cooper & Rhodes, 
1978). These suggestions may be quite specific with regard to improvements required 
for any given criterion (Chakraborty, Majumder & Sarkar, 2011). Some forms of DEA 
may even account for unobserved DMUs (Gajewski, Lee, Botti, Pramjariyakul & 
Taunton, 2009). This demonstrates just how efficient DEA is as a process in its own 
right. 
2.7.3 Limitations 
DEA provides relative efficiency scores (Charnes, Cooper & Rhodes, 1978) 
meaning that efficiency is not ranked in absolute terms. This should be borne in mind 
when using DEA as a DMU may score number one (100 per cent) for efficiency but this 
is only relative to the other DMU’s examined and still may fall far short of true optimal 
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efficiency. This gives rise to another issue. If several DMU’s are positioned on the 
efficiency frontier they cannot be ranked relative to each other (Martin & Roman, 2006) 
as all deviations from the frontier are assumed to be random (Scherga, 2004). This 
makes the identification of specific problem areas impossible as all DMU’s are equally 
efficient. One of the assumptions of DEA is that all DMU’s of interest are observed and 
all relevant inputs and outputs have been measured (Gajewski, Lee, Botti, Pramjariyakul 
& Taunton, 2009). This leaves the DEA process open to manipulation by vested 
interests, for example a management team may wish to exclude or manipulate 
measurements from a particular underperforming DMU. This can lead to some DEA 
results being nonsensical (Liu, 2009). This issue was specifically identified by Martin & 
Roman (2008). In their study of Spanish airports managers influenced their efficiency 
scores by manipulating the inputs i.e. runways, terminal buildings etc. in a particular 
manner to produce the desired results. DEA is also very permissive of what actually 
constitutes a DMU and an input or output. No guidance is provided for analysts and 
choosing the parameters (Parkin & Hollingsworth, 1997). The lack of definition of 
DMU is also highlighted by Charnes, Cooper & Rhodes (1978) in their original paper so 
clearly this is a long-running issue. DEA also suffers from methodological difficulties 
such as: 
1) Producing many different DMU’s. This is mathematically acceptable but 
as has been discussed previously is managerially problematic as the efficient 
DMU’s cannot be ranked if several are positioned on the production frontier, 
2) Multiple projections and multiple reference sets, 
3) A conventional use of DEA cannot provide an industry wide evaluation. 
Efficiency can only be compared from within the reference set, 
4) DEA cannot provide statistical inferences, 
 (Sueyoshi & Goto, 2012) 
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The issue of data integrity was also highlighted by Kuo & Lin (2012) who suggested 
that data should be homogenised into values within the same value range which would 
ensure that the weight range of evaluation indicators is meaningful. It was also 
suggested that the number of DMU’s should be at least two to three times larger than 
the sum of the number of inputs + outputs. This places an operational limitation on the 
use of DEA. As DEA is nonparametric no statistical inferences can be made 
(Chakraborty, Majunder & Sarkar, 2011; Assaf & Matawie, 2010). This also places a 
limitation on sample size and comes with an associated lack of inferential power when 
compared to parametric methods. 
2.7.4 Summary – Data Envelopment Analysis 
While Data Envelopment Analysis was originally developed for use in the not-
for-profit sector its flexibility allowed it to make the crossover into commercial 
applications. DEA theory is dominated by two primary theories; The CCR model which 
measures overall efficiency and the BCC model which allows for the separation of 
technical and scale inefficiencies.   
DEA is a relatively straightforward yet comprehensive method of efficiency 
measurement. It is capable of identifying specific organizational units which are falling 
short on efficiency. In order to do this however it is assumed that all relevant inputs and 
outputs are honestly reported. This leaves DEA open to interference by vested interests. 
As long as this issue is recognised and controlled for it is not a major concern in itself. 
A greater and ongoing issue is the lack of definition of what constitutes a DMU and an 
input or output. There are guidelines available with regard to maximum numbers of 
DMUs and inputs/outputs. 
While DEA is widely used across many industries it does require open and 
honest engagement by managers in reporting their figures. Beyond that, a prudent and 
Chapter Two 
67 
 
systematic application of the process should yield useful and, perhaps even more 
importantly, actionable information regarding a firms efficiency.  
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2.8 Conclusion 
While EVA, the BSC and MCDM are all valid methodologies they only account for a 
company’s performance in its own right. They do not provide any form of ranking or 
“built in” comparative function. EVA scores could be calculated and compared but this 
is essentially another way of reporting profit and does not account for the complexity of 
airline business models or practices. There are also confidentiality issues surrounding 
the necessary data which make EVA unsuited for a study of this type. The BSC is a 
widely used means of assessing company performance and does allow for the inclusion 
of financial and non financial data. However, many aspects of it are largely subjective 
which results in large amounts of quantitative data which makes direct comparison 
difficult. Confidentiality and data availability are also issues for an outside researcher 
seeking to create multiple balanced scorecards for comparison purposes. Multi criteria 
decision making is primarily a research tool that allows researchers to investigate and 
develop strategy and overall is not particularly suited to performance measurement 
and/or comparison.  
 
Economic Value 
Added 
Balanced 
Scorecard 
Multi Criteria 
Decision 
Making 
Data 
Envelopment 
Analysis 
Financial Measures     
Non Financial 
Measures 
    
Strategic     
Proprietary     
Qualitative      
Quantitative      
Benchmarking     
Table 4. Comparison of four key Performance Measurement Methodologies 
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Data Envelopment Analysis is highly suited to and widely used in performance 
measurement studies of airlines. However, there are some issues surrounding its use. An 
ongoing issue with DEA is data availability and input/output selection. Many studies 
use convenience data which often results in studies of DEA as opposed to DEA studies 
of airlines. In other words the method rather than the sector is the main focus of the 
research. Also, 100 per cent efficiency scores are reported as absolutes and while this is 
technically correct (in fact it is necessary in order to form the efficient frontier) in terms 
of the DEA model it is highly unlikely that two or more complex entities achieve 
identical efficiency scores. There are three DEA models available to the researcher 
CRS, VRS and Pure Scale. The majority of the studies reviewed use only one while 
some used two and only one used all three.  
This study intends to address these issues by first selecting the airlines for 
analysis and then investigating the data availability in a reversal of the more common 
direction which tends to focus on data availability first. Those airlines identified as 100 
per cent efficient will be further investigated in an attempt to ascertain their “degree” of 
100 per cent efficiency and finally all three DEA models will be utilised and used as the 
basis for a further analysis in order to identify any common best practices that may exist 
across the best performing airlines. 
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Chapter Three  Research Design and Methodology  
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3.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the research designs and methodology including 
research tool selection and validation; data availability and collection; and airline 
selection. Empiricism is an approach taken in the pursuit of knowledge that asserts that 
only when that knowledge is gained through experience and the senses can it be 
considered sound. 
This approach emphasises the need for ideas and hypotheses to be subject to 
rigorous testing before being accepted as knowledge. The methods and procedures used 
in this testing must be based on measurable and observable evidence.  The 
methodological approach used by the researcher should provide a framework for how 
data is collected, categorised and presented (Arbnor & Bjerke, 1996). However, before 
work of this nature begins it is important to consider the matters of ontology and 
epistemology. Ontology and epistemology describe the perceptions, assumptions, 
beliefs and biases present in the researcher and how they might influence how the 
research is conducted.  
Ontology has been described as “the science or study of being“(Blaikie, 1993) 
and is concerned with an individual’s view on the nature of reality. Simply put, is an 
individual’s perception of reality actually real or what they think is real? Further, does 
this reality only exist through experience (subjective), or does it exist independent of 
experience (objective).  
Epistemology is concerned with the question “what is knowledge and what are 
the sources and limits of knowledge?” (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2000). Similarly to 
ontology epistemology may be subjective or objective. If these matters are not 
understood and addressed it is very easy for the researcher to miss or ignore certain 
aspects of the research as a result of presupposition.  
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Once these issues have been acknowledged it is then possible to proceed with 
the empirical enquiry itself. The basic format of this enquiry is represented by de 
Groot’s Empirical Cycle below in figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6. de Groot's Empirical Cycle (Heitink, 1999)  
 
1. Observation: The collecting and organisation of empirical facts; forming 
hypothesis. 
2. Induction: Formulating hypothesis. 
3. Deduction: Deducting consequences of hypothesis as testable predictions. 
4. Testing: Testing the hypothesis with new empirical material. 
5. Evaluation: Evaluating the outcome of testing (Heitink, 1999). 
 
When conducting research it is important to adhere to three principles: 
reliability, replication and validity (Bryman & Bell, 2007). This section briefly 
describes these three principles and examines how they relate to this study. 
Reliability refers to the question of whether or not the measures that are devised for 
business and management concepts such as staff morale and team working are 
consistent. This consistency can be difficult if not impossible to achieve when dealing 
with more “abstract” concepts such as those previously mentioned. As a result it can be 
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difficult to replicate research as the measures are unreliable. This study uses stable 
measures such as number of employees and fuel costs. These are “concrete” values and 
so are reliable and make replication possible. 
Replication or replicability is a measure of how easy it is to repeat research 
work. There are various reasons for replicating other researchers’ findings such as 
confirming the results are correct or conducting the research again in light of new or 
updated theories. In order for this replication to be possible it is important for 
researchers to describe the processes and procedures in detail. The processes and 
procedures for this study are presented in the following pages. Validity is concerned 
with the integrity of the results and conclusions of a research work. There are various 
types of validity. 
Measurement or construct validity raises the question of whether or not a 
measure is actually a measure of the concept that is under examination. For example, in 
the context of this study the variables used; number of employees, fuel costs, staff costs, 
EBIT and passengers carried are all reliable measures of their constructs. Similarly with 
performance measurement techniques, several were investigated and ultimately 
identified as valid measures of their respective constructs and have been widely used in 
research studies.  
Internal validity is concerned primarily with causality. In other words it 
questions whether or not a conclusion that supposes a causal relationship between two 
or more variables is valid. This study does not assume causal relationships although 
such relationships are identifiable through various means such as regression analysis. 
Such relationships are beyond the scope of this study but are undoubtedly grounds for 
further research. 
External validity asks whether the results of a study can be generalized beyond a 
specific context. As this study necessarily uses convenience sampling generalisations 
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and inferences about the entire population cannot be made hence external validity is 
low. This is a limitation of this study but was beyond the control of the researcher as 
data availability was an issue. Again, this is an area for further research as there is 
possible value in replicating this research using random sampling and hence providing 
inferences. 
These principles are important as they allow for a considered and structured 
research strategy. This in turn allows for clear communication between researchers and 
allows for easy replication of work. The empirical work for this study was carried out in 
three phases: firstly, a total of 75 annual reports of European airlines were examined; 
secondly, a formal DEA model was built and the performance of 17 airlines was 
examined in detail using the model; thirdly, three representative airlines were further 
examined as mini-case studies. The benefits of this structured approach are protection 
against errors and the provision of groundwork for future research (Remenyi, Williams, 
Money & Swartz, 1998). 
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3.2 Research Process 
Watson (1994) illustrated a what, why and how framework that may be used 
when considering research: 
 
What? 
What puzzles/intrigues me? 
What do I want to know more 
about/understand better? 
What are my key research questions? 
Why? 
Why will this be of enough interest to 
others to be published as a thesis, book, 
paper, guide to practitioners or policy-
makers? Can the research be justified 
as a contribution to knowledge? 
How – conceptually? 
What models, concepts and theories can 
I draw on/develop to answer my 
research questions? 
How can these be brought together into 
a basic conceptual framework to guide 
my investigation? 
How – practically? 
What investigative styles and 
techniques shall I use to apply my 
conceptual framework (both to gather 
material and analyse it)? 
How shall I gain and maintain access to 
information sources? 
Figure 7. What, Why & How Framework (Watson, 1994) 
 
This framework provides an excellent overview and starting point when considering a 
research project. It gives insight into not only the thought process but also into what is 
required procedurally in order to execute a research project.  
Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2007) presented a more detailed and formal 
approach to research with their Research Onion diagram. The research onion identifies 
and examines each major step in the research process and provides the researcher with 
an overview of each step. According to the research onion the research process should 
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be approached from the outer ring or layer towards the centre. The outermost ring 
describes the philosophies of research; positivism, realism, objectivism, subjectivism, 
pragmatism, functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist or radical structuralist. The 
second layer deals with approaches to research; deductive or inductive. Strategies are 
described in the third layer; experiment, survey, case study, grounded theory, 
ethnography and archival research. Next there are choices; mono method, mixed 
method or multi method. The fifth layer is concerned with time horizons i.e. should the 
study be cross sectional or longitudinal. Finally, the bulb of the onion describes the 
process of data collection and data analysis. 
 
Figure 8. Research Onion (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2007) 
 
This study is multi faceted and makes use of multiple options available in each layer. 
The scientific approach to the development of knowledge in this study invokes the 
philosophy of realism. This philosophy asserts the basic assumption of fact as opposed 
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to belief. There are however also elements of pragmatism in the direct reporting of 
results and the interpretive approach in the further analysis of these results. As a result 
the research approach is necessarily inductive as the researcher makes observations 
which lead to a result. There then follows a deductive element as conclusions are made 
from previously identified facts. With regard to the research strategy again several 
elements of the onion are used. Action research - solving a particular problem, case 
study – analysis of a particular entity and a form of grounded theory – data collected 
and analysed to identify common factors are all research strategies utilised by this study. 
The choice of method includes both mixed i.e. qualitative and quantitative approaches 
as well as multi methods as several research methods are brought together to complete 
the work. The timeline is a straightforward cross section. The data used are primary data 
as they are taken directly from the “subjects” and not a third party. The airlines included 
in this study were selected on the basis of the availability of annual reports, the annual 
reports being in English and the report containing the required data. 
Overall, the research onion provides a comprehensive six step approach to 
research. McNabb (2004) presents a similar but more detailed approach to research: 
Step 1 – Identify Research Question 
Step 2 – Establish Research Objectives 
Step 3 – Select Research Strategy 
Step 4 – Prepare a Research Plan 
Step 5 – Review the Literature 
Step 6 – Gather the Data 
Step 7 – Analyse and Interpret the Data 
Step 8 – Prepare and Present the Findings 
In terms of describing the research process used in this study with reference to 
reliability, replicability and validity the philosophies of both the Research Onion and 
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McNabb are used as underlying guiding principles. Each piece of research is, by its very 
nature, a unique process and as such may not fit a pre prescribed structure. With this in 
mind the following describes the steps taken by the researcher in carrying out this study. 
3.2.1 Step 1 – Identify Research Question 
The researcher has been working in the aviation industry since 1995 and during 
that time has witnessed the massive changes that have taken place across the European 
industry as a result of the arrival of the low cost carriers to the marketplace. Younger 
and leaner low cost carriers such as Ryanair and easyJet have taken on the established 
leviathan legacy carriers such as Aer Lingus and British Airways with phenomenal 
success. During this time other companies tried and failed to successfully emulate the 
low cost model including attempted moves to this model by legacy carriers. This would 
suggest that emulating the low cost model is not as straightforward as it might appear, 
nor is it a guarantee of success. Thus the research question becomes ‘What elements 
constitute a successful airline?’ 
3.2.2 Step 2 – Establish Research Objectives 
Fundamentally, this research sets out to examine European airlines in an attempt 
to identify those who are leading the field in terms of company performance. In 
addition, it is intended to benchmark the airlines examined and investigate their 
financial, operational and strategic activities in an attempt to identify best practices or 
common characteristics that may be emulated by the poorer performing airlines.  
3.2.3 Step 3 – Literature Review 
A review of the relevant literature was carried out. This review covered two 
main areas performance measurement techniques and the current literature surrounding 
performance measurement in aviation. Chapter 2 looked specifically at performance 
measurement techniques. The goal was to identify a suitable technique that would 
measure financial and operational performance. It was necessary that publicly available 
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data could be used as the researcher had no access to proprietary data. Economic Value 
Added, The Balanced Scorecard, Multi Criteria Decision Making and Data 
Envelopment Analysis were all reviewed. The reviews were conducted in both a general 
context and more specifically within the context of airline performance measurement. 
Chapter 2 also reviewed the literature specific to performance measurement 
from an aviation perspective. This was carried out with a view to identifying a gap in 
the literature. From this review DEA was identified as one of the most commonly used 
analysis techniques with regard to assessing company performance in aviation. This 
highlights DEAs suitability for performance analysis in the aviation sector above that of 
EVA, the BSC and MCDM methods. None of the studies reviewed used DEA to its full 
potential. DEA consists of three different methodologies for assessing efficiency, but in 
the majority of the studies reviewed only one methodology was employed. In a small 
number of cases two DEA methodologies were used and only one study, which looked 
at airports, applied all three (overall efficiency, pure technical efficiency and pure scale 
efficiency). In the majority of the studies data sources were either not provided or the 
data were obtained from a mix of third party agencies i.e. ICAO or IATA and some 
cases included data that were taken from the airlines themselves.  
Although DEA is a frequently used method for assessing company performance 
in an aviation context, to date the structure of the majority of the empirical work appears 
to be; investigate general data availability (i.e. investigate what data has been collected 
and made available by a third party such as ICAO or www.wikinvest.com) → apply 
DEA → report result. This approach ultimately results in a study of DEA using airline 
data. This researcher proposes the opposite, a study of airlines using DEA, by adopting 
the following structure, select target group for investigation (airlines) → investigate 
specific data availability directly from target group → apply DEA → report result → 
further analysis. This approach not only allows for more targeted results i.e. a DEA 
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study on a group of specifically selected airlines as opposed to a “group of airlines” but 
gives a deeper insight into how these airlines are performing, why they appear where 
they do when ranked alongside their peers and then provides specific, actionable targets 
in order to improve performance. The further analysis aspect of the study consisted of 
case studies of high, medium and low performing airlines as identified from the Data 
Envelopment Analysis. This allowed for the identification of best practice across a 
range of financial and non financial headings. 
  The result of the review was the identification of Data Envelopment Analysis as 
a suitable technique for the purpose of the study. DEA was chosen as it was the only 
method of those reviewed that could handle operational and financial data combined, 
did not require specialised knowledge or “insider” information and could cope with 
variables of differing units.  
3.2.4 Step 4 – Research Plan 
Research strategy is primarily concerned with the orientation of the research i.e. 
quantitative or qualitative. Bryman & Bell (2007) describe the fundamental differences 
between quantitative and qualitative research strategies thus: Quantitative research is 
deductive, tests theories and is objective whereas qualitative research is inductive, 
generates theories and is constructive.  
Initially it was intended that this study would be qualitative and make use of 
interviews with senior airline managers. It was envisaged that through cross referencing 
of pre-defined questions in conjunction with open ended questioning a pattern would 
emerge pointing to various “best practices” which could then be recommended for 
application to varying degrees across the industry. This course of action proved to be 
unrealistic very early in the process for various reasons including access to the relevant 
personnel, time constraints and commercial sensitivities. 
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These practical considerations gave rise to the decision to use publicly available, 
accessible data which necessitated a quantitative approach. A quantitative approach by 
definition is concerned with measurement through the collection of numerical data. This 
allows for reliability of measure and makes the research easier to replicate. Unusually 
for quantitative type research this study is not concerned with causality relationships 
between variables. This study is concerned with the identification of the best performing 
airlines and then identifying common characteristics that they may share. This in turn 
required the identification of a performance measurement technique that could make 
valid use of such data. Finally, the availability of the data required investigation. Several 
techniques were considered but given the constraints of data availability and the lack of 
requirement for “industry expert” input and its flexibility Data Envelopment Analysis 
was chosen. 
In order to “define” a data set it was decided to limit the study to European 
IATA registered passenger airlines, of which there were 75. IATA membership was 
used as a preliminary requirement for inclusion in the study as it is one of the largest 
airline industry associations with approximately 84% of available seat kilometres 
worldwide provided by IATA members. The next step was to investigate the availability 
and content of each airlines annual report. The 75 annual reports were accessed online 
through the relevant airlines website. Any reports not available in English were 
discarded. The remaining reports were read in their entirety. Of the 75 airlines, only 17 
had sufficient commonality of data to perform a Data Envelopment Analysis. This 
commonality was identified through the systematic reading of each available annual 
report and recording potential inputs and outputs that may be used in a Data 
Envelopment Analysis. Ryanair and easyJet, while not IATA members, are two of the 
most successful airlines in Europe. The researcher felt it would be remiss not to include 
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two such successful airlines in an efficiency ranking study. For this reason their annual 
reports were examined and found to contain sufficient data that they may be included. 
3.2.4.1 DEA Model Parameter Selection 
With respect to data availability this study uses staff costs (in place of personnel 
costs), fuel costs and total number of staff (operating costs were not provided in 
absolute terms in many annual reports, whereas total number of staff was) as inputs. The 
outputs are passengers carried (in place of revenue passenger miles which were not 
provided in all annual reports) and EBIT (Tonne KMs not used as this study did not 
include cargo figures, EBIT was routinely reported in the annual reports). Regarding the 
availability of data an effort was made to align these chosen variables with the most 
commonly used variables as identified in figures 4 and 5 above since exact matches 
were not possible. It should be noted that there is a certain level of distortion when 
using inputs/outputs such as number of employees and EBIT. In the case of number of 
employees this distortion arises through the use of outsourcing. Contract workers are 
not counted as employees but do contribute to input. EBIT may also be distorted 
depending on whether or not an airline owns or leases some or all of its fleet. It should 
also be noted however that in the cases of those airlines that do carry cargo the 
resources utilised to deliver this service are included in all of the inputs used for this 
study but only one of the outputs (EBIT).   
There is no agreement on the number of DMUs that should be used in a data 
envelopment analysis. There is a general consensus that the minimum number of DMUs 
should be total number of inputs × total number of outputs, which in this case would 
give six DMUs. A DMU may constitute another airline within the group to be examined 
i.e. revenue passenger miles flown by Aer Lingus, Ryanair etc. or it may constitute 
values from the same airline but from different time periods i.e. revenue passenger 
miles flown in each quarter. It is accepted that the more DMUs included the more 
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accurate the results will be. There are obvious limitations to this approach and many 
studies use a rule of thumb which suggests: total number of inputs × total number of 
outputs × two as the minimum number of DMUs used. Using this rule of thumb (total 
number of inputs × total number of outputs × two) gives three inputs × two outputs × 
two which results in a recommended minimum of 12 DMUs. This study uses 17 DMU’s 
which is greater than the recommended minimum. 
DEA may be input or output oriented. In the case of an input oriented DEA the 
focus is on making changes to the input variables in order to achieve efficiencies. For 
example, a company may achieve an efficiency score of 80 per cent in an input oriented 
DEA meaning that it needs to reduce its inputs while maintaining output values in order 
to achieve a higher efficiency score. Conversely, a company may achieve an efficiency 
score of 80 per cent in an output oriented DEA meaning that it needs to increase its 
outputs while maintaining input levels in order to improve efficiency. 
This study uses an output oriented model as this provides an indication of 
capacity shortfall and encourages a more strategic approach to improving efficiency as 
opposed to the often “blunt instrument” approach of reducing inputs. 
3.2.5 Step 5 – Gather the Data 
At the time of this study there were 75 European passenger airlines registered as 
IATA members (Appendix B). Cargo only airlines were excluded as one of the input 
variables selected was total number of passengers. Mixed cargo/passenger airlines were 
accepted. It might be more correct to define these airlines as passenger carriers who also 
carry cargo. The time period selected for the data collection was the year 2011. Data 
collection took place late in 2012 and early 2013 and so 2011 was the latest period for 
which annual reports were available. 
A technique known as “Free Floating Attention” is often used by psychoanalysts 
when analysing a patient. The theory behind the technique is that the analyst takes in or 
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absorbs what the analysand is saying with a certain detachment while attempting to 
identify common themes or patterns in the patients discourse (Freud, 1973). This was 
essentially the approach taken to the data collection from each airlines annual report. 
Each report was read and if a particular report was felt to be providing sufficient data, it 
was put aside for closer investigation. Several of the annual reports were not available 
in English and were discounted. Others were quite brief documents with little substance 
or usable data. As a result of this process, 23 reports were selected for further attention. 
This was further refined based on the inputs/outputs identified above, of the original 75 
airlines investigated 17 provided enough commonality of data to be used in this study.  
3.2.6 Step 6 – Analyse and Interpret the Data 
Once the various elements of the proposed Data Envelopment Analysis were 
established (i.e. inputs/outputs and number of DMUs) the analysis was performed. 
Initially it was intended to use the “Solver” function in Microsoft Excel to 
execute the analysis. This is a relatively straightforward process when applied to simple 
DEA analyses. It does however become cumbersome as the complexity of the model 
increases. There are several DEA software packages available. Many of these are 
available on a “free trial” basis, but offer extremely limited usage, i.e. the number of 
DMUs and inputs/outputs are limited as are, in some cases, the type of model allowed 
(e.g. constant returns to scale or variable returns to scale). 
It was decided to purchase PIM – 3.0, a DEA software package provided by Dr. 
Ali Emrouznejad and available to download from www.deazone.com. A student 
version is available at relatively low cost which provides full modeling functionality but 
with some limitations on data usage. For example, limitations on the number of DMUs 
are in place but are well within the requirement for this study. PIM – 3.0 allows for data 
input by importing an Excel file (see toolbar in figure 9 below). Once the data has been 
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imported it is then a matter of selecting the desired model (CRS, VRS, Pure Scale) and 
orientation from the menu illustrated below in figure 9.  
 
Figure 9. PIM - 3.0 Software Screenshot 
 
Appendix D contains the raw data as collected from each airline annual report 
and processed data for use in the analyses. In order to standardize the data it was 
necessary to convert some financial data into Euros. This was completed using the 
conversion rate in effect on the 31
st
 of December 2011 which was taken from 
www.xe.com.  
DEA requires that all variable values be positive. As some of the airlines 
examined had recorded losses it was necessary to apply an across the board increase of 
€71 million to the EBIT values in order to ensure that all values were positive (Air 
Berlin reported a loss of €70 million). Three DEA model runs were then performed 
using this data.  
1) A Constant Returns To Scale Model (CRS) which provides overall 
efficiency scores  
2) A Varying Returns To Scale Model (VRS) which provides technical 
efficiency scores 
3) CRS/VRS which provides pure scale efficiency scores 
 
A robustness score was determined for each of the efficient airlines as identified in 
each of the three DEA models. Robustness is a measure of how suitable an airline is for 
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emulation. This was achieved by determining how often an efficient airline appeared in 
a reference set. Based on these scores the efficient airlines were categorised as highly 
robust, moderately robust and not robust. This is covered in detail in chapter four.  
The PIM 3-0 software provides input and output targets as a byproduct of a 
model run. These targets are the values that would result in a 100 per cent efficiency 
score if they were the actual input and output values of each airline. In order to validate 
the software these target values were substituted for the actual values with the 
expectation that each airline would then score 100 per cent. On completion of the 
software validation, a one-at-a-time sensitivity analysis was carried out in order to 
assess the models sensitivity to input and out variable changes. This is covered in detail 
in chapter five. 
In order to facilitate further analysis the airlines were divided into three 
categories based on their efficiency score; those that scored 100 per cent efficiency and 
those that scored above average and those that scored below average. Again this 
categorisation was applied to all three DEA models. These categories were aggregated 
which resulted in the identification of three airlines that scored 100 per cent in all three 
DEA models (Ryanair, Flybe and Estonian Air), two airlines that scored above average 
in all three models (Croatia Airlines and easyJet) and one airline that scored below 
average in all three models (KLM). One airline was selected from each group and for 
each selected airline the annual reports for the year 2011 were reviewed.  Strategic, 
financial and operational data common to all three was extracted for further analysis and 
comparison across a range of headings. 
3.2.7 Step 7 – Prepare and Present the Findings 
This study consists of a Data Envelopment Analysis of European airlines. All 
three DEA models (CCR, CRS and Pure Scale) are performed and further analysis, 
primarily in the form of a comparative case study, is carried out based on the results. An 
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evaluation of the robustness of each efficient airlines efficiency score is also carried out 
in order to ascertain which airlines are suitable role models for the less efficient airlines. 
The data is taken solely from primary sources i.e. annual reports. The results and 
findings are presented in chapters four, five and six below. The basic DEA model 
results are presented primarily in tabular and graphical format as this provides a clear 
and concise overview of the model outputs. 
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Chapter Four  Results and Discussion 
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Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the three Data Envelopment Analyses that were 
performed. The results of each DEA model are presented in the following format: 
1) A graph of efficiency scores and rankings is presented. 
2) A table presenting the output targets of each airline. These figures 
represent the targets that each airline would need to attain (whilst maintaining 
their current input levels) in order to achieve a 100 per cent efficiency score. 
The raw results from the three DEA models are then examined in greater depth. In 
doing so the best and worst performing airlines from the data set are identified and 
further analysed from various strategic, financial and operational perspectives. 
The airlines are divided into the following three groups for each DEA model: 
1) Those airlines that achieve 100 per cent efficiency score within each 
model. 
2) Those airlines that achieve above average efficiency scores within each 
model. 
3) Those airlines that achieve below average efficiency scores within each 
model. 
One airline common to each group across all three models is selected for further 
analysis in order to confirm that the data envelopment analyses are valid. 
 
4.1 Model Validation 
One feature of Data Envelopment Analysis is the calculation of target variables. 
These targets are what each company needs to accomplish in order to achieve 100 per 
cent efficiency. For example, in table 4 which presents the results of the CCR model 
validation run, easyJet achieves an efficiency score of 84.44 per cent with an EBIT of 
€393.3 and 54.50 million passengers carried. Table 4 also presents target values for 
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easyJet of; EBIT €511.69 and passengers carried 64.54 million. These are the specific 
targets that easyJet need to achieve in order to score 100 per cent efficiency. In order to 
validate the models, each model was run with the target variables substituted in place of 
the actual variables. 
This resulted in 51 model validation runs the results of which are presented in tables 
4, 5 and 6 below. Table 5 presents the results for the CCR validation model runs. Table 
5 presents the results for the BCC model runs and Table 6 presents the results for the 
pure scale model runs. In each of the 51 model runs the substituted variables return an 
efficiency score of 100 per cent as expected. These results validate both the models and 
target variables. 
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Model 
Run 
Airline 
No. 
Employees 
(Actual) 
Fuel 
Costs €M 
(Actual) 
Staff 
Costs €M 
(Actual) 
EBIT €M 
(Actual) 
Passengers 
Carried 
Million 
(Actual) 
CCR Model 
% Result 
(Actual) 
EBIT €M 
(Target) 
Passengers 
Carried 
Million 
(Target) 
CCR Model 
% Validation 
Result 
1 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72.00 100.00 491.90 72.00 100 
2 Flybe 2949 127.5 89.6 191.9 7.60 100.00 191.90 7.60 100 
3 Estonian Air 283 24.8 10.0 57.5 0.68 100.00 57.50 0.68 100 
4 Croatia Airlines 1136 44.0 31.0 69.2 1.90 88.47 78.22 2.15 100 
5 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.50 84.44 511.69 64.54 100 
6 Aer Lingus 3491 288.7 260.6 243.8 9.50 66.86 364.64 14.21 100 
7 Aegean 1615 184.0 86.0 40.3 6.50 60.06 100.83 10.82 100 
8 Air Berlin 9113 1000.0 475.0 1.0  35.30 60.00 570.39 58.83 100 
9 Meridiana Fly 2011 197.0 114.0 174.0 4.40 55.59 312.98 7.91 100 
10 Air Astana 3358 132.0 62.6 121.9 3.00 53.34 228.52 5.62 100 
11 Icelandair 1179 138.6 143.6 100.6 1.75 46.06 218.42 3.80 100 
12 Turkish Airlines 18489 1632.0 677.3 666.3 33.00 38.68 1722.59 85.32 100 
13 Finnair 7467 555.0 477.0 10.1 8.00 24.40 477.23 32.79 100 
14 
TAP Air 
Portugal 
8661 717.0 524.0 89.1 9.75 23.05 550.81 42.30 100 
15 British Airways 40000 3594.0 2515.8 779.0 34.25 18.96 4108.84 180.65 100 
16 KLM 33918 2700.0 2100.0 343.0 19.70 13.10 2617.42 150.33 100 
17 Lufthansa 115335 30000.0 6700.0 805.0 100.60 10.17 7917.41 989.43 100 
Table 5. CCR Model Software Validation Results 
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Model 
Run 
Airline 
No. 
Employees 
(Actual) 
Fuel Costs 
€M 
(Actual) 
Staff Costs 
€M 
(Actual) 
EBIT €M 
(Actual) 
Passengers 
Carried 
Million 
(Actual) 
BCC Model  
per cent 
Result 
(Actual) 
EBIT 
€M 
(Target) 
Passengers 
Carried 
Million 
(Target) 
BCC Model  
per cent 
Validation 
Result 
18 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72.00 100.00 491.90 72.00 100 
19 Flybe 2949 127.5 89.6 191.9 7.60 100.00 191.90 7.60 100 
20 Aer Lingus 3491 288.7 260.6 243.8 9.50 100.00 243.80 9.50 100 
21 British Airways 40000 3594 2515.8 779.0 34.25 100.00 779.00 34.25 100 
22 Estonian Air 283 24.8 10.0 57.5.0 0.68 100.00 57.50 0.68 100 
23 Lufthansa 115335 30000.0 6700.0 805.0 100.60 100.00 805.00 100.60 100 
24 Meridiana Fly 2011 197.0 114.0 174.0 4.40 100.00 174.00 4.40 100 
25 Turkish Airlines 18489 1632.0 677.3 666.3 33.00 100.00 666.30 33.00 100 
26 Croatia Airlines 1136 44.0 31.0 69.2 1.90 96.31 82.63 1.97 100 
27 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.50 85.87 458.01 63.47 100 
28 Icelandair 1179 138.6 143.6 100.6 1.75 85.32 117.91 2.61 100 
29 Air Astana 3358 132.0 62.6 121.9 3.00 83.32 146.31 5.25 100 
30 Aegean 1615 184.0 86.0 40.3 6.50 63.41 40.03 10.25 100 
31 Air Berlin 9113 1000.0 475.0 1.0  35.30 60.12 430.03 58.72 100 
32 KLM 33918 2700.0 2100.0 343.0 19.70 48.86 702.08 40.32 100 
33 
TAP Air 
Portugal 
8661 717.0 524.0 89.1 9.75 25.02 356.11 38.97 100 
34 Finnair 7467 555.0 477.0 10.1 8.00 24.51 308.58 32.65 100 
Table 6. BCC Model Software Validation Results 
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Model 
Run 
Airline 
No. 
Employees 
(Actual) 
Fuel 
Costs €M 
(Actual) 
Staff 
Costs €M 
(Actual) 
EBIT €M 
(Actual) 
Passengers 
Carried 
Million 
(Actual) 
Pure Scale 
Model % 
Result 
(Actual) 
EBIT 
€M 
(Target) 
Passengers 
Carried 
Million 
(Target) 
Pure Scale 
Model % 
Validation 
Result 
35 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72.00 100.00 491.90 72.00 100 
36 Flybe 2949 127.5 89.6 191.9 7.60 100.00 191.90 7.60 100 
37 Estonian Air 283 24.8 10.0 57.5 0.68 100.00 57.50 0.68 100 
38 Air Berlin 9113 1000.0 475.0 1.0 35.30 99.80 429.37 35.37 100 
39 Finnair 7467 555.0 477.0 10.1 8.00 99.57 277.50 8.03 100 
40 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.50 98.34 399.95 55.42 100 
41 Aegean 1615 184.0 86.0 40.3 6.50 94.72 108.69 6.86 100 
42 
TAP Air 
Portugal 
8661 717.0 524.0 89.1 9.75 92.12 96.72 10.58 100 
43 Croatia Airlines 1136 44.0 31.0 69.2 1.90 91.87 86.10 2.07 100 
44 Aer Lingus 3491 288.7 260.6 243.8 9.50 66.86 364.64 14.21 100 
45 Air Astana 3358 132.0 62.6 121.9 3.00 64.03 190.39 6.34 100 
46 Meridiana Fly 2011 197.0 114.0 174.0 4.40 55.59 312.98 7.91 100 
47 Icelandair 1179 138.6 143.6 100.6 1.75 53.98 186.36 3.80 100 
48 Turkish Airlines 18489 1632.0 677.3 666.3 33.00 38.68 1722.59 85.32 100 
49 KLM 33918 2700.0 2100.0 343.0 19.70 26.82 1278.74 73.44 100 
50 British Airways 40000 3594.0 2515.8 779.0 34.25 18.96 4108.84 180.65 100 
51 Lufthansa 115335 30000.0 6700.0 805.0 100.60 10.17 7917.41 989.43 100 
Table 7. Pure Scale Model Software Validation Results 
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  4.2 Results 
On initial examination of the results it is clear that there is a certain level of 
consistency across the best performing airlines with three of them achieving 100 per 
cent efficiency across all three models. This implies that these airlines are performing 
well across the board, in terms of overall, technical and pure scale efficiency. 
There is less consistency at the lower end of the scale in each model with a greater 
number of airlines changing position within the rankings. There is also greater 
movement across the three models with respect to airlines scoring above and below 
average. For example, Air Astana scores above average in the BCC model but below 
average in the CCR and CCR/BCC models. This implies that poorer performing airlines 
are less uniform in their performance and don’t score as consistently as the better 
performers.  
For a recap on the concepts of overall, technical and pure scale efficiency the 
reader is referred to Figure 3 on page 58. The Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (CCR) 
model assumes constant returns to scale and is a measure of overall efficiency. The 
Banker, Charnes and Cooper (BCC) model assumes variable returns to scale and is a 
measure of pure technical (or managerial) efficiency. The ratio of overall efficiency 
score/pure technical score provides a measure of pure scale efficiency. 
 
4.2.1 The Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (CCR) Model – Overall Efficiency 
Figure 10 is a graph presenting the efficiency scores and rankings according to 
the CCR model. The CCR model is a measure of overall technical efficiency. This 
model takes into account pure technical efficiency (a measure of management 
efficiency) and pure scale efficiency (a measure of whether or not the airline is 
operating optimally for its size). An airline is assumed to operate under constant 
returns to scale if an increase in inputs results in a proportionate increase in the outputs, 
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i.e. if the inputs are doubled, then the outputs are also expected to double. As such it is a 
good indicator of general efficiency. However, any improvements made under this 
model may still leave inefficiency in the system. These underlying inefficiencies may be 
identified more explicitly by using the Banker, Charnes and Cooper (BCC) model to 
identify pure technical inefficiencies and the CCR/BCC ratio to identify pure scale 
inefficiencies as will be demonstrated. 
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Figure 10. Overall Efficiency Scores and Rankings of Airlines 
 
The above graph presents the overall efficiency scores and rankings for the 17 airlines 
examined according to the CCR model. From the graph it can be seen that three airlines 
Ryanair, Flybe and Estonian Air are operating at 100 per cent relative efficiency. It is 
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important to remember that these efficiency scores are relative and not absolute. This is 
to say they are the most efficient airlines within the group of 17 airlines examined. The 
lowest scoring airline Lufthansa achieved an efficiency score of 10.17 per cent. This 
represents a spread of 89.83 per cent efficiency between the best and worst performing 
airlines. This is a significant differential across the group and implies that there are 
substantial efficiencies to be achieved within Lufthansa and other low scoring airlines. 
On initial examination of the graph there appears to be a relatively clear division 
into three groups. This is as a result of two relatively large differentials in scores. The 
first large differential is 17.58 per cent between easyJet (84.44 per cent) and Aer Lingus 
(66.86 per cent). Therefore easyJet and airlines scoring above it were classified as the 
high scoring group. The second large differential is 14.28 per cent between Turkish 
Airlines (38.68 per cent) and Finnair (24.40 per cent). Therefore Finnair and the airlines 
scoring below it form the low scoring group. The remaining airlines form the mid-range 
group. The high scoring group consists of Ryanair, Flybe, Estonian Air, Croatia Airlines 
and easyJet. The mid-range scoring group consists of Aer Lingus, Aegean, Air Berlin, 
Meridiana Fly, Air Astana, Icelandair and Turkish Airlines. Finally, the low scoring 
group consists of Finnair, TAP Air Portugal, British Airways, KLM and Lufthansa. 
The highly efficient group consists of three privately owned low cost carriers 
and two state owned flag carriers. The presence of the two flag carriers in this group is 
interesting as generally speaking flag carriers are found in the lowest scoring group. In 
fact the lowest scoring group consists exclusively of flag carrier airlines. Estonian Air 
and Croatian Airlines are different from the other flag carriers in that they are relatively 
small airlines. Also, they were founded in 1991 and 1989 respectively meaning that they 
came into existence during the period of time that the European airline market was 
being deregulated. Consequently they were free of many of the legacy issues that 
affected the existing flag carriers.  
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The least efficient group consists exclusively of national flag carriers all of 
which were founded prior to deregulation. As a result they were saddled with the 
myriad issues associated with traditional flag carriers of this era. These issues include a 
heavily entrenched and unionised workforce, political interference, resistance to change 
and an unreasonable expectation of service from the public (Flottau, 2012; Sparaco, 
2012). As a result it is often extremely difficult if not impossible for these airlines to 
realise efficiency improvements. This may explain why this group attains such low 
efficiency scores when compared to the privately owned, non unionised post 
deregulation airlines in the highly efficient group. 
The mid-range group consists of primarily flag carriers such as Turkish Airlines 
and Aer Lingus with only two privately owned carriers, Meridiana Fly and Air Berlin. It 
may be the case that these carriers are to some extent overcoming the issues that hinder 
the low scoring group. Consider the case of Aer Lingus which in recent years have 
made no secret of their intention to move towards a more low cost model (Carey, 2008). 
They are clearly having some success as a result of this strategy as the graph shows 
them to be the highest scorer in the mid-range group and just behind easyJet overall. 
This is despite the various encumbrances endured by the flag carriers. 
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Table 8 is a table presenting efficiency scores and output targets for each airline 
based on the output oriented CCR model. 
Airlines 
Efficiency  
% 
EBIT 
(€million) 
EBIT Target 
(€million) 
Passengers 
Carried 
(million) 
Passengers 
Carried 
Target 
(million) 
Ryanair 100.00 491.9 491.90 72.00 72.00 
Flybe 100.00 191.9 191.90 7.60 7.60 
Estonian 
Air 
100.00 57.5 57.50 0.68 0.68 
Croatia 
Airlines 
88.47 69.2 78.22 1.90 2.15 
easyJet 84.44 393.3 511.69 54.50 64.54 
Aer Lingus 66.86 243.8 364.64 9.50 14.21 
Aegean 60.06 40.3 100.83 6.50 10.82 
Air Berlin 60.00 1.0 570.39 35.30 58.83 
Meridiana 
Fly 
55.59 174.0 312.98 4.40 7.91 
Air Astana 53.34 121.9 228.52 3.00 5.62 
Icelandair 46.06 100.6 218.42 1.75 3.80 
Turkish 
Airlines 
38.68 666.3 1722.59 33.00 85.32 
Finnair 24.40 10.1 477.23 8.00 32.79 
TAP Air 
Portugal 
23.05 89.1 550.81 9.75 42.30 
British 
Airways 
18.96 779.0 4108.84 34.25 180.65 
KLM 13.10 343.0 2617.42 19.70 150.33 
Lufthansa 10.17 805.0 7917.41 100.60 989.43 
Table 8. CCR Efficiency Scores & Output Targets 
 
The target figures in the above table represent the number of passengers carried and 
EBIT that each airline would need to achieve without any increase in inputs (i.e. total 
number of staff, fuel costs or staff costs) in order to reach 100 per cent efficiency. Those 
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airlines that score 100 per cent efficiency do not need to make any increases as they are 
already on the efficient frontier. Essentially, the difference between the reported figures 
and the target figures in the table represents the shortfall in each airlines potential 
output. 
To take an example in percentage terms: Tap Air Portugal carried 9.75 million 
passengers and reported an EBIT of €89.1 million. In order to reach 100 per cent 
efficiency Tap Air Portugal needs a gain of 333.86 per cent in the number of passengers 
carried and a gain of 518.19 per cent in EBIT reported with no increase in any of the 
inputs i.e. total number of staff, fuel costs or staff costs. 
As expected the airlines with the lowest efficiency scores have the largest shortfalls, 
with Lufthansa requiring an almost 10 fold increase in passengers carried. These are 
capacity shortfalls and in many cases such as this one, the increases required in order to 
reach the efficiency frontier are practically impossible. Conversely Croatia Airlines with 
an 88.47 per cent efficiency score only requires a 13.15 per cent increase in its 
passengers carried figure in order to begin moving towards the efficiency frontier. 
4.2.2 The Banker, Charnes and Cooper (BCC) Model – Technical Efficiency 
Figure 11 is a graph presenting the efficiency scores and rankings according to 
the BCC model. The BCC model is a measure of pure technical efficiency (a measure of 
management efficiency) only. This model differs from the CCR model in that it allows 
for variable returns to scale meaning that an increase in inputs will not necessarily result 
in a proportionate increase in outputs. As such it is considered a good indicator of 
managerial efficiency. Improvements made under this model alone may still leave 
inefficiency in the system. Any remaining scale related inefficiencies may be identified 
using the CCR/BCC (pure scale) models as will be demonstrated. 
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Figure 11. Technical Efficiency Scores & Rankings of Airlines 
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The above graph presents the technical efficiency scores and rankings for the 17 airlines 
examined according to the BCC model. In this case the graph shows that eight airlines 
are operating at 100 per cent relative efficiency compared to three for the CCR model. 
These airlines are Ryanair, Flybe, Estonian Air, Aer Lingus, British Airways, 
Lufthansa, Meridiana Fly and Turkish Airlines. Again, it is important to remember that 
these efficiency scores are relative and not absolute.  
The lowest scoring airline Finnair achieved an efficiency score of 24.51 per cent. 
This represents a spread of 75.49 per cent efficiency between the best and worst 
performing airlines. This is also a significant differential across the group and although 
less so than for the CCR model it still implies that there are substantial efficiencies to be 
achieved within Finnair and other low scoring airlines. 
This model is a specific measure of managerial efficiency. It shows that from 
this perspective the majority of the airlines examined are performing reasonably well 
overall. The efficiency scores are higher across the board with an average efficiency 
score of 80.75 per cent compared to 55.47 per cent for the CCR model. This 
demonstrates that the managerial teams appear to be having a positive impact on the 
overall efficiency of their airlines. The implication of this is that there are greater 
efficiencies to be realised in other areas i.e. scale efficiencies. 
Whereas the CCR graph presented a clear division into three groups the BCC 
appears to show four distinct groups. This is as a result of three relatively large 
differentials in scores. The first large differential is 10.44 per cent between Croatia 
Airlines (96.31 per cent) and easyJet (85.87 per cent). Therefore Croatia Airlines and 
airlines scoring above it were classified as the high scoring group. The second large 
differential is 19.91 per cent between Air Astana (83.32 per cent) and Aegean (63.41 
per cent). Therefore Air Astana and the airlines scoring above it but below Croatia 
Airlines form the high to mid-range scoring group. The third differential is 23.84 per 
Chapter Four 
 
103 
 
cent between KLM (48.86 per cent) and TAP Air Portugal (25.02 per cent). Therefore 
KLM and the airlines scoring above it but below Air Astana form the low mid-range 
scoring group. The remaining airlines form the low range group. The high scoring group 
consists of the eight 100 per cent efficient airlines listed above and Croatia Air. There is 
an upper mid-range consisting of easyJet, Icelandair and Air Astana. The lower mid-
range consists of Aegean, Air Berlin and KLM. Finally the lowest ranked airlines are 
TAP Air Portugal and Finnair.  
When comparing the results of this model with the previous model there are 
several clear differences in the positioning of a number of the airlines. The three airlines 
that scored 100 per cent in the previous CCR model do so again here. They are joined at 
the top by five more airlines including British Airways and Lufthansa both of which had 
scored in the lowest ranking group previously. This implies that their issues lie in the 
scale of their operations as opposed to management efficacy. Finnair and TAP Air 
Portugal remain in the lowest scoring group across both models. This implies poor 
managerial performance.  
The distribution of flag carriers also differs from the previous CCR model. In 
this case there are four flag carriers in the top tier as opposed to 1. This gives a 1:1 spilt 
of flag carriers to private entities compared to 1:2 previously. This may be indicative of 
a more level playing field in this area. Flag carriers are no longer necessarily being run 
by government departments but by independent management teams who are answerable 
to shareholders as opposed to government. 
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Table 9 is a table presenting efficiency scores and output targets for each airline 
based on the output oriented BCC model. 
Airlines 
Efficiency  
per cent 
EBIT 
(€million) 
EBIT 
Target 
(€million) 
Passengers 
Carried 
(million) 
Passengers 
Carried 
Target 
(million) 
Ryanair 100.00 491.9 491.90 72.00 72.00 
Flybe 100.00 191.9 191.90 7.60 7.60 
Aer Lingus 100.00 243.8 243.80 9.50 9.50 
British Airways 100.00 779.0 779.00 34.25 34.25 
Estonian Air 100.00 57.5 57.50 0.68 0.68 
Lufthansa 100.00 805.0 805.00 100.60 100.60 
Meridiana Fly 100.00 174.0 174.00 4.40 4.40 
Turkish Airlines 100.00 666.3 666.30 33.00 33.00 
Croatia Airlines 96.31 69.2 82.63 1.90 1.97 
easyJet 85.87 393.3 458.01 54.50 63.47 
Icelandair 85.32 100.6 117.91 1.75 2.61 
Air Astana 83.32 121.9 146.31 3.00 5.25 
Aegean 63.41 40.3 129.69 6.50 10.25 
Air Berlin 60.12 1.0 430.03 35.30 58.72 
KLM 48.86 343.0 702.08 19.70 40.32 
TAP Air 
Portugal 
25.02 89.1 356.11 9.75 38.97 
Finnair 24.51 10.1 308.58 8.00 32.65 
Table 9. BCC Efficiency Scores & Output Targets 
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The target figures in the above table represent the number of passengers carried 
and EBIT that each airline would need to achieve without any increase in inputs (i.e. 
total number of staff) in order to reach 100 per cent efficiency. Those airlines that score 
100 per cent efficiency do not need to make these increases as they are already on the 
frontier. 
To take an example in percentage terms: Icelandair carried 1.75 million passengers and 
reported an EBIT of €100.6 million. In order to reach 100 per cent efficiency Icelandair 
needs a gain of 17.2 per cent in the number of passengers carried and a gain of 49.14 per 
cent in EBIT reported with no increase in inputs i.e. total number of staff. 
As with the previous CCR model the airlines with the lowest efficiency scores 
also report the largest shortfall when it comes to capacity. However the BCC model 
differs in that it focuses specifically on managerial efficacy in an effort to explain the 
shortfalls. In direct opposition to the CCR model Lufthansa has a 100 per cent 
efficiency score and need not make any increases in its outputs. This implies that 
Lufthansa is employing effective managerial strategies and that any potential 
performance improvements lie in the area of scale efficiencies. 
Once again the lowest performing airlines have the largest shortfalls with 
Finnair requiring a massive 30 fold increase in passengers carried and a four fold 
increase in EBIT in order to reach the efficient frontier. These figures clearly point to 
inefficiencies beyond that of management efficacy. 
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4.2.3 The Pure Scale Model - Pure Scale Efficiency 
Figure 12 is a graph presenting the efficiency scores and rankings according to 
the Pure Scale model. This model is a measure of pure scale efficiency only. An airline 
is considered to be scale efficient when the size of its operation is optimal and any 
change to its size will result in a reduction in efficiency (Merkert & Morrell, 2012). 
Again, improvements made under this model alone may still leave inefficiency in the 
system due to managerial inefficiency. 
 
Figure 12. Pure Scale Efficiency Scores and Rankings of Airlines 
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The graph in figure 12 presents the pure scale efficiency scores and rankings for the 17 
airlines examined according to the CCR/BCC model. Given the fact that the results for 
this model are derived from dividing the CCR results by the BCC results it to be 
expected that the scores would be similar to the CCR model. This is especially the case 
with airlines that score 100 per cent in both models. In this case the graph shows that 
three airlines are operating at 100 per cent relative efficiency. These are the same three 
airlines that scored 100 per cent in the CCR model i.e. Ryanair, Flybe and Estonian Air.  
Again similar to the CCR model the lowest scoring airline was Lufthansa which 
achieved a CCR/BCC efficiency score of 10.17 per cent. This represents a spread of 
89.83 per cent efficiency between the best and worst performing airlines. This is an 
equivalent result to the CCR model. The average efficiency score for this model is 70.66 
per cent which is higher than the CCR average but lower than the BCC model average.  
The graph once again lends itself to a three way split. This is as a result of two relatively 
large differentials in scores. The first large differential is 25.01 per cent between Croatia 
Airlines (91.87 per cent) and Aer Lingus (66.86 per cent). Therefore Croatia Airlines 
and airlines scoring above it were classified as the high scoring group. The second large 
differential is 15.3 per cent between Icelandair (53.98 per cent) and Turkish Airlines 
(38.68 per cent). Therefore Turkish Airlines and the airlines scoring below it form the 
low scoring group. The remaining airlines form the mid-range group. The high scoring 
group consists of Ryanair, Flybe, Estonian Air, Air Berlin, Finnair, easyJet, Aegean, 
TAP Air Portugal and Croatia Airlines. The mid-range group consists of Aer Lingus, 
Air Astana, Meridiana Fly and Icelandair. Finally Turkish Airlines, KLM, British 
Airways and Lufthansa form the low scoring group. There is very little spread within 
the high scoring group with only 8.13 per cent between the highest and lowest scores. 
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This results in a higher average score than the CCR model as reported above despite the 
overall spread of 89.83 per cent. 
In this case the high scoring group consists of four flag carriers and five 
privately operated airlines. This gives a 1:1.25 ratio as opposed to the 1:1 ratio of the 
CCR model and the 1:2 ratio for the BCC model.  The most anomalous score is that of 
Finnair. This airline scored in the lowest group for both CCR and BCC models. In the 
pure scale model it appears in the highest scoring group with a score of 99.57 per cent. 
This implies that Finnairs issues are not related to the scale of its operation and its 
efficiency scores are being lowered by a lack of managerial efficacy.  
Given that this model is a measure of pure scale efficiency there is an interesting 
dichotomy between several of the airlines. Depending on the measure used i.e. 
passengers carried, aircraft operated, routes operated or profits KLM, British Airways, 
Lufthansa and Ryanair all rank either at, or very close to the top of the world’s largest 
airlines. Yet, Ryanair is the highest scoring airline in this category while KLM, British 
Airways and Lufthansa are the three worst performers. This indicates that these three 
airlines are not taking advantage of their size in order to drive efficiencies in their 
operations. Table 10 is a table presenting efficiency scores and output targets for each 
airline based on the output oriented pure scale model. 
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Airlines 
Efficiency  
per cent 
EBIT 
(€million) 
EBIT 
Target 
(€million) 
Passengers 
Carried 
(million) 
Passengers 
Carried 
Target 
(million) 
Ryanair 100.00 491.9 491.90 72.00 72.00 
Flybe 100.00 191.9 191.90 7.60 7.60 
Estonian Air 100.00 57.5 57.50 0.68 0.68 
Air Berlin 99.80 1.0 429.37 35.30 35.37 
Finnair 99.57 10.1 277.50 8.00 8.03 
easyJet 98.34 393.3 399.95 54.50 55.42 
Aegean 94.72 40.3 108.69 6.50 6.86 
TAP Air Portugal 92.12 89.1 96.72 9.75 10.58 
Croatia Airlines 91.87 69.2 86.10 1.90 2.07 
Aer Lingus 66.86 243.8 364.64 9.50 14.21 
Air Astana 64.03 121.9 190.39 3.00 6.34 
Meridiana Fly 55.59 174.0 312.98 4.40 7.91 
Icelandair 53.98 100.6 186.36 1.75 3.80 
Turkish Airlines 38.68 666.3 1722.59 33.00 85.32 
KLM 26.82 343.0 1278.74 19.70 73.44 
British Airways 18.96 779.0 4108.84 34.25 180.65 
Lufthansa 10.17 805.0 7917.41 100.60 989.43 
Table 10. Pure Scale Efficiency Scores & Output Targets 
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Again in order to reach 100 per cent efficiency, the EBIT and Passengers Carried target 
figures in the above table are what each airline would need to achieve without 
increasing inputs (i.e. total number of staff). Airlines that score 100 per cent efficiency 
do not need to make these increases as they are already on the frontier. 
To take an example in percentage terms; 
Croatia Airlines carried 1.9 million passengers and reported an EBIT of €69.2 
million. In order to reach 100 per cent efficiency Croatia Airlines needs a gain of 8.9 per 
cent in the number of passengers carried and a gain of 32.8 per cent in EBIT reported 
with no increase in inputs i.e. total number of staff. 
In some cases the output targets are many multiples of the actual outputs being 
achieved which makes them unfeasible. However it may be argued that this is only the 
case for the lowest scoring eight airlines. Of the other nine airlines the lowest efficiency 
score is Croatia Airlines with 91.87 per cent. While it is no mean feat to increase 
passengers carried by 8.9 per cent and EBIT by 32.8 per cent it is not necessarily 
unrealistic or unobtainable. This is further highlighted when compared to Lufthansa 
which has a requirement to increase EBIT by 983.53 per cent in order to reach optimal 
efficiency and this is before passengers carried is considered. 
 
4.3 Robustness Categories 
Chen (1997) and Chen & Yeh (1998) proposed a method whereby the frequency 
of the reference set could be used to measure the robustness of an efficient airline 
relative to its efficient peers. The reference set is the set of efficient units that dominate 
a given inefficient unit on all axes. In other words, the more frequently an efficient 
airline is identified as a role model for inefficient airlines, the more robust it is. These 
airlines which appear frequently in the reference set of the inefficient airlines are likely 
to be efficient across a range of factors making them good examples to emulate. 
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Conversely, efficient airlines which appear infrequently in the reference set of the 
inefficient airlines are not as robust and therefore not suitable for emulation. This means 
that they are highly sensitive to small changes in their input and output variables and 
therefore their position on the frontier is tenuous. 
Each airlines efficiency score is calculated relative only to the efficient airlines 
that dominate it on both the X and the Y axis. These dominant airlines constitute the 
reference set of the inefficient airline. This is demonstrated in figure 13 below. 
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Figure 13. Pure Scale Efficiency Scores & Output Targets 
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In this example the reference set for DMU H consists of DMUs B, C and D 
because they are situated on the frontier and dominate DMU H on both the X and Y 
axis. The reference set for DMU K consists of DMUs C, D and E because they are 
situated on the frontier and dominate DMU K on both the X and Y axis. 
In this study each efficient airline has the potential to appear 17 times in a 
reference set. An airline that appears 17 times is considered the most robust whilst an 
airline which does not appear in a reference set is not considered to be robust. In order 
to ascertain levels of robustness the range 0 to 17 is divided into three equal divisions.  
 Highly Robust: 12 to 17 
 Moderately Robust: 7 to 11 
 Not Robust: 0 to 6 
4.3.1 Reference Sets for Each Model (CCR, CRS and Pure Scale) 
This section will examine the robustness of the airlines positioned on the 
efficient frontier for all three models; CCR, CRS and Pure Scale. The number of times 
an efficient airline appears in a reference set is calculated. This provides robustness 
scores for each efficient airline. The efficient airlines are then grouped into highly 
robust, moderately robust and not robust categories depending on how many times they 
appear in a reference set. This process identifies how “secure” each efficient airlines 
position is on the frontier.  
4.3.2 Robustness - Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (CCR) 
The CCR model of DEA is a measure of overall efficiency. From another 
perspective, it is a measure of inefficiencies due to both managerial performance (pure 
technical efficiency) and company size (pure scale efficiency) combined. 
In this case, three of the 17 airlines examined are situated on the efficiency 
frontier. In other words three of the airlines were 100 per cent efficient. This means that 
14 out of 17 or 82.35 per cent of airlines examined were inefficient. Furthermore, there 
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was a significant spread between the most and least efficient airlines of 89.83 per cent 
implying that the poorer performers were performing significantly worse than their 
efficient peers. The average efficiency score for this group is 55.47 per cent meaning 
that the inefficient airlines would have to increase their outputs, i.e. passengers carried 
and EBIT by 44.53 per cent on average to achieve 100 per cent efficiency.  
Table 11 below shows a table displaying each of the airlines that appear on the 
efficient frontier (Ryanair, Flybe and Estonian Air) and the frequency with which they 
appear in the reference sets of each of the 17 airlines examined. For demonstration 
purposes consider Ryanair and Air Astana. Ryanair dominates (or is equalled) on all 
axes. Neither Flybe nor Estonian Air dominates Ryanair on all axes hence the reference 
set for Ryanair consists of one airline, Ryanair. Air Astana is dominated on all axes by 
Ryanair, Flybe and Estonian Air hence its reference set consists of Ryanair Flybe and 
Estonian Air. 
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Name Ryanair Flybe Estonian Air 
Ryanair  
  
easyJet   
 
Flybe 
 
 
 
Aegean   
 
Aer Lingus    
Air Berlin   
 
British Airways    
Croatia Airlines 
 
  
Estonian Air 
  
 
Finnair   
 
Icelandair  
 
 
KLM    
Lufthansa  
 
 
Meridiana Fly    
TAP Air Portugal   
 
Turkish Airlines    
Air Astana    
Frequencies 14 13 10 
Table 11. Table of CCR Model Reference Sets 
Based on the above table Ryanair and Flybe are highly robust. These airlines 
may consequently be considered to be “well-rounded” performers or class leaders, 
making them suitable for emulation. Estonian Air is moderately robust, making it less 
suitable for emulation. 
In order to facilitate further analysis, the results were divided into three groups: 
 Airlines that scored 100 per cent efficiency 
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 Airlines that scored above average (55.47 per cent) but below 100 
per cent 
 Airlines that scored below average (55.47 per cent) 
 
Airlines with 
100%  
Score 
Airlines with 
Above Average  
Score 
Airlines with 
Below Average  
Score 
Ryanair Croatia Airlines Air Astana 
Flybe easyJet Icelandair 
Estonian Air Aer Lingus Turkish Airlines 
 Aegean Finnair 
 Air Berlin TAP Air Portugal 
 Meridiana Fly British Airways 
  KLM 
  Lufthansa 
Table 12. 100% Efficiency, Above Average & Below Average Scoring Groups within 
CCR 
 
4.3.3 Robustness - Banker, Charnes and Cooper (BCC) 
The BCC model of DEA is a measure of managerial performance. In this case 
eight of the 17 airlines examined are situated on the efficiency frontier. This means that 
nine out of 17 or 52.94 per cent of airlines examined were inefficient from a managerial 
performance perspective. Again there was a sizeable spread between the most and least 
efficient airlines of 75.49 per cent although not as significant as the previous model it 
still demonstrates a broad variance of managerial performance. The average efficiency 
score for this group is 80.75 per cent meaning that the inefficient airlines would have to 
increase their outputs, i.e. passengers carried and EBIT by 19.25 per cent on average to 
achieve 100 per cent efficiency. 
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Table 13 below shows each of the airlines that appear on the efficient frontier 
and the frequency with which they appear in the reference set as explained in the 
previous section. 
Name Ryanair Flybe 
Aer 
Lingus 
British 
Airways 
Estonian 
Air 
Lufthansa 
Meridiana 
Fly 
Turkish 
Airlines 
Ryanair  
       
easyJet    
     
Flybe 
 
 
      
Aegean   
  
 
   
Aer Lingus 
  
 
     
Air Berlin   
      
British 
Airways 
   
 
    
Croatia 
Airlines 
 
 
  
 
   
Estonian 
Air 
    
 
   
Finnair   
      
Icelandair 
    
 
 
 
 
KLM  
  
 
   
 
Lufthansa 
     
 
  
Meridiana 
Fly 
      
 
 
TAP Air 
Portugal 
   
     
Turkish 
Airlines 
       
 
Air Astana 
 
 
  
 
   
Freq: 7 8 3 2 5 1 2 2 
Table 13. Table of BCC Model Reference Sets 
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Based on the above table none of the airlines are highly robust. Ryanair and 
Flybe are moderately robust, making them suitable for emulation, but not ideal. 
Estonian Air, Aer Lingus, British Airways, Lufthansa, Meridiana Fly and Turkish 
Airlines are not robust making them unsuitable for emulation as their position on the 
frontier is tenuous. 
In order to facilitate further analysis, the results were divided into three groups: 
 Airlines that scored 100 per cent efficiency 
 Airlines that scored above average (80.75 per cent) but below 100 
per cent 
 Airlines that scored below average (80.75 per cent) 
Airlines with 
100 % Score 
Airlines with 
Above Average Score 
Airlines with 
Below Average Score 
Ryanair Croatia Airlines Agean 
Flybe easyJet Air Berlin 
Aer Lingus Iceland Air KLM 
British Airways Air Astana TAP Air Protugal 
Estonian Air  Finnair 
Lufthansa   
Meridiana Fly   
Turkish Airlines   
Table 14. 100% Efficiency, Above Average & Below Average Scoring Groups within 
BCC 
 
4.3.4 Robustness - Pure Scale (CCR/BCC) 
The CCR/BCC model of DEA is a measure of pure scale efficiency. In this case 
four of the 17 airlines examined appear on the efficiency frontier. This means that four 
out of 17 or 23.53 per cent of airlines examined were efficient from a pure scale 
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perspective. Again there was a sizeable spread between the most and least efficient 
airlines of 89.83 per cent which demonstrates a broad variance of pure scale efficiency. 
The average efficiency score for this group is 70.66 per cent meaning that the inefficient 
airlines would have to increase their outputs, i.e. passengers carried and EBIT by 29.34 
per cent on average to achieve 100 per cent efficiency. 
Table 15 below shows a table displaying each of the airlines that appear on the 
efficient frontier and the frequency with which they appear in the reference set as 
explained in the previous section. 
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Name Ryanair Flybe Estonian Air 
Ryanair  
  easyJet   
 Flybe 
 
 
 Aegean    
Aer Lingus 
   Air Berlin   
 British Airways 
   Croatia 
Airlines 
 
  
Estonian Air 
  
 
Finnair   
 Icelandair 
  
 
KLM  
  Lufthansa 
   Meridiana Fly 
   TAP Air 
Portugal   
 Turkish 
Airlines 
   Air Astana     
Frequencies 7 8 5 
Table 15. Table of Pure Scale Reference Sets 
Based on the above table none of the airlines are highly robust. Ryanair and Flybe are 
moderately robust, making them suitable for emulation, but again not ideal. Estonian 
Air appears in the not robust category. 
In order to facilitate further analysis, the results were divided into three groups: 
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 Airlines that scored 100 per cent efficiency 
 Airlines that scored above average (80.75 per cent) but below 100 
per cent 
 Airlines that scored below average (80.75 per cent) 
Airlines with 
100% Score 
Airlines with 
Above Average Score 
Airlines with 
Below Average Score 
Ryanair Air Berlin Aer Lingus 
Flybe Finnair Air Astana 
Estonian Air easyJet Meridiana Fly 
 Aegean Icelandair 
 TAP Air Protugal Turkish Airlines 
 Croatia Airlines KLM 
  British Airways 
  Lufthansa 
Table 16. 100% Efficiency, Above Average & Below Average Scoring Groups within 
Pure Scale 
 
4.4 Further Analysis 
As previously mentioned, in order to facilitate further analysis the airlines were 
split into the following groups. Those airlines that scored 100 per cent efficiency and 
those that scored above average but below 100 per cent and those that scored below 
average. This process resulted in the following groupings (see table 17 below):  
 Ryanair, Flybe and Estonian Air were the only airlines that achieved 100 
per cent efficiency scores in each of the CCR, BCC and CCR/BCC models.  
 Croatia Airlines and easyJet were the only airlines that achieved above 
average efficiency scores in each model.  
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 KLM was the only airline to achieve a below average efficiency score in 
all three models.  
Airlines with 
100 per cent Score 
in all models 
Airlines with 
Above Average Score 
in all models 
Airlines with 
Below Average Score 
in all models 
Ryanair Croatia Airlines KLM 
Flybe easyJet  
Estonian Air   
Table 17. 100% Efficiency, Above Average & Below Average Scoring Groups across 
all DEA Models 
 
As Ryanair is the top scorer across all three models as well as being highly robust, it 
was chosen from the 100 per cent efficiency group for further analysis. easyJet was 
chosen from the above average group as it is closest to Ryanair with regard to strategy 
and market i.e. a low cost carrier operating in Europe. Finally, KLM was the only 
airline to score below average across all three DEA models and so was chosen by 
default. 
4.4.1 Airlines Chosen for Further Analysis 
4.4.1.1 Ryanair 
Ryanair is a low cost airline based in Ireland. It was founded in 1985 and has 
grown to become one of the largest airlines in Europe (depending on metric). 
Its business model is loosely based on that of U.S. carrier Southwest Airlines i.e. it is a 
point to point no frills short haul operator. Ryanair does not have any interline 
agreements with any other airline meaning it does not offer connections. 
Ryanair currently operates a single type fleet of 303 Boeing 737-800 aircraft 
across 1600 routes and 180 destinations (Ryanair.com figures for 2014). The average 
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age of a Ryanair aircraft is approximately three years making it one of the youngest 
fleets in Europe. 
  In 2011 Ryanair carried 72 million passengers and performed 85,709 million 
Revenue Passenger Kilometres (RPK’s). The average load factor in 2011 was 83 per 
cent. Ryanair employed 8063 people which equates to 8930 passengers carried for each 
member of staff. 
4.4.1.2 KLM 
Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V. (Royal Dutch Airlines) or KLM is 
the national airline of the Netherlands. It was originally founded in 1919 and, like 
Ryanair, has grown to become one of the largest airlines in Europe (depending on 
metric). 
KLM operates a hub and spoke network of short, medium and long haul routes. 
Interline agreements are in place meaning that passengers may connect with the KLM 
network along with their baggage. In other words a passenger may fly from Dublin to 
Amsterdam with Aer Lingus and then on to New York with KLM but only needs to 
check in once in Dublin and is not required to collect and recheck their baggage in 
Amsterdam. 
KLM currently operates a mixed fleet of 118 aircraft consisting of five different 
types to 136 destinations (KLM.com figures for 2014). The average age of a KLM 
aircraft is currently approximately nine years. 
  In 2011 KLM carried 19.7 million passengers and performed 65,218 million 
Revenue Passenger Kilometres (RPK’s). The average load factor in 2011 was 85.6 per 
cent. KLM employed 33,918 people which equates to 2966 passengers carried for each 
member of staff. 
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4.4.1.3 easyJet 
easyJet is a UK based low cost airline. It was founded in 1995 and has like 
Ryanair and KLM grown to become one of the largest airlines in Europe (depending on 
metric). 
Its business model is loosely based on that of U.S. carrier Southwest Airlines i.e. 
it is a point to point no frills short haul operator. easyJet does not have any interline 
agreements with any other airline meaning it does not offer connections. 
easyJet currently operates a fleet of 138 Airbus A319 and 61 Airbus A320 
aircraft across to 134 destinations (easyJet.com figures for 2014). easyJet is currently 
the world’s largest operator of the Airbus A319. The average age of an easyJet aircraft 
is approximately four years making it one of the youngest fleets in Europe alongside 
Ryanair. 
  In 2011 easyJet carried 54.5 million passengers and performed 61,374 million 
Revenue Passenger Kilometres (RPK’s). The average load factor in 2011 was 87.33 per 
cent. easyJet employed 8288 people which equates to 6576 passengers carried for each 
member of staff. 
The annual reports of each airline for the year 2011 were revisited and data 
(strategic financial and operational) common to all three airlines in addition to the 
original input / output variables was extracted for further analysis. This additional data 
is categorised as follows. 
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  Strategic Financial Operational 
Bases      
Routes     
Route Network      
Cargo/Freight     
Airframe Maintenance      
Engine Maintenance     
Rewards Program      
Subsidiaries     
Fleet Mix    
Annual Labour Costs per Staff Member      
CO2 Emissions     
Passengers per Staff Member    
Revenue Passenger Kilometres (RPK)      
Fleet Number    
Average Age of Fleet      
Average Daily Flight Hours    
Block Hours      
Load Factor      
Table 18. Strategic, Financial and Operational Data 
 
Given that Ryanair is highly robust and thus may be considered a role model or class 
leader which its peers should seek to emulate this section will examine the figures for 
easyJet and KLM in comparison to Ryanair. 
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This data is presented in tabular form in table 19 below. 
 Ryanair easyJet KLM 
Bases 45 19 1 
Routes 1300 547 304 
CO2 Emissions Ranked No. 1 Ranked No. 3 Ranked No. 7 
Passengers per Staff 
Member 8930 6576 2966 
Annual Labour Costs 
per Staff Member €46,075 €62,440 €61,914 
Revenue Passenger 
Kilometres (RPK) 85,709 million 61,374 million 65,218 million 
Route Network Point to Point Point to Point Hub and Spoke 
Fleet Number 272 167 128 
Fleet Mix One Aircraft Type Two Aircraft Types 8 Aircraft Types 
Average Age of Fleet 3 yrs 4 yrs 11.4 yrs 
Cargo/Freight No No Yes 
Subsidiaries 0 0 16 
Airframe Maintenance In house Outsourced Both 
Engine Maintenance Outsourced Outsourced Both 
Average Daily Flight 
Hours 8.36 11.3 13.12 
Rewards Program No No Yes 
Block Hours 829,981 761,708 613,334 
Load Factor 83 per cent 87.30 per cent 85.60 per cent 
Table 19. Comparison of Strategic, Financial and Operational data for Ryanair, 
easyJet and KLM 
 
Bases 
The point-to-point network model lends itself to multiple bases more so than the 
hub-and-spoke network model. Multiple bases allow for more flexibility in route 
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structure and mean less exposure to external factors such as natural disasters, industrial 
action or congestion. 
For example KLM is extremely vulnerable to any issues that may arise at 
Schipol airport. Strategically, multiple bases allow for penetration into a greater number 
of markets. The route structure is not limited by either aircraft range or a preference for 
operating frequent short haul flights.  
In addition many airports offer financial incentives to airlines willing to 
establish a base at their facility. These range from reduced or waived passenger 
handling fees to the provision of free facilities (The Economist, 2013). In many cases 
these inducements are dependent on the airline delivering a minimum number of 
passengers to the airport. Ryanair have been particularly partial to these arrangements in 
the past but recent clarifications on what does and does not constitute state subsidy has 
at least reduced the proliferation of such incentives (O’Halloran, 2005). 
The fact that many of Ryanair’s staff are contract staff as opposed to permanent 
employees allows for more mobility with regard to personnel. There is no need for 
Ryanair to become involved in each state’s tax and employment laws as these issues are 
the responsibility of the individual contractor. This permits Ryanair to assign staff to 
any of their bases dynamically, without complication (for Ryanair) and most 
importantly at minimum cost. 
Routes 
There is a large differential between the airlines in the number of routes 
operated. This is to be expected given the different network models, but what is perhaps 
more interesting is the ratio of routes operated to the number of aircraft: 
Ryanair = 4.8 routes per aircraft operated 
easyJet = 3.3 routes per aircraft operated 
KLM = 2.4 routes per aircraft operated 
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This certainly implies a lack of efficiency with regard to aircraft utilisation in the case 
of KLM. However, it may be the case that this ratio in fact points to a greater 
inefficiency on behalf of easyJet as their model is the same as Ryanair’s i.e. short haul 
point to point. This model relies on an intensive utilisation of flight assets. It may be the 
case that easyJet are operating more aircraft than they need to. There are other factors 
pointing to a lack of efficiency with regard to aircraft utilisation on easyJets part which 
will be examined later. 
C02 Emissions 
Actual C02 emissions were not reported in all three annual reports but world 
rankings were (www.ryanair.com; www.easyJet.com; www.klm.com). Despite the 
highest number of block hours Ryanair scores number one for the lowest C02 emissions 
per passenger. This is as a direct result of operating a young fuel efficient fleet. This is 
also helped by Ryanair’s preference for secondary airports which results in less holding 
time and thus lower overall fuel burn. 
A secondary benefit to low CO2 emissions is the potential cost savings should an 
emissions trading scheme and/or carbon cap be imposed on European airlines. An 
attempt to impose a carbon tax on European airlines was defeated in 2012 after strong 
opposition from the worldwide aviation industry (Szakonyi, 2012). However, the 
“threat” of such a tax is ever present. If such a tax is introduced the cost will ultimately 
be passed on to the consumer in the form of higher ticket prices. Therefore, the airline 
with the lowest exposure to this tax will have the least associated increase in ticket 
prices in comparison to its less environmentally friendly peers giving it a competitive 
edge in the marketplace.  
Passengers per Staff Member 
The staffing figure presented in table 19 points to substantial overstaffing in 
KLM. The passengers carried per staff member figures for each airline are as follows 
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            Ryanair = 8930 passengers carried per staff member 
            easyJet = 6576 passengers carried per staff member 
            KLM = 581 passengers carried per staff member 
This represents a massive gulf between the best and worst performing airlines in terms 
of staff productivity. Each member of staff at Ryanair handles over 15 times more 
passengers than their counterpart at KLM. Whether this is down to inefficient rostering, 
generous working conditions or some other reason is beyond the scope of this study but 
undoubtedly there is the capacity for substantial savings in this area for KLM. 
 This over staffing is also evident when the number of staff versus fleet ratio is 
examined. 
Ryanair = 29.6 staff per aircraft  
easyJet = 49.7 staff per aircraft  
KLM = 265 staff per aircraft  
KLM have just under nine times the number of staff per aircraft as Ryanair. This is due 
at least in part to the relatively complex fleet mix. Each type of aircraft operated 
requires its own specifically qualified pilots, engineers and cabin crew. Despite this, the 
staff:aircraft ratio is still extremely skewed and there is clearly scope for savings for 
KLM if they were to target staff cuts. 
Annual Labour Costs per Staff Member 
The differential in labour costs per staff member between the three airlines is 
certainly as a result of Ryanair‘s preference for contract staff over full time employees. 
easyJet also employs this hiring practice, but not to the same extent as Ryanair. This 
means that for the majority of its staff Ryanair is not obliged to pay any form of social 
insurance or employee taxes. Annual holidays are also taken at the contractors expense. 
Apart from the obvious savings that this brings about it also allows for a simplified 
payroll process which also results in cost savings. In addition, as operational Ryanair 
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staff i.e. flight and cabin crew, are paid on a block hour basis they are not getting paid if 
a flight is delayed on the ground. This is not the case with either KLM or easyJet.  
With regard to sundries, Ryanair staff pay for their own training, medicals, uniforms 
and even their identification cards. Again this is not the case for KLM or easyJet. In fact 
Ryanair are one of the few airlines who impose these costs on their staff. While these 
practices have their critics the cost savings achieved as a result of them are apparent.  
Revenue Passenger Kilometres (RPK) 
The RPK totals are derived from multiplying the total number of revenue paying 
passengers by the distance in kilometres that they travelled. Ryanairs RPKs are very 
high primarily due to the sheer volume of passengers carried. Again Ryanair 
substantially exceeds KLM and easyJet with regard to RPKs. In fact easyJet returned 
fewer RPKs despite higher block hours performed and slightly higher load factors.  
RPKs are essentially an airlines “product”. An airline can provide as many seat 
kilometres as they like but it is only when they are filled with revenue paying 
passengers that they produce income.  
Route Network 
Both Ryanair and easyJet operate a short haul point-to-point network while 
KLM operates a short, medium and long haul hub and spoke network.  
A hub and spoke network is a necessity for any airline operating long haul flights from a 
single base. The purpose of this type of network is to feed the long haul network from 
satellite airports where the market for long haul flights may not exist. For example, in 
order to fly from Kerry to New York with Aer Lingus a passenger is “fed” into the Aer 
Lingus long haul network by means of a commuter flight between Kerry and Dublin. 
The advantage to the passenger is the need for only one ticket, the requirement to check 
in only once and to have their bags checked through for the whole journey. The 
disadvantage for Aer Lingus is the added complexity and thus expense that this requires. 
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This arrangement can also cause disruption to an airlines’ operation as the long haul 
flight is, at least to some extent, at the mercy of any delays that the feeder flight may 
experience. Also, the feeder portion of the flight is often subsidised to some extent in 
order that the airline is not seen to be penalising passengers for not living close to their 
long haul base. An additional complexity is the fact that passenger taxes are applied at 
the point of origin. For example a British Airways flight from London to New York 
may have passengers who originated in Dublin, Amsterdam and Paris all of whom 
attract different passenger tax rates. 
Interline arrangements also exist on hub and spoke networks. In these cases, to 
take KLM as an example, KLM may allow the transfer of passengers onto its long haul 
network from any number of feeder airlines. A KLM flight to New York originating at 
Schipol may be fed by a British Airways flight from London, an Aer Lingus flight from 
Dublin and an Air France Flight from Paris. It is clear to see the potential complexity 
and subsequent expense that these arrangements are capable of adding to an operation. 
The primary advantage of a point-to-point network is simplicity. There are no 
connections, no passenger or baggage transfers and in the case of Ryanair and easyJet 
no interline arrangements. This results in a very simple and linear process. Once a 
passenger has reached their destination and collected their bags the airline has no further 
responsibility to them. 
Fleet 
Ryanair operate a young (3 years average age) fleet of Boeing 737 aircraft. This 
provides for commonality of flight crew, cabin crew and engineers as well as ground 
handling equipment. easyJet operates a young (4 years average age) fleet of Airbus 
A319 and A320 aircraft. While these are technically different types they also allow for 
commonality across flight crew, cabin crew and engineers and any associated savings. 
However this particular mix of types also allows for some level of flexibility of capacity 
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on routes which the Ryanair 1 fleet type model does not. KLM operates an older 
(average age 11.4 years) mixed fleet ranging from 70 seat Fokker 70 regional jets up to 
Boeing 747s, some of which are almost 22 years old. This complexity of fleet 
substantially adds to costs not only as a result of crew training and complexity of 
maintenance but the older aircraft in the fleet are ‘previous generation’ and therefore are 
significantly less fuel efficient. 
Cargo/Freight 
KLM is the only airline of the three to offer a cargo/freight service. Again this 
adds complexity and thus expense to their operation.  
In order to operate a cargo service an airline is required to purchase and maintain 
specialised equipment. In addition to this additional trained staff are required. The 
airline is also required to fulfil additional auditing requirements in terms of security.  
Yield parameters have to be set as in some cases it may be more profitable to offload 
passengers or their baggage in favour of cargo. 
There is no doubt that providing a freight service is, or at least has the potential 
to be, profitable otherwise no airline would do so. However, any airline offering a 
combined cargo and passenger service is exposing itself to two different markets, for 
which the service itself is expensive to provide.  
Once again simplicity and its associated cost saving appears to be preferred strategy for 
the better performing airlines. 
Subsidiaries 
Ryanair and easyJet concentrate solely on the ‘core business’ of being an airline. 
They both provide ancillary services such as hotel rooms, car hire, insurance, bus 
tickets, etc., but these are operated by other companies. Thus they are revenue earning 
and can easily be disposed of should they become a liability. KLM is the sole 
shareholder in 12 separate companies and a substantial shareholder in four more. As 
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such it is vulnerable to any economic shocks that these subsidiaries may suffer. It also 
results in less focus on the company’s core business. 
The importance of concentrating on the “core business” can be demonstrated by 
Aer Lingus’ introduction of the “Cahill Plan” in 1993 (Donoghue, 1994). At that time 
Aer Lingus was in serious financial difficulty with losses of over IE£11 million. Bernie 
Cahill, the then Chairman of the Board, introduced the Cahill Plan which was credited 
with effectively saving Aer Lingus from financial ruin. One critical element of the 
Cahill Plan was the streamlining of the airline so that it could concentrate on its core 
business. This resulted in the disposal of a number of wholly owned subsidiaries 
including hotels, maintenance facilities and other airlines. This reform was the first step 
in turning Aer Lingus into the profitable airline that it is today.  
Airframe Maintenance 
Ryanair performs all of its airframe maintenance in house. easyJet outsources 
this activity while KLM only outsources heavier maintenance. For example “D checks”. 
This is where the aircraft is practically broken down into its constituent parts and each 
part is thoroughly examined. The exterior paint is removed in order to inspect the metal 
underneath. A “D check” takes approximately two months and up to 50,000 man hours. 
Given the amount of time an aircraft will be out of the schedule D checks are often 
planned for years in advance by the airlines. 
The decision to perform airframe maintenance in house or outsource it is 
ultimately a strategic “judgment call”. This is especially the case when dealing with a 
single type fleet (practically speaking easyJet may be considered a single type fleet). In 
these cases the decision making process is reasonably straight forward.  
When dealing with a complex fleet mix there certainly appears, from a high 
level perspective at least, to be a strong case to be made for outsourcing airframe 
maintenance. The number of staff, training costs, inventory, equipment and hanger 
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space required for this type of maintenance operation are enormous. The scheduling 
requirements are highly complex which also adds to cost.  
Given the mobility of aircraft there exists a very competitive global maintenance 
market and given the above complexities it is hard to see how carrying out an in house 
maintenance program on a mixed type fleet could be done cost effectively. 
Engine Maintenance 
Both Ryanair and easyJet outsource all of their engine maintenance while KLM 
both outsources and performs some maintenance in house. 
As with airframe maintenance above the decision to outsource engine maintenance is 
ultimately a strategic “judgment call” which in this case is the approach both Ryanair 
and easyJet have chosen. 
Again KLM have chosen a strategy of mixing outsourcing and in house 
maintenance programs. For similar reasons with regard to airframe maintenance it is 
hard to see how such complex maintenance programs could be carried out cost 
effectively. 
Average Daily Flight Hours 
This figure is derived from yearly block hours  365  number of aircraft to 
give the average daily utilisation per aircraft.  
Ryanair reports the lowest average daily flight hours (8.36hrs per day). This may be 
indicative of a level of inefficiency on Ryanair’s part in terms of aircraft utilisation. 
When compared to easyJets (11.3 hours per day) daily average flight hours it is clear 
that Ryanair is getting approximately 33 per cent fewer flight hours per day from its 
aircraft.  
This is due in part to Ryanair operating so many bases from secondary airports. 
The intensity of operation from these bases is less than those operated from primary 
airports. For example, Ryanair currently operates approximately 40 flight per week 
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between its Dublin base and London Stansted and approximately 15 flights per week 
between its Shannon Base and London Stansted. 
Rewards Program 
KLM is the only airline of the three to offer a rewards program. Both Ryanair 
and easyJet are on record as saying they believe rewards programs add complexity and 
thus cost. They both consider their low fares to be the best reward to offer their 
customers. 
A rewards program is of greater value to an airline operating on a well served 
route with customers for whom price is not necessarily the greatest concern. In many 
cases the low cost carriers compete specifically on price point.  
  In order to have a rewards programme an airline must offer rewards. These 
rewards generally consist of free upgrades or flights, lounge access and complimentary 
drinks and meals. Ultimately these inducements have to be paid for and result in higher 
fares. They also carry their own cost such as administration which again ultimately gets 
passed on to the consumer in the form of higher fares. 
Block Hours 
Block hours are measured as the time elapsed between the aircraft moving under 
its own power with the intention of flight on departure and when the parking brakes are 
applied on arrival. Again Ryanair returns the highest yearly figure for block hours. This 
is not surprising given the number routes that they operate. 
It is also indicative of the fast turnaround of the aircraft. The low cost carriers 
put great emphasis on turning an aircraft around as quickly as possible. In other words 
they try to get the arriving passengers disembarked and the departing passengers 
embarked as quickly as possible. This is in addition to any services the aircraft requires 
i.e. fuel, catering and hygiene services. The general consensus in the airline industry is 
that an aircraft makes no money sitting on the ground. 
Chapter Four 
 
135 
 
This allows for higher aircraft utilisation and is reflected in the routes operated 
per aircraft ratio reported previously. When this figure is taken in conjunction with the 
average daily flight hours it again shows the efficiency in Ryanairs operation as 
opposed to KLMs. Despite the lowest average daily flight hours Ryanair reports the 
highest average daily block hours. This essentially means that Ryanairs crews are on 
duty for fewer hours but are performing more flights per day. The reverse is the case for 
KLM. 
Load Factor 
At 87.3 per cent easyJet is the class leader with KLM a close second at 85.6 per 
cent Ryanair comes third at 83 per cent. These are all excellent load factors and in many 
ways highlight just how bloated and inefficient KLM is since its load factor is not 
substantially higher than Ryanair despite the resources used in achieving it. 
There is however another consideration. Load factors are a better indicator of 
performance for low cost carries as they depend more on passenger volume than long 
haul operators who depend on business and first class passengers to subsidise the 
economy fares. With this in mind a better comparator in this case is passenger yield 
which is a measure of how much money a flight makes.  
For example, suppose two airlines operate two flights with 100 seats available 
on each. Each flight costs €5000 to operate. Airline A sells 85 seats at €100 each 
resulting in a profit of €3500. Airline B sells 75 seats at €150 each resulting in a profit 
of €6250. So despite airline A returning a load factor of 85 per cent and airline B 
returning a load factor of 75 per cent airline B is actually making a higher profit. 
Load factors of 100 per cent are considered an indication of poor yield management as 
if all of the seats on a flight are sold then the fares were set too low. 
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The above are all areas where airline management can make tangible changes in 
order to improve their company’s performance. Reducing staff numbers, scrapping 
aircraft and more efficient use of staff have all been identified as means by which 
airlines may address downturns (Morrell, 2011).   
The key findings of this chapter are the efficiency rankings for the 17 airlines 
examined according to the CCR, BCC and Pure Scale models, robustness scores and 
further analysis. There is a certain level of consistency across the top and bottom ranked 
airlines across the three models. Ryanair is the top performer according to all three 
models meaning that it is efficient in terms of overall, technical and pure scale 
efficiencies. Conversely, KLM consistently scores in the bottom three airlines across all 
three models. There is reasonable fluidity amongst the mid ranking airlines with for 
example, Finnair scoring fifth from the bottom, bottom and fifth from the top according 
to the CCR, BCC and Pure Scale models respectively. This indicates that the high 
performers are doing most things well, the mid range performers are doing some things 
well and the lower performers could improve in most areas. 
The robustness scores are an important extension of the DEA process as they allow 
for distinction between those airlines situated on the frontier. The process of 
determining the reference sets identifies those airlines that are most secure on the 
frontier and so are the most suitable for poorer performing airlines to model themselves 
upon. This makes these airlines more ‘valuable’ when seeking to identify best practice. 
The further analysis section compared a number of strategic, financial and 
operational elements of three selected airlines and indicates tendencies towards certain 
practices. For example, lower labour costs, higher number of routes, not carrying 
freight, high passenger to staff ratio, not having a rewards program and higher block 
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hours are all characteristics of more efficient airlines. There are no barriers to the 
implementation of any of these practices by the less efficient airlines. 
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Sensitivity Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of sensitivity analysis is to examine how sensitive a model is to 
parameter changes that may be introduced. Sensitivity analyses are usually performed as 
a series of separate experiments during which each variable is changed in isolation by a 
set amount. This allows the researcher to investigate what effect these changes have on 
the model outcome. Small alterations to the variables should not result in large changes 
to the model outcome.  
The parameter values of any model are subject to change and error. Sensitivity 
analysis, broadly defined, is the investigation of these potential changes and errors and 
their potential impact on any on any conclusions drawn from the model (Baird, 1989). 
Essentially, a sensitivity analysis answers the question “what, if any, effect will changes 
in parameter values have on model output?” Thus a sensitivity analysis may be useful 
for a number of purposes for example: 
 Testing the robustness of an optimal solution 
 Identifying critical parameters 
 Making recommendations more credible 
 Testing a model for validity or accuracy 
This provides confidence in a model and its outputs and hence is valuable when making 
a decision or recommendation on that basis. Even if the parameter values are set, for 
example price or weight, there is no guarantee that they will remain constant over time 
(Pannell, 1997). 
There is an array of sensitivity analysis techniques that may be applied to a 
particular model. These range from simple one-at-a-time analyses to standardised 
regression coefficients to structured tests based on partitioning of empirical input 
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distribution (Hamby, 1994). In the context of this research three of the most relevant 
sensitivity analysis methods are: 
5.2 One-at-a-time sensitivity analysis  
This is the most straightforward means of performing a sensitivity analysis. This 
method consists of repeatedly changing one parameter value at a time while the 
remaining parameter values remain constant (O’Neill, Gardner & Mankin, 1980). 
Sensitivity rankings for each parameter may be derived by increasing and decreasing 
each parameter by a set percentage while the other parameter values remain constant. 
Any change in model output is then recorded and parameters may be ranked in order of 
sensitivity. 
5.3 Factorial design 
This method involves changing each parameter by a range of set amounts (i.e. 
+/- 10 per cent, +/- 20 per cent and +/-50 per cent) then running the model for every 
possible permutation of these changes (Box, Hunter & Hunter, 1978). The changes in 
parameter values may be predefined or may be chosen arbitrarily by the researcher. This 
technique results in enormous amounts of data. For example, a model with six 
parameters subject to the six percentage changes stated above requires 6
6 
or 46,656 
model runs. This makes analysis of the results difficult. 
5.4 Subjective sensitivity analysis 
The subjective sensitivity analysis is a subjective analysis of each individual 
parameter by a subject matter expert (Downing, Gardner & Hoffman, 1985). This 
method depends on the subject matter experts deciding before a model is run which 
parameters will have the least influence on the model outcome and hence may be 
discarded. This technique may be used to reduce the number of parameters for a given 
model in order to reduce the amount of data to manageable amount. It is a blunt 
instrument and due to its subjectivity lacks a scientific approach.  
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5.5 Method 
This study will use the One-at-a-time method of sensitivity analysis. This 
technique was chosen on the following basis: it is uncomplicated and requires no 
subject matter expert knowledge; it produces a manageable amount of data and as a 
result of its scientific approach it is replicable and verifiable. It is also one of the most 
commonly used sensitivity analysis techniques (Eschenbach & Gimpel, 1990). In order 
to keep the data levels manageable Ryanair, easyJet and KLM were chosen to be 
analysed with regard to sensitivity. These three airlines were chosen on the basis of their 
DEA scores which are discussed in chapter six.  
Each model (CCR, BCC and Pure Scale) was re- run for each of the three 
airlines with the following changes to the input and output variables. This resulted in 
270 separate model runs in total, the results of which are tabulated and presented in 
Appendix C. 
5.5.1 Input Changes 
Each input variable (number of employees, fuel costs and staff costs) was 
increased and decreased separately by 10 per cent, 20 per cent and then 50 per cent. No 
other variables were altered and a model run was executed after each variable change. 
This action was carried out for each of the three airlines Ryanair, easyJet and KLM and 
across each of the three models, BCC, CCR and Pure Scale. This resulted in 162 
separate model runs the results of which are presented in tabular form an Appendix C. 
5.5.2 Output Changes 
Each output variable (EBIT and passengers carried) was increased and decreased 
separately by 10 per cent, 20 per cent and then 50 per cent. No other variables were 
altered and a model run was executed after each variable change. This action was 
carried out for each of the three airlines Ryanair, easyJet and KLM across each of the 
Chapter Five 
 
 
142 
 
three models, BCC, CCR and Pure Scale. This resulted in 108 separate model runs the 
results of which are presented in tabular form an Appendix C. 
5.5.3 Sensitivity Index 
Parameter sensitivity may be ranked according to a sensitivity index. A 
sensitivity index may be calculated using a number of methods which results in a value 
that reflects the relative sensitivity of the model parameters to the model output. Hamby 
(1994) identified 14 potential sensitivity indices including relative deviation and partial 
rank correlation coefficient. These methods are highly complex and when subsequently 
compared by Hamby (1995) none were found to perform as well as a simple index 
proposed by Hoffman & Gardner (1983); 
SI = ( Dmax – Dmin) / Dmax 
SI = sensitivity index 
Dmax = output when parameter set to maximum value 
Dmin = output when parameter set to minimum value 
Pannell (1997) suggested that the following simpler sensitivity index is satisfactory and 
maybe even preferable to the Hoffman & Gardner approach;   
SI = ( Dmax – Dmin)  
This is the sensitivity index used to calculate the sensitivity rankings of the parameters 
in this study. In this study Dmax is defined as (Parameter + 50 per cent) and Dmin is 
defined as (Parameter - 50 per cent).  
5.5.4 Charnes, Cooper & Rhodes Model Sensitivity Indices  
The sensitivity indices for the parameters for the CCR model are as follows in 
tables 20, 21 and 22: 
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Ryanair 
Parameter Dmax Dmin SI (Dmax – Dmin) 
No. Employees 100 100.00 0.00 
Fuel Costs 100 100.00 0.00 
Staff Costs 100 100.00 0.00 
EBIT 100 100.00 0.00 
Passengers Carried 100 96.23 3.77 
Table 20. CCR Model Sensitivity Indices for Ryanair 
 
easyJet 
Parameter Dmax Dmin SI (Dmax – Dmin) 
No. Employees 84.15 100.00 -15.85 
Fuel Costs 74.63 100.00 -25.37 
Staff Costs 84.44 100.00 -15.56 
EBIT 88.63 84.44 4.19 
Passengers Carried 100.00 46.99 53.01 
Table 21. CCR Model Sensitivity Indices for easyJet 
 
KLM 
Parameter Dmax Dmin SI (Dmax – Dmin) 
No. Employees 12.29 17.82 -5.53 
Fuel Costs 9.46 24.48 -15.02 
Staff Costs 13.10 13.68 -0.58 
EBIT 14.79 12.36 2.43 
Passengers Carried 18.57 8.26 10.31 
Table 22. CCR Model Sensitivity Indices for KLM 
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It should be noted that sensitivity indices are dimensionless (Eckhardt, 2012). This 
means that they are pure numbers and as such their “sign” is irrelevant. For example, a 
sensitivity index value of +10 or -10 has the same absolute value i.e. 10. 
Ryanair CCR 
From table 20 Ryanair’s parameters in order of sensitivity (descending) are; 1. 
Passengers carried 2. All other parameters scored 0. Ryanair CCR model outputs do not 
drop below 100 per cent efficiency when any one parameter, with the exception of 
passengers carried, is either increased or decreased by up to 50 per cent. This further 
demonstrates how solid Ryanair’s position is on the efficient frontier. The airline can 
absorb a loss of at least 50 per cent in EBIT without impacting on its efficiency score. A 
50 per cent drop in passengers carried only results in a 3.77 per cent drop in efficiency. 
In terms of inputs a 50 per cent increase in any one input still results in an efficiency 
score of 100 per cent. This points to highly efficient use of inputs. This insulates 
Ryanair to a large extent from various factors the most significant of which is fuels 
costs.  
easyJet CCR 
From table 21 above, easyJet’s CCR model parameters in order of sensitivity 
(descending) are; 1. Passengers carried 2. Fuel costs 3. Number of employees 4. Staff 
costs and 5. EBIT. The most critical parameter for easyJet is passengers carried. An 
examination of the results presented in Appendix C indicates that an increase of 20 per 
cent in the number of passengers carried will result in an efficiency score of 100 per 
cent. Given that passengers carried has the highest sensitivity index this is the parameter 
that has the greatest effect on the efficiency score and so should be prioritised by 
decision makers when considering strategies for improving efficiency. A 20 per cent 
change in fuel costs or staff costs will also result in an efficiency score of 100 per cent. 
Since these parameters have lower sensitivity indices they should not be given the same 
Chapter Five 
 
 
145 
 
priority as passengers carried. EBIT has the lowest sensitivity index so despite being a 
critical element of business performance, in this scenario it makes the least contribution 
to efficiency score.  
KLM CCR 
KLMs CCR model parameters in order of  sensitivity (descending) are as 
follows from table 22; 1. Fuel costs 2. Passengers carried 3. Number of employees 4. 
EBIT 5. Staff costs. The most critical parameter for KLM is fuel costs. An examination 
of the results presented in Appendix C indicates that a decrease of 50 per cent in fuel 
costs will result in an efficiency score of 24.48 per cent. Despite resulting in a marginal 
improvement in efficiency, fuel costs has the highest sensitivity index and is the 
parameter that has the greatest effect on the efficiency score and provides a starting 
point for decision makers when considering strategies for improving efficiency. A 50 
per cent change in passengers carried, number of employees or EBIT also result in 
marginal increases in efficiency. The parameter with the lowest sensitivity index, staff 
costs, when reduced by 50 per cent results in an improvement of 0.58 per cent in the 
efficiency score. The largest increase in efficiency score for any parameter is 11.38 per 
cent where fuel costs are reduced by 50 per cent (CCR efficiency score when fuel costs 
are reduced by 50 per cent 24.48 per cent - original CCR efficiency score 13.1 per cent  
= 11.38 per cent change (See model run 192 in Table 42 Appendix C)) this is indicative 
of the high level of inefficiencies present in KLM.  
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5.5.5 Banker, Charnes & Cooper Sensitivity Indices 
The sensitivity indices for the BCC model are as follows in tables 23, 24 and 25: 
Ryanair 
Parameter Dmax Dmin SI (Dmax – Dmin) 
No. Employees 100 100 0 
Fuel Costs 100 100 0 
Staff Costs 100 100 0 
EBIT 100 100 0 
Passengers Carried 100 100 0 
Table 23. BCC Model Sensitivity Indices for Ryanair 
easyJet 
Parameter Dmax Dmin SI (Dmax – Dmin) 
No. Employees 85.87 100.00 -14.13 
Fuel Costs 79.35 100.00 -20.65 
Staff Costs 85.87 100.00 -14.13 
EBIT 100.00 84.50 15.50 
Passengers Carried 100.00 84.62 15.38 
Table 24. BCC Model Sensitivity Indices for easyJet 
KLM 
Parameter Dmax Dmin SI (Dmax – Dmin) 
No. Employees 48.86 53.53 -4.67 
Fuel Costs 47.41 59.89 -12.48 
Staff Costs 48.86 51.25 -2.39 
EBIT 70.84 30.39 40.45 
Passengers Carried 54.31 47.14 7.17 
Table 25. BCC Model Sensitivity Indices for KLM 
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Ryanair BCC 
As shown in table 23, Ryanairs parameters in order of sensitivity (descending) 
are; 1. All parameters scored 0. Ryanairs BCC model outputs do not drop below 100 per 
cent efficiency when any one parameter is either increased or decreased by up to 50 per 
cent. This again demonstrates how solid Ryanair’s position is on the efficient frontier. 
The airline can absorb a minimum change of 20 per cent in all parameters without 
reducing its efficiency score. This indicates a highly efficient use of inputs.  
easyJet BCC 
easyJets parameters presented in table 24,  in order of sensitivity (descending) 
are; 1. Fuel costs 2. EBIT 3. Staff costs 4. Number of employees and 5. Passengers 
carried. The most critical BCC model parameter for easyJet is fuel costs. An 
examination of the results presented in Appendix C indicates that a decrease of 20 per 
cent in fuel costs will result in an efficiency score of 100 per cent. Given that fuel costs 
has the highest sensitivity index this is the parameter that has the greatest effect on the 
efficiency score and so should be prioritised by decision makers when considering 
strategies for improving efficiency. A 50 per cent change in number of employees or 20 
per cent change in staff costs, EBIT or passengers carried will also result in an 
efficiency score of 100 per cent. Since these parameters have lower sensitivity indices 
they should not be given the same priority as passengers carried. Passengers carried has 
the lowest sensitivity index so should be given the least priority when targeting 
inefficiencies.  
KLM BCC 
From table 25, KLM parameters in order of sensitivity (descending) are; 1. EBIT 
2. Fuel costs 3. Passengers carried 4. Number of employees and 5. Staff costs. The most 
critical BCC model parameter for KLM is EBIT. An examination of the results 
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presented in Appendix C indicates that an increase of 50 per cent in EBIT will result in 
an efficiency score of 70.84 per cent. This is a relatively significant improvement in 
efficiency of 21.98 per cent considering that the parameter with the lowest sensitivity 
index (passengers carried) results in a 5.45 per cent improvement when increased by 50 
per cent. The largest increase in efficiency score for any parameter is 21.98 per cent 
(EBIT +50 per cent) which is again indicative of the high level of inefficiencies present 
in KLM.  
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5.5.6 Pure Scale Sensitivity Indices 
The sensitivity indices for the Pure Scale ratio are below in tables 26, 27 and 28: 
Ryanair 
Parameter Dmax Dmin SI (Dmax – Dmin) 
No. Employees 100 100.00 0.00 
Fuel Costs 100 100.00 0.00 
Staff Costs 100 100.00 0.00 
EBIT 100 100.00 0.00 
Passengers Carried 100 96.23 3.77 
Table 26. Pure Scale Model Sensitivity Indices for Ryanair 
 
easyJet 
Parameter Dmax Dmin SI (Dmax – Dmin) 
No. Employees 97.99 100.00 -2.01 
Fuel Costs 94.05 100.00 -5.95 
Staff Costs 98.34 100.00 -1.66 
EBIT 88.63 99.93 -11.30 
Passengers Carried 100.00 55.53 44.47 
Table 27. Pure Scale Model Sensitivity Indices for easyJet 
 
KLM 
Parameter Dmax Dmin SI (Dmax – Dmin) 
No. Employees 25.15 33.29 -8.14 
Fuel Costs 19.96 40.87 -20.91 
Staff Costs 26.82 26.70 0.12 
EBIT 20.88 40.67 -19.79 
Passengers Carried 34.20 17.52 16.68 
Table 28. Pure Scale Model Sensitivity Indices for KLM 
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Ryanair Pure Scale 
Table 26 shows Ryanairs parameters in order of sensitivity (descending) are; 1. 
Passengers carried 2. All other parameters scored 0. Ryanair pure scale ratio outputs do 
not drop below 100 per cent efficiency when any one parameter, except passengers 
carried, is either increased or decreased by up to 50 per cent. This further demonstrates 
how solid Ryanairs position is on the efficient frontier. A 50 per cent drop in passengers 
carried results in a 3.77 per cent drop in pure scale efficiency. In terms of inputs a 50 
per cent increase in any one input still results in a pure scale efficiency score of 100 per 
cent. This points to Ryanair operating at an optimal level in terms of scale.  
easyJet Pure Scale 
easyJets parameters in table 27 in order of sensitivity (descending) are; 1. 
Passengers carried 2. EBIT 3. Fuel costs 4. Number of employees and 5. Staff costs.  
The most critical pure scale ratio parameter for easyJet is passengers carried. An 
examination of the results presented in Appendix C indicates that an increase of 20 per 
cent in passengers carried will result in an efficiency score of 100 per cent. Given that 
passengers carried has the highest sensitivity index this is the parameter that has the 
greatest effect on the efficiency score and so should be prioritised by decision makers 
when considering strategies for improving efficiency. A 50 per cent change in number 
of employees or 20 per cent change in fuel costs will also result in an efficiency score of 
100 per cent. Since these parameters have lower sensitivity indices they should not be 
given the same priority as passengers carried. Staff costs has the lowest sensitivity index 
so should be given the least priority when targeting inefficiencies. Despite being second 
in terms of sensitivity index an increase in EBIT of 50 per cent results in a pure scale 
efficiency score of 88.63 per cent. 
KLM Pure Scale 
Chapter Five 
 
 
151 
 
KLM parameters in table 28 in order of sensitivity (descending) are; 1. Fuel 
costs 2. EBIT 3. Passengers carried 4. Number of employees and 5. Staff costs 
The most critical pure scale ratio parameter for KLM is fuel costs. An examination of 
the results presented in Appendix C indicates that a decrease of 50 per cent in fuel costs 
will result in a pure scale efficiency score of 40.87 per cent. This is an improvement in 
efficiency of 14.05 per cent. As with the previous models (CCR and BCC) KLM once 
again demonstrates high levels of inefficiency. 
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Chapter Six  Conclusion 
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6.1 Conclusions Relevant to the Airline Industry 
This thesis examined the overall, technical and scale efficiencies of a group of 
European airlines using publicly available data (annual reports) for the year 2011. The 
best and worst performers were identified and analysed in an attempt to explain why 
they performed as they did. In order to achieve this, three data envelopment analyses 
were carried out. This resulted in identification of their efficiency scores and the input 
and output targets which each airline would need to meet in order to achieve pareto 
optimisation. In addition the level of robustness of the efficient airlines was determined.  
This investigation employed a funnel approach to input and output variable 
selection. Annual reports for each airline were examined and potential input and output 
variable were selected where sufficient information was available to provide an in depth 
comparison. This resulted in three inputs: number of staff, fuel costs and staff costs; and 
two outputs: EBIT and passengers carried. 
The results indicated that in terms of overall efficiency the average efficiency score 
is 55.47 per cent. Three airlines scored 100 per cent efficiency and thus defined the 
efficiency frontier. On the basis of the frequency of their appearance in the reference set 
Flybe, Ryanair and Estonian Air were identified as highly robust.  
  In terms of managerial performance the average efficiency score is 80.75 per 
cent. Eight airlines scored 100 per cent efficiency and defined the efficiency frontier. 
No airlines were identified as highly robust. Ryanair, Flybe and Estonian Air were 
identified as moderately robust. In terms of pure scale the average efficiency score is 
70.66 per cent. Three airlines scored 100 per cent efficiency and defined the efficiency 
frontier. Again no airlines were identified as highly robust. Ryanair, Flybe and Estonian 
Air were identified as moderately robust, making them suitable for emulation. 
Chapter Six 
 
 
154 
 
In order to facilitate further analysis three airlines were chosen, one from each 
performance group and further information common to all three extracted from their 
annual reports. This information pertained to their financial, operational and strategic 
positions. Ryanair having scored 100 per cent across all three models and being highly 
robust was chosen as the benchmark. easyJet and KLM were compared and it was found 
that with regard to the measures chosen generally speaking, the less the equivalence 
with Ryanair, the lower the performance score. This further analysis validated the 
results from the original data envelopment analyses. This proves that a valid company 
analysis is possible using publicly available and easily accessible data. However it 
should be noted that data availability is not consistent. This is important not only for the 
operators themselves in terms of benchmarking themselves against their peers, but also 
for external analysts or investors who may wish to identify the best performers from a 
given data set. 
This research is an examination of the efficiency of 17 European airlines. 
Ultimately every airline produces the same basic product as its competitors i.e. a seat 
travelling from A to B. Service offerings beyond ‘the seat’ do differ with full service 
carriers providing ancillaries such as food and checked luggage as part of the ticket 
price. In order to sell this seat an airline must focus on differentiating itself from its 
competitors. It would appear from this study that the less successful airlines are the ones 
that focus on differentiating the product as opposed to how it is produced. The “full 
service” carriers such as KLM and Turkish Airlines have historically focused outwardly 
with regard to their product, pursuing ever higher service levels. The problem with this 
strategy is that once an innovative new service offering is successfully introduced it is 
immediately emulated by competitors. Thus, costs increase and any initial advantages 
are lost. 
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  This study demonstrates that in the majority of cases it is the low cost carriers 
that achieve the highest efficiency scores. This is as a result of the airlines looking 
inwardly and differentiating themselves in terms of how they produce the product as 
opposed to the product itself. Thus they are able to distinguish their product in terms of 
price not service level. This is far more difficult to emulate.  
In recent years there has been a paradigm shift with regard to airline business 
models. The market now demands low fares and the full service carriers are finding it 
difficult to compete on this front. This is not entirely the carriers own fault. It is not a 
simple matter of adopting the business model of a low cost carrier. As this research has 
demonstrated many of the elements required to operate a long haul service i.e. a hub and 
spoke network, a mixed fleet and operating from primary airports are not conducive to 
the low cost model. This represents a very real challenge for the industry. 
 
6.2 Conclusions Relevant to the Research Approach Taken 
This research came about as a result of the authors’ desire to find a method 
where successful airlines could be identified and compared across financial and 
operational measures. After a review of the literature surrounding performance 
measurement Data Envelopment Analysis was identified as an appropriate method by 
which this comparison could be made. However, in a review of the literature 
surrounding DEA several gaps were identified and ultimately addressed by this study. 
In doing so this research makes the following contributions to the current body of 
knowledge: 
This study builds on previous work by applying all three models of DEA to an 
airline focused study. Much of the previous work in this area (Zhu, 2011; Lu, Wang, 
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Hung & Lu, 2012; Lee & Worthington, 2014; Joo & Fowler, 2014) has not made use of 
all three models. Merkert & Williams (2013) did apply all three models but did not 
report pure technical or pure scale results also their study was restricted to PSO (Public 
Service Obligation) airlines. Chang, Yu & Chen (2013) applied and reported results for 
all three models in their study which focused on Chinese airports. Thus the contribution 
made by this researchers study is the application and reporting of all three DEA models 
as applied to the airline industry. 
 
6.3 Conclusions Relevant to the use of DEA as a Research Technique 
An ongoing issue with DEA is the selection of input and output variables. Also, 
one of the assumptions of DEA is that all DMUs of interest are observed and all 
relevant inputs and outputs have been measured (Gajewski, Lee, Botti, Pramjariyakul & 
Taunton, 2009). These choices are made by the relevant researcher and in the majority 
of cases the input and output data were drawn from third party sources (Assaf & 
Jesiassen, 2011; Assaf; 2011; Lu, Wang, Hung & Lu, 2012; Lin, 2012; Steven, Dong & 
Dresner, 2012; Wanke, 2013; Arjomandi & Seufert, 2014). This results in an immediate 
constraint with regard to data availability. For example, Joo & Fowler (2014) in their 
paper “Exploring Comparative Efficiency and Determinants of Efficiency for Major 
World Airlines” drew their data from the “World Airline Report” who in turn appear to 
draw their data from IATA. This resulted in the omission of Ryanair (not an IATA 
member) which by a number of metrics is a major world airline. Lee & Worthington 
(2014) also specifically point out that their input and output selection was restricted by 
data availability. Their data sources were World Air Transport Statistics and ICAO. 
Squalli (2014) also commented on the restricted data availability from IATA and ICAO. 
In a small number of cases (Strycekova, 2011; Ismail & Jenatabadi, 2014) no 
meaningful information on data collection is provided.  
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In an attempt to overcome the data availability issues this researcher undertook 
an extensive investigation in order to establish what data was actually available from 
primary sources so as not to be constrained by what data a third party has chosen to 
report. The data gathered using this process was only constrained by whether or not it 
was provided by the primary source (i.e. airline annual report). For example, Cyprus 
Airways do not provide information on load factors in their Annual Reports therefore 
this data was literally unavailable as opposed to being meta-constrained as a result of a 
third party’s reporting rules. 
Researcher subjectivity is an issue with DEA and Parkin & Hollingsworth 
(1997) found that no guidance is provided on input/output selection. It is too easy for 
the decision maker to skew the results of a DEA analysis by including favourable input 
or output variables. Conversely, unfavourable input or output variables may be excluded 
in order to influence the results. As such input and output selection needs to be as 
objective as possible. Meaningful and objective data are often difficult to obtain due to 
commercial sensitivities. In many of the existing DEA studies this is not an issue as 
they are focusing on the DEA process itself as opposed to the actual subject matter (i.e. 
the comparison of airlines) and as such the input and output variable selection is of 
lesser consequence. In the cases where the objective is the analysis of the subject matter 
the majority of studies source their input and output variable from pre existing sources. 
For example, Kumar & Gulati (2008) obtain their input/output variables from 
amalgamated publications consisting of pre collated data. Similarly, Barbott, Costa & 
Sochirca (2008) used data for their airline based DEA study which was previously 
collated and published by the UK Civil Aviation Authority. This approach to data 
collection results in a pre-emptive constraining of the data set.  
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In this research the 77 DMUs initially selected for analysis were chosen with no 
knowledge of what data were available. This approach was designed to examine the 
feasibility of applying DEA to a set of DMUs for which the availability of input/output 
data was unknown. In essence the airlines to be examined were selected on the basis of 
interest as opposed to the availability of pre collated data. This approach resulted in the 
exclusion of 60 airlines from the analysis due to a lack of suitable data. While the 
analysis itself returned valid results it is clear that there are questions surrounding the 
suitability of DEA for analysis of a specific entity without prior knowledge of data 
availability relative to its peers. This is undoubtedly a limitation of the DEA process as 
its applicability is dependent on very specific data availability. 
 
6.4 Conclusions Relating to Sensitivity, Robustness and Further Analysis 
A sensitivity analysis was performed in order to ascertain how sensitive the three 
DEA models used in this study were. None of the empirical work on DEA reviewed by 
the researcher included any type of sensitivity analysis thus this study builds on the 
previous work in this area. The purpose of a sensitivity analysis is to investigate what 
effect changes in parameter values have on model output (Baird, 1989). Thus a 
sensitivity analysis can be useful for several purposes such as; testing the robustness of 
an optimal solution, identifying critical parameters, making recommendations more 
credible or testing a model for validity or accuracy. The method of sensitivity analysis 
employed by this study was the one-at-a-time method (Downing, Gardner & Hoffman, 
1985) and although it is one of the most commonly used sensitivity analysis methods 
(Eschenbach & Gimpel, 1990) the researcher found no record of its use in a DEA study. 
The results of the sensitivity analysis are presented in Appendix C and demonstrate that 
the models employed are not excessively sensitive to input/output parameter changes.  
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Taking this work a step further, the individual input/output parameters were 
analysed in terms of sensitivity. This analysis builds on all of the previous DEA studies 
reviewed by the researcher. Hamby (1994) identified fourteen potential sensitivity 
indices and subsequently identified a relatively simple index as proposed by Hoffman & 
Gardner (1983) as the best performer in terms of ranking parameter sensitivity (Hamby, 
1995).  The results of this analysis are presented in Chapter 5 and provide sensitivity 
rankings for each input/output parameter according to each DEA model. Each 
input/output parameter, when altered resulted in a change of efficiency score for KLM 
and easyJet. However, the most significant result was the identification of ‘Passengers 
Carried’ as Ryanair’s only sensitive parameter according to the CCR and Pure Scale 
models of DEA. This parameter sensitivity analysis is remarkable as it demonstrates just 
how far ahead of the other airlines examined Ryanair is in terms of efficiency and its 
ability to cope with dramatic changes in its input and output parameters. This goes 
beyond the calculation of efficiency scores and provides a means by which an airline 
can identify which of its input/output parameters have the greatest effect on its relative 
efficiency.  
If several DMU’s are positioned on the efficiency frontier they cannot be ranked 
relative to each other as they have all scored 100 per cent and thus are considered equal 
(Martin & Roman, 2006). A method was proposed by Chen (1997) and Chen & Yeh 
(1998) whereby the frequency of the reference set could be used to measure the 
robustness of an efficient airline relative to its efficient peers. Using this method 
robustness scores were determined for each airline within each DEA model the results 
of which are presented in Chapter 4. The application of this method to a DEA study 
provides a means whereby DMU’s situated on the efficient frontier can be ranked 
relative to each other. This additional ranking process is particularly valuable in 
situations where a large proportion of DMU’s are situated on the frontier. For example, 
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Figure 11 shows the efficiency scores of the seventeen airlines examined in this study 
according to the BCC model. Eight of the airlines that achieved a 100 per cent 
efficiency score are situated on the frontier and hence considered equal. Measuring the 
robustness of these eight airlines allows for them to be ranked relative to each other (see 
Table 13). Although this additional ranking is not in terms of efficiency but rather 
‘suitability for emulation’ it is still a significant development within the field of DEA as 
demonstrated by this study. 
All of the models in this study were output oriented. This is traditionally the 
orientation used in DEA studies as it was originally developed as a measure of 
production efficiency. This gives a measure of how far short an entity is falling from its 
potential maximum output. An analysis using this orientation is valid in terms of 
absolute results. This is sufficient for academic or research purposes. However, given 
the massive shortfalls in outputs found during the course of this study (almost 1000 per 
cent in some cases) it is clear that these would be unreasonable targets in a “real world” 
setting. If DEA were to be used in a practical sense input oriented models would 
provide more targeted controllable results. For example, given the outputs used in this 
study, EBIT and passengers carried, increasing these values would be beneficial but 
clearly achieving these increases would not be a straightforward task. Conversely, a 
reduction in the input values i.e. staff numbers, fuel costs and labour costs while not 
necessarily straightforward is much more attainable. 
This research set out to examine European airlines in an attempt to identify those 
who are leading the field in terms of company performance. This objective was 
achieved and in doing so the airlines examined were benchmarked and their financial, 
operational and strategic activities were compared and best practices or common 
characteristics that may be emulated by the poorer performing airlines were identified.  
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Value was added to the Data Envelopment Analyses through the addition of 
sensitivity analyses on not only the models themselves but on the individual parameters. 
The analyses were further developed through the application of robustness measures to 
the results. Overall this work adds to the body of knowledge not only through the results 
of the actual analyses themselves but by the identification and application of additional 
methodologies which allow for the expansion of the DEA process. 
6.5 Limitations 
One of the greatest limitations of any DEA analysis is that of data availability. 
Given that a comparison is being made the same data must be available for all DMUs 
being examined. This was certainly the case in this study. This becomes even more 
problematic if the research is attempting to focus on a particular airline for which the 
required data may not be available. Depending on the scenario this data may not be 
available due to any number of reasons from commercial sensitivity to the fact that it’s 
just not recorded. This limits the “open” application of DEA as the researcher is very 
much constrained by the availability of data. This results in the very real danger of 
“measuring what you can and not what you should”. 
There were issues surrounding the data used with respect to Lufthansa. The data 
were taken from the Lufthansa Group annual report and as such were “Group Level” 
data. The Lufthansa Group report provides data on the Lufthansa Group, the Lufthansa 
Airline Group and Lufthansa the airline. However, the inputs and outputs required were 
only available at the group level. Despite that it was decided to use the Lufthansa group 
data on the basis that the higher number of DMU’s used the better the quality of the 
results. This was not the case in this instance. The results returned in the case of 
Lufthansa were flawed on account of the data being the only data that were Group 
Level. Other airlines such as SAS and Singapore Airlines also report their figures in this 
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manner and serious consideration should be given when using this data in similar 
analyses. In hindsight the author would not have included the Lufthansa Group data.  
DEA is a non parametric model. While this can be advantageous it does have 
drawbacks. Non parametric methods are generally employed in hypothesis testing as 
opposed to estimating or measuring effects. This combined with the fact that the data 
from annual reports is already a year or two old means that results tend to be “lagging”. 
A recurring limitation of DEA is that of subjectivity regarding the selection of 
inputs and outputs and this study is no different. While attempts were made to identify 
and use the most commonly used inputs and outputs data availability forced the 
researcher into choosing suitable alternatives. In one instance EBIT was chosen as an 
alternative to Tonne KMs as cargo figures were not included. The researcher felt that 
EBIT was a better measure of “production” but other variables such as load factor were 
also available and just as valid, it was rejected on grounds that there was little variation 
in the values with most airlines reporting loads between 65 per cent and 75 per cent. 
Another researcher may have chosen load factor with entirely different results. 
6.6 Further Research 
This study would benefit from a longitudinal approach. This would allow for the 
tracking of changes in efficiency scores over time. This combined with any adjustments 
to the factors in the further analysis section such as number of bases, fleet or passengers 
per staff member would allow for the identification of any correlations that may exist 
between these adjustments and efficiency scores. Such correlations would provide great 
assistance in strategic decision making and planning. This approach could also be 
expanded to include comparisons of efficiency scores with more “traditional” financial 
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performance measures. If correlation was identified this could provide extremely 
targeted identification low and high performing areas of the business. 
There is potential to make further use of a two stage approach to DEA similar to 
that identified by Zhu (2011). This works by taking sets of airlines grouped under 
headings such as European, American, Asian and African. These airlines may be low 
cost, long haul or regional. A data envelopment analysis is performed and the top 
performer from each group is identified. A second analysis is then performed using only 
these top performers. This results in the identification of a worldwide industry leader. 
The potential for a two stage approach is practically endless given the enormous 
variability of the process.  
Given the importance of ancillary revenue to airline profitability it would be 
worthwhile to analyse each revenue stream on its own individual merits. Revenue could 
be broken down into ticket sales, onboard sales, insurance sales, hotels and car rental for 
example. Each value could then be used as an output variable in either a single or two 
stage analysis in order to identify areas which are falling short of their full potential. 
One avenue that was considered by this researcher but discounted on grounds of 
time constraints was the inclusion of qualitative passenger data. This could include 
passenger perception of safety, on time performance, customer service or price. This 
aspect of performance measurement was notably missing from any literature on airline 
performance. Passengers are the end product of an airline and it seems remiss that their 
input is missing from any attempts to measure and compare airline performance with a 
view to improvement. 
There is some scope for a collaborative study from both an academic and 
practitioner perspective. DEA is unusual as it requires one individual to be familiar not 
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only with the relatively complex mathematics of the process (usually an academic) but 
also with the elemental aspects of the airline industry (usually a practitioner). One 
possible outcome of such collaboration may be overcoming the subjectivity issues 
surrounding input and output selection. This has the potential to result in a more 
standardised model of DEA applicable specifically to the airline industry.   
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Author Inputs Outputs 
Zhu (2011) 
 
Two Stage Approach: 
Stage 1 Inputs 
 Cost per available seat mile 
 Salaries per available seat mile 
 Wages per available seat mile 
 Benefits per available seat  
mile 
 Fuel expenses per available 
seat mile 
 
Stage 1 Outputs 
 Load Factor 
 Fleet Size 
 
Stage 2 Outputs 
 Revenue passenger miles 
 Passenger revenue 
Chiou &  
Chen (2006) 
 
 Fuel costs 
 Personnel costs 
 Aircraft cost – including 
maintenance, depreciation and 
interest (12 months) 
 No of flights 
 Seat mile 
 Passenger miles 
 Embarkation passengers 
Greer (2006)  Labour 
 Aircraft fuel 
 Fleet wide aircraft seating 
capacity 
 Available seat miles 
Sheraga  
(2004) 
 Available ton KMs 
 Operating cost 
 Non flight assets 
 Revenue passenger KMs 
 Non passenger revenue 
ton-KMs 
Adler & 
Galany  
(2001) 
 
 Total lending related charges 
 Total passenger charges paid 
to airport 
 Airline station costs including 
ground staff salaries 
 Airline operating costs 
including fuel and crew salaries 
 
 Profit 
 Revenue 
 Total no of passengers 
carried 
 Average load factors 
Two outputs suggested but 
not used: 
 Average delay in 
minutes at each hub airport 
 Minimum connecting 
times at hub airport. 
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Charnes &  
Gallages and 
Li 
(1996) 
 Seat KMs available 
 Cargo ton KMs available 
 Fuel 
 Labour 
 Passenger KMs 
performed 
 
 
 
Sengupta  
(1999) 
 
 Available ton KMs 
 Total operating cost net of 
depreciation and amortization 
costs 
 Total non flight assets defined 
as total assets minus flight 
equipment at cost net of 
depreciation and amortization 
 Revenue passenger KMs 
 Non passenger revenue 
 
Schefczyk  
(1993) 
 Available ton KMs 
 Operating Cost 
 Non flight Assets 
 Revenue passenger KMs 
 Non passenger revenue 
Assaf &  
Josiassen  
(2012) 
 
 Labour 
 Capital 
 Fuel 
 Other operating inputs (total 
assets) 
 Revenue passenger KMs 
 Incidental revenues 
 
Schmidt &  
Sickles (1984) 
 
 Labour index 
 Materials  
 Energy 
 Capital Expenses 
 Tonne KMs performed 
 
Barla  &  
Perelman  
(1989) 
 Labour 
 Aircraft Capacity 
 Tonne KMs performed 
 
Cornwall,  
Schmidt  &  
Sickles (1990)  
 Labour index 
 Materials 
 Energy 
 Capital Expenses 
 Tonne KMs performed 
 
Distexhe &  
Perelman 
(1994) 
 Labour 
 Aircraft Capacity 
 Tonne KMs performed.  
Passengers and Freight 
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Good, Röller 
& Sickles 
(1995) 
 Labour 
 Materials 
 No. of aircraft 
 Revenues 
Oum  & Yu  
(1995) 
 
 Labour 
 Fuel 
 Materials 
 Flight Equipment 
 Revenue passenger KMs 
 Revenue tonne KMs 
 Ancillary output 
 
Baltagi,  
Griffen & 
Rich  
(1995) 
 Capital 
 Labour 
 Tonne KMs performed 
Ahn, Good  &  
Sickles (1997)  
 Labour 
 Materials 
 Fuel 
 Revenues 
 
Coelli,  
Perelman &  
Romano 
(1999) 
 Labour 
 Capital 
 Tonne KMs performed 
 
Barbott , 
Costa & 
Sochirca  
(2008) 
 No of employees 
 No of aircraft 
 Fuel (Gallons consumed) 
 Revenue passenger KMs 
 Revenue tonne KMs 
 Ancillary output 
Barros &  
Peypoch 
(2009) 
 No of employees 
 Operational costs 
 No of aircraft 
 EBIT 
 Revenue passenger KMs 
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Continent Company Country Base 
Annual Report 
Available 
Europe Aegean Airlines Greece Y 
Europe Adria Airlines Slovenia N 
Europe Aer Lingus Ireland Y 
Europe Aerosuit Airlines Ukraine N 
Europe Aigle Azur France N 
Europe Air Astana Kazakhstan Y 
Europe  Air Austral France N 
Europe Air Baltic Latvia N 
Europe Air Berlin Germany Y 
Europe Air Corsica France N 
Europe Air Europa Spain N 
Europe Air France France Y 
Europe Air Malta Malta Y 
Europe Air Moldova Molodva N 
Europe Air Nostrum Spain N 
Europe Air One S.p.A. Italy N 
Europe Alitalia Italy N 
Europe Atlasjet Airlines Turkey N 
Europe Austrain Austria N 
Europe B & H Airlines 
Bosnia &  
Herzogovina 
N 
Europe Belavia Belarus N 
Europe Belle Air Albania N 
Europe Blue Panorama Italy N 
Europe Blue 1 Finland N 
Europe BMI UK N 
Europe BMI Regional UK N 
Europe British Airways UK Y 
Europe Brussels Airlines Belgium N 
Europe Bulgaria Air Bulgaria N 
Europe 
Cargolux Airlines  
International S.A. 
Luxembourg N 
Europe Carpatair Romania N 
Europe CityJet Ireland N 
Europe Condor Germany N 
Europe Corsair International France N 
Europe Croatia Airlines Croatia Y 
Europe Cyprus Airways Cyprus Y 
Europe Czech Airlines Czech Republic N 
Europe Estonian Air Estonia Y 
Europe Euroatlantic Airways Portugal N 
Europe European Air Transport Belgium N 
Europe Eurowings Germany N 
Europe Finnair Finland Y 
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Europe Flybe UK Y 
Europe Freebird Airlines Turkey N 
Europe Iberia Spain Y 
Europe Icelandair Iceland Y 
Europe Intersky Austria N 
Europe Jat Airways Serbia N 
Europe KLM Netherlands Y 
Europe LOT Polish Airlines Poland N 
Europe Lufthansa Germany Y 
Europe Lufthansa CityLine Germany N 
Europe Luxair Luxembourg N 
Europe Malmo Aviation Sweden N 
Europe Meridiana Fly Italy Y 
Europe NIKI Germany N 
Europe Olympic Air Greece N 
Europe Onier Air Turkey N 
Europe Pegasus Airlines Turkey N 
Europe PGA - Portugalia Airlines Portugal N 
Europe SAS Sweden Y 
Europe SATA AirAcores Portugal N 
Europe SATA Internacional Portugal N 
Europe Sky Airlines Turkey N 
Europe SunExpress Turkey N 
Europe Swiss Switzerland Y 
Europe TAP Air Portugal Portugal Y 
Europe Tarom SA Romania N 
Europe THY Turkish Airlines Turkey Y 
Europe TNT Airways SA Belgium N 
Europe TUIfly Germany N 
Europe 
Ukraine International  
Airlines 
Ukraine N 
Europe Virgin Atlantic UK N 
Europe White Coloured By You Portugal N 
Europe Wideroe Norway N 
Table 29. Table of IATA Member Airlines (2011) 
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Model  
Run 
Airline 
No. 
Employees 
(Actual) 
Fuel 
Costs €M 
(Actual) 
Staff Costs 
€M 
(Actual) 
EBIT €M 
(Actual) 
Passengers 
Carried 
Million 
(Actual) 
CCR Model % 
Result (Actual) 
Input Change % 
CCR Model % 
Sensitivity 
Result 
1 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Employees + 10% (8869) 100 
2 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Employees + 20% (9676) 100 
3 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Employees + 50% (12095) 100 
4 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Employees - 10% (7257) 100 
5 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Employees - 20% (6451) 100 
6 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Employees - 50% (4032) 100 
                    
7 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Fuel Cost + 10% (1349.4) 100 
8 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Fuel Cost + 20% (1472.0) 100 
9 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Fuel Cost + 50% (1840.1) 100 
10 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Fuel Cost - 10% (1104.0) 100 
11 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Fuel Cost - 20% (981.4) 100 
12 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Fuel Cost - 50% (613.4) 100 
                    
13 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Staff + 10% (408.7) 100 
14 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Staff + 20% (445.8) 100 
15 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Staff + 50% (557.3) 100 
16 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Staff - 10% (334.4) 100 
17 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Staff - 20% (297.2) 100 
18 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Staff - 50% (185.8) 100 
Table 30. Ryanair CCR Sensitivity Analysis for Input Parameters 
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Model 
Run 
Airline 
No. 
Employees 
(Actual) 
Fuel 
Costs €M 
(Actual) 
Staff Costs 
€M 
(Actual) 
EBIT €M 
(Actual) 
Passengers 
Carried 
Million 
(Actual) 
BCC Model % 
Result (Actual) 
Input Change % 
BCC Model % 
Sensitivity 
Result 
19 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Employees + 10% (8869) 100 
20 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Employees + 20% (9676) 100 
21 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Employees + 50% (12095) 100 
22 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Employees - 10% (7257) 100 
23 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Employees - 20% (6451) 100 
24 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Employees - 50% (4032) 100 
                    
25 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Fuel Cost + 10% (1349.4) 100 
26 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Fuel Cost + 20% (1472.0) 100 
27 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Fuel Cost + 50% (1840.1) 100 
28 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Fuel Cost- 10% (1104.0) 100 
29 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Fuel Cost - 20% (981.4) 100 
30 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Fuel Cost - 50% (613.4) 100 
                    
31 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Staff + 10% (408.7) 100 
32 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Staff + 20% (445.8) 100 
33 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Staff + 50% (557.3) 100 
34 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Staff - 10% (334.4) 100 
35 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Staff - 20% (297.2) 100 
36 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Staff - 50% (185.8) 100 
Table 31. Ryanair BCC Sensitivity Analysis for Input Parameters 
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Model 
Run 
Airline 
No. 
Employees 
(Actual) 
Fuel 
Costs €M 
(Actual) 
Staff Costs 
€M 
(Actual) 
EBIT €M 
(Actual) 
Passengers 
Carried 
Million 
(Actual) 
Pure Scale % 
Result (Actual) 
Input Change % 
Pure Scale % 
Sensitivity 
Result 
37 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Employees + 10% (8869) 100 
38 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Employees + 20% (9676) 100 
39 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Employees + 50% (12095) 100 
40 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Employees - 10% (7257) 100 
41 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Employees - 20% (6451) 100 
42 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Employees - 50% (4032) 100 
                    
43 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Fuel Cost + 10% (1349.4) 100 
44 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Fuel Cost + 20% (1472.0) 100 
45 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Fuel Cost + 50% (1840.1) 100 
46 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Fuel Cost- 10% (1104.0) 100 
47 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Fuel Cost - 20% (981.4) 100 
48 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Fuel Cost - 50% (613.4) 100 
                    
49 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Staff + 10% (408.7) 100 
50 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Staff + 20% (445.8) 100 
51 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Staff + 50% (557.3) 100 
52 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Staff - 10% (334.4) 100 
53 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Staff - 20% (297.2) 100 
54 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Staff - 50% (185.8) 100 
Table 32. Ryanair Pure Scale Sensitivity Analysis for Input Parameters 
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Model 
Run 
Airline 
No. 
Employees 
(Actual) 
Fuel 
Costs €M 
(Actual) 
Staff Costs 
€M 
(Actual) 
EBIT €M 
(Actual) 
Passengers 
Carried 
Million 
(Actual) 
CCR Model % 
Result (Actual) 
Output Change % 
CCR Model % 
Sensitivity 
Result 
55 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 EBIT + 10% (541.1) 100.00 
56 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 EBIT + 20% (590.3) 100.00 
57 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 EBIT + 50% (737.9) 100.00 
58 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 EBIT - 10% (442.7) 100.00 
59 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 EBIT - 20% (393.5) 100.00 
60 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 EBIT - 50% (246.0) 100.00 
                  
 
61 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Pax Carried + 10% (79.2) 100.00 
62 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Pax Carried + 20% (86.4) 100.00 
63 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Pax Carried + 50% (108.0) 100.00 
64 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Pax Carried - 10% (64.8) 100.00 
65 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Pax Carried - 20% (57.6) 100.00 
66 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Pax Carried - 50% (36.0) 96.23 
Table 33. Ryanair CCR Sensitivity Analysis for Output Parameters 
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Model 
Run 
Airline 
No. 
Employees 
(Actual) 
Fuel 
Costs €M 
(Actual) 
Staff Costs 
€M 
(Actual) 
EBIT €M 
(Actual) 
Passengers 
Carried 
Million 
(Actual) 
BCC Model % 
Result (Actual) 
Output Change % 
BCC Model % 
Sensitivity 
Result 
67 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 EBIT + 10% (541.1) 100 
68 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 EBIT + 20% (590.3) 100 
69 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 EBIT + 50% (737.9) 100 
70 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 EBIT - 10% (442.7) 100 
71 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 EBIT - 20% (393.5) 100 
72 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 EBIT - 50% (246.0) 100 
                    
73 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Pax Carried + 10% (79.2) 100 
74 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Pax Carried + 20% (86.4) 100 
75 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Pax Carried + 50% (108.0) 100 
76 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Pax Carried - 10% (64.8) 100 
77 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Pax Carried - 20% (57.6) 100 
78 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Pax Carried - 50% (36.0) 100 
Table 34. Ryanair BCC Sensitivity Analysis for Output Parameters 
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Model 
Run 
Airline 
No. 
Employees 
(Actual) 
Fuel 
Costs €M 
(Actual) 
Staff Costs 
€M 
(Actual) 
EBIT €M 
(Actual) 
Passengers 
Carried 
Million 
(Actual) 
Pure Scale % 
Result (Actual) 
Output Change % 
Pure Scale % 
Sensitivity 
Result 
79 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 EBIT + 10% (541.1) 100.00 
80 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 EBIT + 20% (590.3) 100.00 
81 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 EBIT + 50% (737.9) 100.00 
82 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 EBIT - 10% (442.7) 100.00 
83 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 EBIT - 20% (393.5) 100.00 
84 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 EBIT - 50% (246.0) 100.00 
                    
85 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Pax Carried + 10% (79.2) 100.00 
86 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Pax Carried + 20% (86.4) 100.00 
87 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Pax Carried + 50% (108.0) 100.00 
88 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Pax Carried - 10% (64.8) 100.00 
89 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Pax Carried - 20% (57.6) 100.00 
90 Ryanair 8063 1226.7 371.5 491.9 72 100 Pax Carried - 50% (36.0) 96.23 
Table 35. Ryanair Pure Scale Sensitivity Analysis for Output Parameters 
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Model 
Run 
Airline 
No. 
Employees 
(Actual) 
Fuel 
Costs €M 
(Actual) 
Staff Costs 
€M 
(Actual) 
EBIT €M 
(Actual) 
Passengers 
Carried 
Million 
(Actual) 
CCR Model % 
Result (Actual) 
Input Change % 
CCR Model % 
Sensitivity 
Result 
91 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 Employees + 10% (9117) 84.38 
92 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 Employees + 20% (9946) 84.32 
93 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 Employees + 50% (12432) 84.15 
94 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 Employees - 10% (7460) 84.71 
95 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 Employees - 20% (6630) 93.29 
96 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 Employees - 50% (4144) 100.00 
                    
97 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 Fuel Cost + 10% (1208.5) 84.44 
98 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 Fuel Cost + 20% (1318.3) 74.63 
99 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 Fuel Cost + 50% (1647.9) 74.63 
100 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 Fuel Cost- 10% (988.7) 93.76 
101 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 Fuel Cost - 20% (878.9) 100.00 
102 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 Fuel Cost - 50% (549.3) 100.00 
                    
103 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 Staff + 10% (568.7) 84.44 
104 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 Staff + 20% (621.0) 84.44 
105 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 Staff + 50% (776.3) 84.44 
106 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 Staff - 10% (465.8) 84.44 
107 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 Staff - 20% (414.0) 100.00 
108 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 Staff - 50% (258.8) 100.00 
Table 36. easyJet CCR Sensitivity Analysis for Input Parameters 
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Model 
Run 
Airline 
No. 
Employees 
(Actual) 
Fuel 
Costs €M 
(Actual) 
Staff Costs 
€M 
(Actual) 
EBIT €M 
(Actual) 
Passengers 
Carried 
Million 
(Actual) 
BCC Model % 
Result (Actual) 
Input Change % 
BCC Model % 
Sensitivity 
Result 
109 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 Employees + 10% (9117) 85.87 
110 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 Employees + 20% (9946) 85.87 
111 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 Employees + 50% (12432) 85.87 
112 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 Employees - 10% (7460) 85.87 
113 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 Employees - 20% (6630) 94.93 
114 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 Employees - 50% (4144) 100.00 
                    
115 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 Fuel Cost + 10% (1208.5) 80.33 
116 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 Fuel Cost + 20% (1318.3) 79.35 
117 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 Fuel Cost + 50% (1647.9) 79.35 
118 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 Fuel Cost- 10% (988.7) 93.87 
119 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 Fuel Cost - 20% (878.9) 100.00 
120 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 Fuel Cost - 50% (549.3) 100.00 
                    
121 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 Staff + 10% (568.7) 85.87 
122 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 Staff + 20% (621.0) 85.87 
123 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 Staff + 50% (776.3) 85.87 
124 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 Staff - 10% (465.8) 85.87 
125 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 Staff - 20% (414.0) 100.00 
126 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 Staff - 50% (258.8) 100.00 
Table 37. easyJet BCC Sensitivity Analysis for Input Parameters  
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Model 
Run 
Airline 
No. 
Employees 
(Actual) 
Fuel 
Costs €M 
(Actual) 
Staff Costs 
€M 
(Actual) 
EBIT €M 
(Actual) 
Passengers 
Carried 
Million 
(Actual) 
Pure Scale % 
Result (Actual) 
Input Change % 
Pure Scale % 
Sensitivity 
Result 
127 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 Employees + 10% (9117) 98.27 
128 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 Employees + 20% (9946) 98.20 
129 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 Employees + 50% (12432) 97.99 
130 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 Employees - 10% (7460) 98.27 
131 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 Employees - 20% (6630) 98.20 
132 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 Employees - 50% (4144) 100.00 
                    
133 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 Fuel Cost + 10% (1208.5) 95.72 
134 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 Fuel Cost + 20% (1318.3) 94.05 
135 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 Fuel Cost + 50% (1647.9) 94.05 
136 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 Fuel Cost- 10% (988.7) 95.72 
137 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 Fuel Cost - 20% (878.9) 100.00 
138 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 Fuel Cost - 50% (549.3) 100.00 
                    
139 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 Staff + 10% (568.7) 98.34 
140 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 Staff + 20% (621.0) 98.34 
141 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 Staff + 50% (776.3) 98.34 
142 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 Staff - 10% (465.8) 98.34 
143 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 Staff - 20% (414.0) 100.00 
144 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 Staff - 50% (258.8) 100.00 
Table 38. easyJet Pure Scale Sensitivity Analysis for Input Parameters 
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Model 
Run 
Airline 
No. 
Employees 
(Actual) 
Fuel 
Costs €M 
(Actual) 
Staff Costs 
€M 
(Actual) 
EBIT €M 
(Actual) 
Passengers 
Carried 
Million 
(Actual) 
CCR Model % 
Result (Actual) 
Output Change % 
CCR Model % 
Sensitivity 
Result 
145 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 EBIT + 10% (432.6) 84.46 
146 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 EBIT + 20% (471.9) 85.50 
147 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 EBIT + 50% (589.9) 88.63 
148 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 EBIT - 10% (353.9) 84.44 
149 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 EBIT - 20% (314.7) 84.44 
150 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 EBIT - 50% (196.7) 84.44 
                    
151 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 Pax Carried + 10% (59.9) 92.81 
152 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 Pax Carried + 20% (65.4) 100.00 
153 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 Pax Carried + 50% (81.8) 100.00 
154 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 Pax Carried - 10% (49.1) 76.18 
155 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 Pax Carried - 20% (43.6) 68.82 
156 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 84.4 Pax Carried - 50% (27.3) 46.99 
Table 39. easyJet CCR Sensitivity Analysis for Output Parameters 
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Model 
Run 
Airline 
No. 
Employees 
(Actual) 
Fuel 
Costs €M 
(Actual) 
Staff Costs 
€M 
(Actual) 
EBIT €M 
(Actual) 
Passengers 
Carried 
Million 
(Actual) 
BCC Model % 
Result (Actual) 
Output Change % 
BCC Model % 
Sensitivity 
Result 
157 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 EBIT + 10% (432.6) 93.39 
158 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 EBIT + 20% (471.9) 100.00 
159 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 EBIT + 50% (589.9) 100.00 
160 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 EBIT - 10% (353.9) 84.50 
161 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 EBIT - 20% (314.7) 84.50 
162 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 EBIT - 50% (196.7) 84.50 
                    
163 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 Pax Carried + 10% (59.9) 92.88 
164 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 Pax Carried + 20% (65.4) 100.00 
165 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 Pax Carried + 50% (81.8) 100.00 
166 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 Pax Carried - 10% (49.1) 84.82 
167 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 Pax Carried - 20% (43.6) 84.62 
168 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 85.87 Pax Carried - 50% (27.3) 84.62 
Table 40. easyJet BCC Sensitivity Analysis for Output Parameters 
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Model 
Run 
Airline 
No. 
Employees 
(Actual) 
Fuel 
Costs €M 
(Actual) 
Staff Costs 
€M 
(Actual) 
EBIT €M 
(Actual) 
Passengers 
Carried 
Million 
(Actual) 
Pure Scale % 
Result (Actual) 
Output Change % 
Pure Scale % 
Sensitivity 
Result 
169 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 EBIT + 10% (432.6) 90.43 
170 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 EBIT + 20% (471.9) 85.50 
171 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 EBIT + 50% (589.9) 88.63 
172 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 EBIT - 10% (353.9) 99.93 
173 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 EBIT - 20% (314.7) 99.93 
174 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 EBIT - 50% (196.7) 99.93 
                    
175 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 Pax Carried + 10% (59.9) 99.93 
176 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 Pax Carried + 20% (65.4) 100.00 
177 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 Pax Carried + 50% (81.8) 100.00 
178 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 Pax Carried - 10% (49.1) 89.82 
179 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 Pax Carried - 20% (43.6) 81.32 
180 easyJet 8288 1098.6 517.5 393.3 54.5 98.34 Pax Carried - 50% (27.3) 55.53 
Table 41. easyJet Pure Scale Sensitivity Analysis for Output Parameters 
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Model 
Run 
Airline 
No. 
Employees 
(Actual) 
Fuel Costs 
€M 
(Actual) 
Staff Costs 
€M 
(Actual) 
EBIT €M 
(Actual) 
Passengers 
Carried 
Million 
(Actual) 
CCR Model % 
Result (Actual) 
Input Change % 
CCR Model % 
Sensitivity 
Result 
181 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 Employees + 10% (37310) 12.81 
182 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 Employees + 20% (40702) 12.53 
183 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 Employees + 50% (50877) 12.29 
184 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 Employees - 10% (30526) 13.51 
185 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 Employees - 20% (27134) 13.74 
186 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 Employees - 50% (16959) 17.82 
                    
187 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 Fuel Cost + 10% (2970) 12.17 
188 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 Fuel Cost + 20% (3240) 11.36 
189 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 Fuel Cost + 50% (4050) 9.46 
190 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 Fuel Cost- 10% (2160) 15.49 
191 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 Fuel Cost - 20% (2160) 15.49 
192 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 Fuel Cost - 50% (1350) 24.48 
                    
193 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 Staff + 10% (2310) 13.10 
194 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 Staff + 20% (2520) 13.10 
195 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 Staff + 50% (3150) 13.10 
196 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 Staff - 10% (1890) 13.10 
197 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 Staff - 20% (1680) 13.10 
198 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 Staff - 50% (1050) 13.68 
Table 42. KLM CCR Sensitivity Analysis for Input Parameters 
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Model 
Run 
Airline 
No. 
Employees 
(Actual) 
Fuel 
Costs €M 
(Actual) 
Staff Costs 
€M 
(Actual) 
EBIT €M 
(Actual) 
Passengers 
Carried 
Million 
(Actual) 
BCC Model % 
Result (Actual) 
Input Change % 
BCC Model % 
Sensitivity 
Result 
199 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 Employees + 10% (37310) 48.86 
200 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 Employees + 20% (40702) 48.86 
201 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 Employees + 50% (50877) 48.86 
202 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 Employees - 10% (30526) 48.86 
203 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 Employees - 20% (27134) 49.52 
204 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 Employees - 50% (16959) 53.53 
                    
205 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 Fuel Cost + 10% (2970) 47.95 
206 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 Fuel Cost + 20% (3240) 47.41 
207 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 Fuel Cost + 50% (4050) 47.41 
208 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 Fuel Cost- 10% (2160) 50.77 
209 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 Fuel Cost - 20% (2160) 50.77 
210 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 Fuel Cost - 50% (1350) 59.89 
                    
211 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 Staff + 10% (2310) 48.86 
212 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 Staff + 20% (2520) 48.86 
213 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 Staff + 50% (3150) 48.86 
214 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 Staff - 10% (1890) 48.86 
215 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 Staff - 20% (1680) 48.89 
216 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 Staff - 50% (1050) 51.25 
Table 43. KLM BCC Sensitivity Analysis for Input Parameters 
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Model 
Run 
Airline 
No. 
Employees 
(Actual) 
Fuel 
Costs €M 
(Actual) 
Staff Costs 
€M 
(Actual) 
EBIT €M 
(Actual) 
Passengers 
Carried 
Million 
(Actual) 
Pure Scale % 
Result (Actual) 
Input Change % 
Pure Scale % 
Sensitivity 
Result 
217 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 Employees + 10% (37310) 26.22 
218 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 Employees + 20% (40702) 25.62 
219 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 Employees + 50% (50877) 25.15 
220 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 Employees - 10% (30526) 27.46 
221 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 Employees - 20% (27134) 27.74 
222 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 Employees - 50% (16959) 33.29 
                    
223 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 Fuel Cost + 10% (2970) 25.38 
224 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 Fuel Cost + 20% (3240) 23.96 
225 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 Fuel Cost + 50% (4050) 19.96 
226 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 Fuel Cost- 10% (2160) 30.05 
227 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 Fuel Cost - 20% (2160) 30.50 
228 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 Fuel Cost - 50% (1350) 40.87 
                    
229 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 Staff + 10% (2310) 26.82 
230 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 Staff + 20% (2520) 26.82 
231 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 Staff + 50% (3150) 26.82 
232 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 Staff - 10% (1890) 26.82 
233 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 Staff - 20% (1680) 26.80 
234 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 Staff - 50% (1050) 26.70 
Table 44. Pure Scale Sensitivity Analysis for Input Parameters 
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Model 
Run 
Airline 
No. 
Employees 
(Actual) 
Fuel 
Costs €M 
(Actual) 
Staff Costs 
€M 
(Actual) 
EBIT €M 
(Actual) 
Passengers 
Carried 
Million 
(Actual) 
CCR Model % 
Result (Actual) 
Output Change %  
CCR Model % 
Sensitivity 
Result 
235 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 EBIT + 10% (377.3) 13.44 
236 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 EBIT + 20% (411.6) 13.78 
237 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 EBIT + 50% (514.5) 14.79 
238 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 EBIT - 10% (308.7) 12.77 
239 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 EBIT - 20% (274.4) 12.43 
240 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 EBIT - 50% (171.5) 12.36 
                    
241 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 Pax Carried + 10% (21.7) 14.09 
242 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 Pax Carried + 20% (23.6) 15.03 
243 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 Pax Carried + 50% (29.6) 18.57 
244 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 Pax Carried - 10% (17.7) 12.12 
245 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 Pax Carried - 20% (15.8) 11.80 
246 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 13.1 Pax Carried - 50% (9.9) 8.26 
Table 45. CCR Sensitivity Analysis for Output Parameters 
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Model 
Run 
Airline 
No. 
Employees 
(Actual) 
Fuel 
Costs €M 
(Actual) 
Staff Costs 
€M 
(Actual) 
EBIT €M 
(Actual) 
Passengers 
Carried 
Million 
(Actual) 
BCC Model % 
Result (Actual) 
Output Change %  
BCC Model % 
Sensitivity 
Result 
247 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 EBIT + 10% (377.3) 52.86 
248 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 EBIT + 20% (411.6) 56.86 
249 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 EBIT + 50% (514.5) 70.84 
250 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 EBIT - 10% (308.7) 44.85 
251 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 EBIT - 20% (274.4) 40.85 
252 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 EBIT - 50% (171.5) 30.39 
                    
253 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 Pax Carried + 10% (21.7) 49.75 
254 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 Pax Carried + 20% (23.6) 50.61 
255 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 Pax Carried + 50% (29.6) 54.31 
256 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 Pax Carried - 10% (17.7) 47.96 
257 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 Pax Carried - 20% (15.8) 47.14 
258 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 48.86 Pax Carried - 50% (9.9) 47.14 
Table 46. KLM BCC Sensitivity Analysis for Output Parameters 
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Model 
Run 
Airline 
No. 
Employees 
(Actual) 
Fuel 
Costs €M 
(Actual) 
Staff Costs 
€M 
(Actual) 
EBIT €M 
(Actual) 
Passengers 
Carried 
Million 
(Actual) 
Pure Scale % 
Result (Actual) 
Output Change %  
Pure Scale % 
Sensitivity 
Result 
259 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 EBIT + 10% (377.3) 25.43 
260 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 EBIT + 20% (411.6) 24.43 
261 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 EBIT + 50% (514.5) 20.88 
262 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 EBIT - 10% (308.7) 28.47 
263 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 EBIT - 20% (274.4) 30.43 
264 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 EBIT - 50% (171.5) 40.67 
                    
265 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 Pax Carried + 10% (21.7) 28.33 
266 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 Pax Carried + 20% (23.6) 29.71 
267 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 Pax Carried + 50% (29.6) 34.20 
268 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 Pax Carried - 10% (17.7) 25.26 
269 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 Pax Carried - 20% (15.8) 23.71 
270 KLM 33918 2700 2100 343 19.7 26.82 Pax Carried - 50% (9.9) 17.52 
Table 47. KLM Pure Scale Sensitivity Analysis for Output Parameters 
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Appendix D  Data Collation and Normalisation 
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Airline 
No. 
Employees 
Currency of 
Original Data 
Original Fuel 
Costs 
(Million) 
Euro 
Value Fuel 
Costs   
(Million)  
Original Staff 
Costs 
(Million) 
Euro Value 
Staff Costs 
(Million) 
Original 
EBIT 
(Million) 
Euro Value 
EBIT (Million) 
+ €71 Millon  
Total No 
Passengers 
Ryanair 8063 € 1226.7 1226.7 371.5 371.5 420.9 491.9 72.00M 
Flybe 2949 £ 106.4 127.5 74.8 89.6 100.9 191.9 7.60M 
Aer Lingus 3491 € 3491.0 288.7 288.7 260.6 172.8 243.8 9.50M 
British Airways 40000 £ 3000.0 3594.0 2100.0 2515.8 591.0 779.0 34.25.00M 
Estonian Air 283 € 24.8 24.8 10.0 10.0 -13.5 57.5 679000.00 
Lufthansa 115335 € 30000.0 30000.0 6700.0 6700.0 734.0 805.0 100.60M 
Meridiana Fly 2011 € 197.0 197.0 114.0 114.0 103.0 174.0 4.40M 
Turkish Airlines 18489 TRY 4000.0 1632.0 1600.0 677.3 595.3 666.3 33.00M 
Croatia Airlines 1136 HRK 337.0 44.0 234.5 31.0 -1.8 69.2 1.89M 
easyJet 8288 £ 917.0 1098.6 432.0 517.5 269.0 393.3 54.50M 
Icelandair 1179 ISK 22000.0 138.6 228000.0 143.6 47000.0 100.6 1.75M 
Air Astana 3358 € 132.0 132.0 62.6 62.6 50.9 121.9 3.00M 
Aegean 1615 € 184.0 184.0 86.0 86.0 -30.7 40.3 6.50M 
Air Berlin 9113 € 1000.0 1000.0 475.0 475.0 -70.0 1.0 35.30M 
KLM 33918 € 2700.0 2700.0 2100.0 2100.0 272.0 343.0 19.70M 
TAP Air 
Portugal 
8661 € 717.0 717.0 524.0 524.0 18.1 89.1 9.75M 
Finnair 7467 € 555.0 555.0 477.0 477.0 -60.9 10.1 8.00M 
Table 48. Collated and Normalised Data from Airline Annual Reports
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